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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE CYBERCRIME TRIANGLE:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF OFFENDER, VICTIM, AND PLACE
By
SINCHUL BACK
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Rob T. Guerette, Major Professor
Information technology can increase the convergence of three dimensions of the
crime triangle due to the spatial and temporal confluence in the virtual world. In other
words, its advancement can lead to facilitating criminals with more chances to commit a
crime against suitable targets living in different real-world time zones without temporal
and spatial borders. However, within this mechanism, cybercrime can be discouraged if the
offender is properly handled, the target/victim is well guarded, or the place is effectively
managed (Wilcox & Cullen, 2018, p. 134). In fact, Madensen and Eck (2013) assert that
only one effective controller is enough to prevent a crime. Given this condition of the crime
triangle, it must be noted that each of these components (the offender, the target, and the
place) or controllers (i.e., handler, guardian, and manager) can play a pivotal role in
reducing cybercrime.
To date, scholars and professionals have analyzed the phenomenon of cybercrime
and developed cybercrime prevention strategies relying predominantly on cybercrime
vii

victimization (suitable targets) but have yet to utilize the broader framework of the crime
triangle commonly used in the analysis and prevention of crime. More specifically, the
dimensions of cybercrime offenders, places, or controllers have been absent in prior
scientific research and in guiding the establishment and examination of cybercrime
prevention strategies. Given this gap, much remains to be known as to how these
conceptual entities operate in the virtual realm and whether they share similarities with
what we know about other crimes in the physical world. Thus, the purpose of this study is
to extend the application of the “Crime Triangle,” a derivative of Routine Activity Theory,
to crime events in the digital realm to provide scholars, practitioners, and policy makers a
more complete lens to improve understanding and prevention of cybercrime incidents. In
other words, this dissertation will endeavor to devise a comprehensive framework for our
society to use to form cybersecurity policies to implement a secure and stable digital
environment that supports continued economic growth as well as national security.
The findings of this study suggest that both criminological and technical
perspectives are crucial in comprehending cybercrime incidents. This dissertation attempts
to independently explore these three components in order to portray the characteristics of
cybercriminals, cybercrime victims, and place management. Specifically, this study first
explores the characteristics of cybercriminals via a criminal profiling method primarily
using court criminal record documents (indictments/complaints) provided by the FIU law
library website. Second, the associations between cybercrime victims, digital capable
guardianship, perceived risks of cybercrime, and online activity are examined using
Eurobarometer survey data. Third, the associations between place management activities
and cybercrime prevention are examined using “Phishing Campaign” and “Cybersecurity
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Awareness Training Program” data derived from FIU’s Division of Information
Technology.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: CYBERCRIME
The Internet and information technology systems have dramatically changed the
way individuals communicate, interact, and conduct business around the globe. Computer
and information systems play a pivotal role in government and industry sectors as well as
individuals’ lives. As such, many benefits have been derived from such technological
evolutions. However, such technological advancements have also provided cybercriminals
great opportunities with efficient tools to exploit online users. In other words,
cybercriminals are abusing these opportunities to use illicit means to achieve their criminal
goals. At the same time, these criminal activities inspire fear in online users and lead to a
lack of trust in the security and safety of information technology and e-commerce (Taylor,
Fritsch, Liederbach, Saylor, & Tafoya, 2019). Furthermore, the Information Age has
unleashed numerous challenges and obstacles for law enforcement officials to effectively
enforce and prosecute cybercrime. This is because cutting-edge technologies can assist
cybercriminals in reducing their risk of detection and apprehension by law enforcement.
The Department of Justice asserts that cybercrime is one of the most serious
national security threats facing the United States in recent years (Scams and Safety, 2016).
Moreover, the U.S. government implements cybersecurity policies against cyber threats
(e.g., cyberattacks, cyber espionage, intellectual theft, and phishing, etc.) as one of their
top priorities. In fact, cybercrime poses a threat to national security and the nation’s
economic well-being as well as individual online users’ properties. For example, due to
Chinese hackers in 2013, China obtained vast amounts of intellectual information, in
particular sensitive information regarding the new US stealth jet, and the F-35 Lightning
1

jet (Grabosky, 2015). In another example, a Connecticut man was charged with stealing
bitcoins in an online phishing scheme (Scams and Safety, 2016). The defendant posted fake
links to online marketplaces on dark web forums. These fake links directed online users to
a fake login page that looked like legitimate login pages. When online users tried to log in,
he stole their usernames and passwords, which were utilized to steal the bitcoins. The point
in highlighting these two cases is that crime in cyberspace can pose grave threats to the
greater society.
In fact, the 2018 FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) Report (Internet
Crime Complaint Center, 2018) indicates that a total of 351,936 Internet crime incident
reports were received from cybercrime victims in the United States with reported financial
losses exceeding $2.7 billion. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (Lewis,
2006, 2018) estimated that cyber threats (cyberattack, internet fraud, intellectual espionage,
cybercrime, and cyberterrorism) cost approximately 1 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in the United States, with a loss of $600 billion per year. Also, these cyber
threats create opportunity costs such as service and employment disruptions and the
additional cost of securing networks, insurance, and recovery from cyber threats (Lewis,
2006, 2018). Consequently, cyber threats, directly and indirectly, hurt the economic wellbeing and national security of the United States.
Statement of the Problem
Technological advancement has fundamentally altered the paradigm of crime and
criminal justice on a worldwide scale (Taylor et al., 2019). Information technology can
increase the convergence of three dimensions (i.e., cyber offender, cybercrime victim, and
cyberspace) of the crime triangle due to spatial and temporal confluence in the virtual world.
2

In other words, technology’s advancement provides criminals with more chances to
commit crimes against suitable targets living in different real-world time zones without
temporal and spatial borders. However, within this context, cybercrime can be discouraged
“if the cyber-adversary is handled, the target/victim is guarded, or the place is effectively
managed” (Wilcox & Cullen, 2018, p. 134). Madensen and Eck (2013) assert that only one
effective controller is enough to prevent a crime incident Given this condition of the crime
triangle, it must be noted that each of these components (the offender, the target, and the
place) or controllers (i.e., handler, guardian, and manager) can play a pivotal role in
reducing cybercrime. In this sense, each component of the crime triangle should be
thoroughly explored as a key factor in crime control strategies within the context of
cybercrime.
Many scholars have attempted to understand and identify the causes of crime events
and victimization in a physical environment using Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine
activity theory (RAT).

In an attempt to explain rising crime trends observed in

metropolitan areas, the RAT approach was presented to identify the causal role that
opportunity plays in crime (Felson, 1987). Cohen and Felson (1979) contended that crime
occurs when there is a convergence in space and time of three elements: (1) a motivated
offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) the absence of a capable guardian against crime.
Thus, crime can increase (or decrease) even when the number of potential offenders
remains the same. In recent years, the RAT perspective has been applied to the explanation
of cybercrimes including cyberstalking, cyber-harassment, cyberbullying, internet fraud,
identity theft, hacking, and malware infection (see Morgan, Maguire, & Reiner, 2012).
However, to date, while a growing body of research in criminology and crime science has
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focused on cybercrime victimization, this literature provides little insights into the causal
mechanisms that underlie cybercrime offense and cyber-place management (Pratt,
Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010).
In a broad sense, Clarke and Eck (2005) argue that traditional criminology attempts
to improve understanding of the psychological and social forces that cause individuals to
become criminals. Traditional criminology tries to account for why some individuals are
more likely than others to commit criminal and deviant acts from the offender perspective
(e.g., motivation). In contrast, crime science focuses on addressing how individual criminal
propensity and environmental factors “facilitate, promote, or provoke, criminal events”
(Cockbain & Laycock, 2017, p. 2; Junger, Laycock, Hartel, & Ratcliffe, 2012). Cockbain
and Laycock (2017) explain that crime science’s theoretical underpinning derives from
opportunity theories of crime such as routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), the
rational choice theory (Clarke & Cornish, 1985), and crime pattern theory (Brantingham
& Brantingham, 1981). Indeed, crime science can provide tentative answers to questions
regarding how individual criminal propensity or environmental conditions affect a
potential offender’s decision to engage in crime.More specifically, crime science can
account for how the changes of these conditions (e.g., cybersecurity settings, virtual
environment) result in a reduction of cyber threats as a cybercrime prevention strategy
through identifing and suppressing cybercriminal opportunity structure.
As a method of crime science, the crime triangle framework can clearly help
address crime problems in our society (Cockbain & Laycock, 2017). For example, over the
last few decades, crime science research has demonstrated that the problem analysis
triangle (crime triangle) framework could be applied as a useful analytic method to help in
4

everyday police work (Scott, Eck, Knutson, & Goldstein, 2008). The crime triangle
framework consists of the three sides representing the offender, the target, and place and is
grounded in routine activity theory’s dynamics (a motivated offender, a suitable target, and
the absence of a capable guardian). Despite the significance of the application of the crime
triangle to crime, there is no empirical study that applies this theoretical framework to
establish effective cybercrime control strategies.
Purpose of the Study
To date, scholars have analyzed the phenomenon of cybercrime and have developed
cybercrime prevention strategies mainly focusing on cybercrime victimization (suitable
target) and have largely ignored the other aspects of the crime triangle (i.e., cybercrime
offenders, places, or controllers). That is, the determinants of cybercrime offenders, places,
or controllers have been less often applied in establishing cybercrime prevention strategies.
Given this, the existing literature might be unable to reveal the exact causal factors of
cybercrime. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to propose the application of the
crime triangle framework to crime events in the digital realm to provide scholars,
practitioners, and policy makers a crime science lens to better understand cybercrime
events. As a result, this dissertation will endeavor to devise a comprehensive framework to
form a more effective blueprint of cybercrime control and cybersecurity policies to better
ensure a secure and stable digital environment that supports continued economic growth as
well as national security.

5

The Significance of the Study
The present study may help in the development of an effective cybercrime
prevention strategy. First, this study can provide a comprehensive perspective of a
cybercrime event, which can be utilized as a starting point to design cybercrime prevention
and detection strategies based on the crime triangle framework. The use of this framework
can help identify the patterns of crimes. In particular, by illuminating the situations and the
places that the cybercrimes occurred, and noting the techniques used to commit the
cybercrimes (Baker & Wolfer, 2003).
Second, Hirschfield (2017) asserts that “the targeting of interventions is
intrinsically linked to the ‘mechanisms’ considered to be responsible for generating crime”
(p. 493). The present study is an early initiative of the evaluation research conducted by
place management strategies on the targeting of cybercrime interventions to reduce
cybercrime in the public sector (a public university). Specifically, the current study
evaluates an intervention that attempts to boost the resilience of potential victims (e.g.,
through cybersecurity awareness training). The findings of this evaluation can provide new
insights into the usefulness of crime prevention in the online domain and people’s
behaviors in response to cyber threats in virtual settings.
Third, the present study is significant because it addresses a gap in the
criminological literature. The current research of RAT by Cohen and Felson (2016) focused
only on suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians. Nevertheless, they examined
whether changes in routine activities at the aggregate level would be positively related to
reducing crime rates; however, Cohen and Felson did not provide any measure of
perpetrator’s situational conditions and opportunities (Madero-Hernandez & Fisher, 2012;
6

Wilcox, Land, & Hunt, 2003). In a related sense, previous tests of RAT did not focus on
clarifying the sources of criminal situational factors and opportunity factors or illustrating
why individuals vary in their propensity to commit crimes. Using the cybercriminal
profiling approach, this study will be able to gain insights for individual differences in
criminal inclinations.
Overview of Chapters
This dissertation will be organized as follows. Chapter 2 will review the literature
on the topic examined in this study. Also, this chapter will explore the current trend in
cybercrime over the past 18 years. A review of the literature illustrates the links between
(1) environmental criminology, and (2) routine activity theory and the crime triangle
framework to explicate crime events. A discussion of the theoretical background of routine
activity theory and the crime triangle for cybercrime events will follow. The second chapter
will conclude with identification of gaps in the research literature and the importance of
the application of the crime triangle framework for cybercrime study.
Chapter 3 will explore the characteristics of cybercriminals via a criminal profiling
method using criminal record documents (i.e., indictments/complaints) retrieved from the
Law School library website at Florida International University (FIU). This study will use
descriptive/regression models to provide answers to the questions of which, what, where,
and how cybercrime offenders attack suitable targets in the United States. After conducting
the cybercriminal profiling analysis, this study will delineate sociodemographic factors,
situational factors, opportunity factors, attack severity, and damage type.

7

In Chapter 4, the associations between cybercrime victims, digital capable guardian,
perceived risk of cybercrime, and online activity will be examined using Eurobarometer
survey data. A cross-sectional research design is used to reveal the nature of cybercrime
victimization. The findings of the correlation and regression analyses will be discussed;
and then a discussion and conclusion, and limitations of the study will close this chapter.
In Chapter 5, the association between place management activities and cybercrime
prevention will be examined using “Phishing Campaign” and “Cybersecurity Awareness
Training Program” related data derived from FIU’s information technology division. This
phase will employ a quasi-experimental design. The data will be analyzed by t-test, Mann
Whitney U-test, and logistic regression methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the
phishing prevention training program at FIU. The results of the effectiveness of the
cybercrime prevention program will then be presented. This chapter will end with a
discussion of the findings, conclusions, and limitations of this study.
Chapter 6 will conclude the dissertation. This chapter will discuss the results of all
three phases of the study. The aim is to ground the findings in the existing literature. The
chapter will also include a discussion of policy implications for policy makers and
practitioners in the United States and internationally. Specifically, this discussion will
focus on how to enforce the strengths of the crime triangle framework in the digital realm
to combat and deter sophisticated cybercriminals.

8

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW: CYBERCRIME AND THE CRIME TRIANGLE
This dissertation attempts to magnify the lens of the cybercrime triangle framework
to contribute to the literature on cybercrime prevention. Three bodies of research are
examined in this chapter. First, an overview of cybercrime is presented that describes the
current issues, trends, and problems in the cybercrime literature so that it may help the
audience have a better understanding of the cybercrime phenomenon. Second, this chapter
focuses its attention on environmental criminology and crime analysis, as well as the
historical roots of the environmental perspective. Third, previous research will be discussed
regarding routine activity theory, the crime triangle framework, and cybercrimes. To that
end, the goal of this chapter is to explain the applicability of the crime triangle framework
to cybercrime research.
Cybercrime
In order to better understand cybercrime issues in the United States, this section
provides definitions of criminal offenses in the digital space, classifications of cybercrime,
and overall trends in cybercrime.
Defining the Terms. This section briefly discusses the definition of cybercrime,
computer crime, hacking, internet fraud, intellectual espionage, and cyberterrorism.
Cybercrime studies are an emerging field of research; therefore, there are still significant
inconsistencies in defining these types of offenses. Thus, this section can contribute to
filling a gap in the existing literature through providing the most common and solid
definitions of the cybercrime types stated above. First, cybercrime is a “computer-assisted
9

crime,” which involves computers in a supporting role in the commission of a crime, while
computer crime is a “computer-focused crime,” which is the direct result of computer
technology, such as hacking (Albanese, 2011; Brenner, 2010; Choi, 2015; Computer
Misuse Act 1990; Holt, Burruss, & Bossler, 2015). Second, hacking is defined as a deviant
act that is “analogous to the crime of trespass; it engages in a violation of a use restriction
on the property that is committed by someone who has no right to access the property”
(Brenner, 2010, pp. 50-1). Third, cyberterrorism is defined as “the use of digital technology
or computer-mediated communications to cause harm and force social change against a
civilian population based on ideological or political beliefs” (Brenner, 2010; Britz, 2010;
Foltz, 2004; Holt et al, 2015, p. 10; Pollitt, 1998). Fourth, the U.S. Department of Justice
defines intellectual espionage (economic/industrial espionage) as an act that violates the
value of intellectual property and trade secrets related to the economic well-being and
national security under the Economic Espionage Act of 1998 (Economic Espionage, 2016).
In this regard, many cybercriminologists assert that cybercrime primarily encompasses
computer crime, hacking, internet fraud, cyberterrorism, and cyber espionage (Brenner,
2010; Choi, 2015; Holt et al., 2015). Thus, cybercrime will be utilized as an umbrella term,
which includes the aforementioned concepts.
Classifications of Cybercrime. Cybercrime can be classified into four categories:
(1) cyber-trespassing, (2) cyber-deception/theft, (3) cyber-pornography, and (4) cyberviolence (Choi, 2015; Wall, 2001, pp. 3-7):
•

Cyber-trespassing is the act of accessing unauthorized property/facility or
causing damage including hacking, cyberattack, defacement, or viruses.
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•

Cyber-deception/theft is defined as stealing money and property or personal
information (e.g., credit card fraud, identity theft, online auction fraud,
economic espionage).

•

Cyber-pornography is an activity that breaches laws on obscenity and
decency

(e.g.,

child

pornography,

online

sexual

exploitation,

possession/distribution of child pornography online).
•

Cyber-violence is defined as the act of committing psychological harm or
the intention to hurt others, thereby breaching laws concerning the
protection of the person (e.g., hate speech, cyber terrorism, cyberstalking).

Overall Trends in Cybercrime. In parallel with the increased use of information
technology by virtually every citizen, new cyber threats are emerging. For example,
information technologies are currently utilized to perform many traditional criminal acts
such as child pornography, financial crimes, espionage, sexual exploitation, stalking,
identity theft, drug trafficking, organized crimes, and terrorist activities (Taylor et al.,
2019). In this regard, the characteristics of cybercriminals are very diverse. Moreover, the
exponential growth of information technology and digital infrastructure may provide
cyber-perpetrators new methods (e.g., Windows/Mac/Android malware, malware
distribution methods, scams) and create cybercriminal-friendly environments with black
markets (e.g., dark web) and digital currencies (e.g., Bitcoin).
Given these complexities, it is important to review the overall trends in cybercrime
in the digital realm. Thus, this section is intended to inform our general knowledge
concerning the scope and prevalence of cybercrime in the United States using a literature
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review of the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) Annual reports from 20012018.
Table 1. 2018 Crime Types
By Victim Count
Crime Type

Victims Crime Type

Victims

Non-Payment/Non-Delivery

65,116

Other

10,826

Extortion

51,146

Lottery/Sweepstakes

7,146

Personal Data Breach

50,642

Misrepresentation

5,959

No Lead Value

36,936

Investment

3,693

Phishing/Vishing/Smishing/Pharming

26,379

Malware/Scareware/Virus

2,811

BEC/EAC

20,373

Corporate Data Breach

2,480

Confidence Fraud/Romance

18,493

IPR/Copyright and

2,249

Counterfeit
Harassment/Threats of Violence

18,415

Denial of Service/TDoS

1,799

Advanced Fee

16,362

Ransomware

1,493

Identity Theft

16,128

Crimes Against Children

1,394

Spoofing

15,569

Re-shipping

907

Overpayment

15,512

Civil Matter

768

Credit Card Fraud

15,210

Charity

493

Employment

14,979

Health Care Related

337

Tech Support

14,408

Gambling

181

Real Estate/Rental

11,300

Terrorism

120

Government Impersonation

10,978

Hacktivist

77

The FBI’s IC3 provides the public with reported information of cybercrime
victimization and offenses nationwide and worldwide. According to the FBI’s most recent
IC3 report (IC3, 2018), in 2018 there were 34 major types of cybercrime victimization
reported by online users (see Table 1). As hot topics for 2018 the FBI’s IC3 highlights the
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top three cybercrime types with the highest reported financial loss as follows: Business
Email Compromise (BEC)1, Ransomware2, and Extortion3.
An annual number of Internet crime victimization/monetary loss from 2000-2018
reported to the FBI’s IC3 is shown in Figure 1. In 2000, the total number of cybercrime
incidents was 16,838. This number increased to 351,937 by 2018. Overall, the number of
Internet crime incidents reported to the FBI’s IC3 has gradually increased between 2000
and 2018. More specifically, Figure 1 indicates that the count of cybercrime victimization
in the United States increased from 2001-2005 (16,838 to 231,493) and peaked in 2009
with 336,655 cybercrime victims. Since then it has remained relatively steady from 20102018 (from 303,809 to 351,937). Also, Figure 1 shows that the amount of monetary loss in
the United States steadily went up from 2001 to 2008 (from $17.8 million to $264.6
million), and abruptly increased in 2009 (47.2% increase from 2008) with a loss of $559.7
million, and increased once again from 2010 to 2014 (from $559.7 million to $800 million),
and finally peaked in 2018 with a monetary loss of $2.7 billion.

“BEC” is a criminal act that targets businesses in collaboration with foreign suppliers and/or businesses
regularly performing wire transfer payments in order to achieve monetary gain (IC3, 2018).
1

“Ransomware” is committed by using a type of malicious software that prohibits authorized access to a
computer system and data base until ransom is paid by crypto currency; extortion refers a criminal act that
a cyber offender demands something of value from a victim by threatening physical or financial harm or
data breach (IC3, 2018).
2

“Extortion” is unlawful extraction of money or property through intimidation or undue exercise of
authority (IC3, 2018).
3
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Figure 1. Cybercrime Victimization and Monetary Loss in the United States (2000 – 2018);
Source. – Adapted from 2001 - 2018 Internet Crime Report (2018)
Having reviewed cybercrime victimization/monetary loss trends, attention can now
be directed at the cybercrime typologies mostly utilized over the last 18 years. Cybercrimes
have been committed in various forms (see Figure 2 and Note). Interestingly, Figure 2
indicates that auction fraud, non-delivery fraud, and Nigerian letter fraud were pervasively
committed by perpetrators from 2001-2011. Since 2011, certain types of fraud (i.e., auction
fraud4, non-delivery fraud5, Nigerian letter fraud6, credit/debit card fraud, confidence fraud,

“Auction fraud” is defined as “a fraudulent transaction or exchange that occurs in the context of an online
auction site” (IC3, 2009).
4

“Non-delivery fraud” can be defined as an incident in which customers purchase goods in online markets,
but they never receive it (IC3, 2018).
5

“Nigerian letter fraud” is defined as an act in which Nigerian criminals send an unsolicited email message,
in which the criminals give the recipient guarantee to obtain a vast amount of money. At the same time, the
criminals request the recipient to transmit “an advance fee or offer identity, credit card or bank account
information” (IC3, 2007).
6
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investment fraud, business fraud, check fraud, etc.: also see Note for definitions) decreased.
Currently, blackmail/extortion/FBI scams, romance scams, auto auction fraud, real estate
fraud, and ransomware scams mostly occurred in the United States followed by Canada,
India, United Kingdom, Australia, France, Brazil, Mexico, China, Japan, and the
Philippines. In short, this section indicates that the pattern of cybercrime typologies has
been diverse and constantly fluctuating over the past 17 years. In this regard, it might have
been influenced by information technology advancements and changes in social contexts
(Taylor et al., 2019).

Figure 2. The Cybercrime Typology Trends; Source. – Adapted from 2001 - 2018
Internet Crime Report (2018); The numbers on the vertical axis indicate percent of total
cybercrime victimization reported to the FBI’s IC3 center.
To better justify the need for an advanced blueprint for responding and effectively
controlling cybercrime, first, it is essential to understand the underlying theoretical
mechanisms involved. The subsequent section introduces the main theoretical framework
that leads to the development of the novel problem-solving strategy proposed in the
dissertation. Specifically, I will discuss elements such as environmental criminology,
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routine activities theory, and the original crime triangle. This review of literature helps
prime the conceptualization of my novel cybercrime triangle framework that will better
ensure a more secure digital environment.
Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis
As environmental criminologists, Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) stated that
criminal events can occur when offenders, victims or criminal targets, and laws converge
in specific settings at certain temporal and spatial patterns. Also, they contended that the
nature of the immediate environment facilitates criminal behavior. For example, the type
of target, level of surveillance, and ease of access can affect the offender’s choice of target.
Furthermore, environmental criminology attempts to explain that criminogenic individuals
are not only a major causal factor of crime events, but also criminogenic elements of certain
places encourage potential perpetrators to engage in criminal activities (Wortley &
Townsley, 2016). Environmental criminology also explains that criminal behavior and
crime patterns are grounded in situational factors and the location of criminogenic
environments. In other words, crime opportunities and other environmental characteristics
shape criminal activities or deter crime in a given location. Given the situational and
criminogenic environments, if crime analysts and practitioners can reveal certain crime
patterns (e.g., offender activity spaces, movement patterns and temporal patterns), they will
gain powerful investigative tools to control and prevent crime. For instance, crime patterns
can be demonstrated visually using graphs, tables and maps in terms of their sociodemographic, temporal and spatial qualities through analyzing crime data and police
reports (Wortley & Townsley, 2016). In a broad sense, it also can allow us to identify that
a crime free environment sustainably reduces opportunity for the occurrence of cybercrime.
16

Along this line, Emig, Heck, and Kravitz (1980) asserted that crime analysis is
employed to investigate pertinent information about crime patterns and crime trend
correlations. From this perspective, crime analysts and practitioners are able to predict
emerging crime problems, which initiates the development of crime prevention strategies.
Thereafter, they can provide tactical advice to law enforcement on “criminal investigations,
development of resources, planning, evaluation, and crime prevention” (Wortley &
Townsley, 2016, p. 157). In the following sections, the historical roots of the environmental
criminology perspective are reviewed in order to help readers comprehensively understand
the cybercrime triangle framework.
The Historical Roots of Environmental Criminology
The initial idea of environmental criminology dates back to the 1960s. Elizabeth
Wood (1961) grounded security guidelines with the use of vandal-proof materials and
designs for facilities. Moreover, Wood (1961) and Jacobs (1961) found that design and
surveillance for facilities were key factors for enhancing the security of a residence. In
short, more ‘eyes on the street’ (surveillance) can potentially decrease criminal
opportunities in a given location. In 1971, Ray Jeffery provided the concept of Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), which explained crime control
through the design of physical environments (e.g., increasing surveillance on the street or
natural access control by doors, fences, and shrubs) so that the rewards for criminal
activities were reduced, while the risk increased. Newman (1973) then proposed the
concept of defensible space, which explained a relationship between residential
environments and crime. Newman explained that defensible space is considered as a crimefree area or territory where it is well managed by the owner or residents of that property.
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Thus, he asserted that defensible space promotes the use of design to enhance the safety of
a residence and reduce crime opportunities in that space.
In the wake of the development of environmental criminology, several crucial
frameworks also arose to address specific conditions that manifest in both space and time.
The first framework was routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), which
postulates three unique elements (motivated offender, suitable target, and absence of
capable guardian) that could potentially facilitate criminal offending. 7 The second
framework, crime pattern theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981), helped explain why
specific spatial and temporal artifacts conducted and inflated crime incidents. For example,
certain places such as bus stops, train stations, and parks attract both potential offenders
and victims in the same location, so these types of places can facilitate crime. The third
framework was rational choice theory, which laid the groundwork for the criminal
decision-making process (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). In this regard, criminals offend since
crime offers the most effective instruments of achieving desired advantages such as money,
material commodities, prestige, sexual gratification, and domination of victims (Cornish &
Clarke, 2002; Gilmour, 2016). The last framework was Clarke’s (1995) situational crime
prevention theory, which posits that crime opportunities can be suppressed by increasing
the risks of arrests, target hardening, and reducing the rewards of criminal behavior. Reyns
(2010) asserted that if the virtual environment can be made less hospitable by cyber place
managers (e.g., information technology officials) for crime, cybercrime incidents will
decline. For example, through target hardening techniques like installing firewalls and

7

The specific elements are discussed in the next section.
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online security programs, cyber place managers can protect online environments against
malware infection, Trojan Horse programs, and unauthorized access (hacking).
Before discussing crime triangle and cybercrime triangle frameworks, the
following section will explain the concepts of RAT that underlie theoretical mechanisms
of the cybercrime triangle proposed in this dissertation.
Routine Activity Theory
The initial idea of the crime triangle framework was expanded from Cohen and
Felson’s RAT. Thus, in this section, routine activity theory is explored to provide a
fundamental backdrop for creating the new theoretical application of the cybercrime
triangle framework. As discussed above, Cohen and Felson (1979) claimed that routine
activities theory could explain why crimes occurred. Cohen and Felson’s traditional routine
activities theory consists of three major tenets: (a) motivated offenders, (b) suitable targets,
and (c) the absence of capable guardianship (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Cohen, Felson, &
Land, 1980; Felson, 1987; Kennedy & Forde, 1990; Massey, Krohn, & Bonati, 1989;
Miethe, Stafford, & Long, 1987; Roncek & Maier, 1991; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger,
1989). Routine activity theory explains that crime events occur when these three elements
– a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian – converge
in time and space (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2017). For instance, burglars may
target their homes of choice, and these places are easily accessed in the absence of capable
guardianship particularly during the daytime on a weekday (Tilley & Sidebottom, 2017)
since changes to the activity of any one of these three elements can affect the likelihood of
crime occurrence.
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In the literature, a vast majority of the routine activities theoretical research has
focused on the crime victimization since RAT has mainly been considered as a
victimization theory rather than offending theory. However, the routine activities
perspectives can be utilized to explain individual criminal behavior as well as victimization
patterns. Since it clearly explains why certain criminals choose certain victims/targets and,
furthermore, why certain victims are likely to be selected as attractive victims/targets at
specific places and time (Chan, Heide, & Beauregard, 2011; Graney & Arrigo, 2002).
According to the routine activities approach, the first element of RAT is a motivated
offender. Motivated offenders are defined as any individuals who might commit illegal
offenses due to certain motivations (Clarke & Felson, 1993; Coster, Estes, & Mueller,
1999). Clarke and Felson (1993) and Clarke and Cornish (1985) contended that criminals
can make a rational decision for the target selection process with which they attempt to
maximize profit and minimize pain. The second element of RAT is a suitable target. Some
scholars (e.g., Clarke & Felson, 1993; Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, 1981; De Coster, Estes,
Mueller, 1999, p. 24) argued that the suitable target element of RAT can be broken into
two components: “the proximity of potential targets to motivated offenders, and the
material or symbolic attractiveness of a person or property target. The proximity of
potential targets to motivated offenders is regarded as the physical proximity between
potential targets and offenders. An attractive target is defined as an object that is not only
small and expensive but also is insecure (De Coster, Estes, Mueller, 1999). The third
element of RAT is a capable guardian. The primary guardians in society are individuals
“whose presence, proximity and absence make it harder or easier to carry out criminal acts”
(Hollis, Felson, & Welsh, 2013, p. 66).
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Felson (1986) and Eck (1994) extended the guardianship concept along with three
distinguishable elements: “(1) handlers – those who look after potential offenders to keep
them out of trouble; (2) place managers – those who look after places to keep them secure
from intruders; and (3) guardians (in a narrower sense) looking after particular crime
targets” (Hollis et al., 2013, p. 66). All of these elements were contributors to building on
the present crime triangle framework which is applied as the theoretical perspectives of the
current study. Most of these elements are discussed in more detail in the next section.
In recent years, routine activity theory has been tested by scholars (e.g., Choi, 2008,
2015; Choi, Scott, & LeClair, 2016; Choi & Lee, 2017; Hinduja & Patchin, 2008; Holt &
Bossler, 2008, 2013; Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns, 2013, 2015; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Reyns,
Henson, & Fisher, 2011) to explain different types of cybercrime, including cyberbullying,
cyberstalking, cyber-harassment, Internet fraud, identity theft, and malware infection.
Similar to the work of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) RAT, Hindelang, Gottfredson,
and Garofalo (1978) proposed lifestyle exposure theory, which focuses on victims’ daily
social interactions, rather than concentrating on the characteristics of individual offenders
or individual causal variables. Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) found that
individuals’ vocational and leisure activities are directly associated with crime
victimization. In short, Hindelang et al. (1978) asserted that differential lifestyle patterns
are correlated with “role expectations, structural constraints, and individual and subcultural
adaptations” (Choi, 2008; Hindelang et al., 1978 p. 245).
Cybercriminologists (e.g., Choi, 2008, 2015; Choi, Scott, & LeClair, 2016; Choi &
Lee, 2017; Hinduja & Patchin, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2008, 2013; Marcum, Higgins,
Ricketts, 2010; Reyns, 2013, 2015; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Reyns et al., 2011) argue that
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Cohen and Felson (1979) incorporated lifestyle-exposure theory (Hindelang et al., 1978)
into their routine activities theory by expanding upon the existent tenet: individual’s
vocational and leisure activities. In Cohen and Felson’s (1979) view, target suitability is
created and influenced by an individual’s vocational and leisure activities, which reflect
the individual’s routine activities such as social interaction and social activities (Choi,
2008). Also, Cohen and Felson (1979) developed two other tenets – capable guardianship
and motivated offender – and integrated these two tenets with the suitable target tenet from
lifestyle-exposure theory. Choi (2008), Holt, Burruss, and Bossler (2015), and Reynes et
al. (2011) argued that routine activities theory could be extended from the lifestyleexposure theory to explain crimes in online settings.
The Cybercrime Triangle Framework
As noted earlier, the crime triangle framework can be a very powerful investigative
tool to predict emerging crime problems and develop crime prevention strategies. The
crime triangle framework helps reveal the characteristics of crime scene places, and
offenders and victims along with their socio-demographic, and temporal and spatial
features, providing tactical advice to law enforcement for their crime prevention strategies.
The crime triangle framework can explain how crime problems are created by
opportunities instead of what makes people criminal (Clarke & Eck, 2005). This triangle
consists of an inner triangle (i.e., offender, target/victim, and place) and an outer triangle
(i.e., handler, guardian, and manager; see Figure 3). Spelman and Eck (1989) have
portrayed the problem of the triangle as “wolf,” “duck” and “den” problems (Clarke & Eck,
2005). Wolf problems occur when repeat offenders attack a series of different targets at
different places. Duck problems occur when repeat victims consistently are attacked by
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different offenders. Den problems occur when different offenders and different targets
encounter each other at the same place where management strategies are poor. Clarke and
Eck (2005) explain that crime occurs when all “wolfs,” “ducks” and “dens” must be present
and all outer elements (handler, guardian, manager) are ineffective or absent. The following
sections explain each tenet of the cybercrime triangle framework.

Figure 3. The Problem Analysis Triangle; Source. – Adapted from POP Center (2018)
and Clarke & Eck (2005).
Offender. Individual cyber criminals are motivated by various factors
(Grabosky, 2015). Grabosky (2015) asserted that cyber criminals’ motivation might be
complex, or mixed. Plenty of motivated cyber criminals seek to catch valuable targets in
the form of online users who connect to the Internet with little or no computer security
(Grabosky, 2015). Normally, cyber criminals are motivated by their desire to control
cyberspace and computer networking systems (Grabosky, 2015). Cyber criminals
randomly plant malicious viruses and worms on social networking sites (SNSs) or web
forum sites to receive individuals’ information when online users click a pop-up window
or fake link (Choi, 2008; Piazza, 2006, p.54). However, the characteristics of individuals
engaged in online interpersonal crimes (cyber harassment and cyberstalking) may be
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different from that of cybercrime perpetration in hacking, cyberattack, and internet fraud.
Online interpersonal criminals intentionally search for attractive targets on SNSs or online
dating sites. Cyber harassers and stalkers may seek to “exert power over their victims” by
invoking fear (McGrath & Casey, 2002, p. 89). By increasing their knowledge of the
victim’s information, the perpetrator can terrorize and control them. Specifically, cyber
harassers and stalkers utilize or post on SNSs a victims’ personal information, such as
mobile phone numbers, addresses, e-mail addresses, personal preferences, and photos
(including nude photos) in order to threaten their victims’ lives (McGrath & Casey, 2002).
Target/victim. Like suitable targets in physical space, many suitable targets exist
in the cyber world. A person’s vocational and leisure activities are the key factors in making
him/her a suitable target (Choi, 2008). During online activities in cyberspace, individuals
can persistently interact with other users through online toolkits and smartphone apps such
as e-mail, online messengers, and SNSs. Also, online users set up their lifestyle by joining
“various cyber communities based on their interests, such as cyber-café’s, clubs, and
bulletin boards” (Choi, 2008, p. 13). Similarly, individuals may also join smartphone apps
for dating and SNSs. They are more likely to be suitable targets for online sexual crime
than someone who does not join such smartphone apps. Likewise, individuals who use
unsecured public wireless networks are more likely to be suitable targets from
cybercriminals because of the inherent vulnerabilities (Brody, Gonzales, & Oldham, 2013).
For example, cyber perpetrators can monitor and store sensitive user data (e.g., login
credentials, bank account information, and social security numbers) and stolen data can be
utilized to conduct fraudulent activity or sell the information to other criminals for
monetary gain.
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Place. In the physical world, the place could mean a point in space (such as a
building, park, intersection, or classroom) or an area (such as a country, city, police district,
neighborhood, or census block). Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) argued that there are
certain “hot spots” in the physical world where crimes routinely occur. Sherman et al.
(1989) explained that the places (such as bars, liquor stores, bus depots, homeless shelters,
downtown malls, and theaters) are regarded as the hot spots for crime in the physical world.
In the cyberworld, virtual places exist in as real a context as the physical world does – like
websites/web pages or social networking sites (Madensen & Eck, 2013). Some cyber
places can have extraordinarily high-crime rates, whereas most places have little or no
crime. Some scholars (e.g., Kennedy, Caplan, & Piza, 2011; Madensen & Eck, 2013;
Spelman & Eck, 1989; Weisburd, 1997) contend that this sort of disparity in the real world
can be created by characteristics of places. Like the physical world’s crime hotspots, Holt
(2013) posited that there exist some hot spots in the virtual world. For example, certain
places (e.g., dark web forums, online dating websites, pornography websites) may have
high-cybercrime levels, while other online places do not (Choi, 2015; Holt, 2013; Holt &
Bossler, 2008).
Handler. The term handler refers to someone who can control motivated offenders
(Wortley & Townsley, 2016). For example, parents, siblings, teachers, friends, and spouses
of the offender can be considered as handlers. They are in the position to discourage deviant
actions (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Madensen and Eck (2013) argue that handlers can
emotionally support a potential offender and keep them away from committing a crime.
For example, individuals with higher levels of parent attachment and parental supervision
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or school attachment are less likely to engage in cyber deviant behaviors (Back, Soor, &
LaPrade, 2018).
Guardian. The term guardian refers to someone who protects suitable targets or
victims from offenders (Wortley & Townsley, 2016). In the physical world, lighting in
areas and using locks, alarms and barriers are regarded as a means of target hardening for
the capable guardian (Choi, 2008; Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell, & Pease, 2004). Cybercriminologists (e.g., Choi, 2008, 2015; Choi, Scott, & LeClair, 2016; Choi & Lee, 2017;
Hinduja & Patchin, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2008, 2013; Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2010;
Reyns, 2013, 2015; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Reyns et al., 2011) stress that digital capable
guardianship is one of the most crucial elements to prevent cybercrimes. Digital capable
guardianship is defined as a preventative tool that helps online users secure themselves
from cyber criminals. Choi (2008) clarified that there are two types of digital capable
guardians: physical capable guardians and cybersecurity guardians. The physical capable
guardians – antivirus software, firewalls, and antispyware – protect computer systems and
personal assets against computer criminals. The cybersecurity guardian – online security
settings and security applications on SNSs – protects online users against interpersonal
criminals online. Both physical capable guardianship and cybersecurity guardianship are
associated with target hardening to hamper the efforts of criminals.
Manager. The term manager refers to someone who takes care of places or
locations and protects them from offenders (Wortley & Townsley, 2016). In this regard,
place managers can be defined as individuals (e.g., landlords, a bus driver, flight attendants,
cybersecurity staffs in an organization, bar owners) who have some responsibility for
controlling deviant behavior in the specific location (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Madensen and
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Eck (2013) assert that place managers implement crime-control strategies at proprietary
places through their authority to handle their properties. Using certain strategies, such as
protecting vulnerable targets, not attracting potential offenders, and effectively controlling
behavior, place managers can alter high-crime places into crime-free environments. In
online settings, place managers (e.g., information security officials or internet providers)
can impact high-cybercrime places (e.g., dark net, social network site, online dating sites,
or school website) and the ecology of cybercrime in their institutions. Then managers in
these places can set appropriate cybersecurity settings and behavioral expectations, and
enforce rules of conduct, or provide guardians. Also, place managers can provide
employees and students or customers cybercrime intervention programs (e.g.,
cybersecurity training or cybercrime awareness program) which may enhance the
protection of potential victims.
In short, plenty of motivated offenders and suitable victims are at zero distance
from one another in virtual space. If place managers and capable guardians are ineffective
and inactive in protecting online users, cybercrimes can be remotely committed from across
the country or even across the world (Yar 2005, p. 415; Hazelwood & Koon-Magnin, 2013).
The next section discusses previous studies of the crime triangle framework and crimes.
Studies of the Crime Triangle Framework and Crimes
Despite public need to apply the crime triangle framework to crime events, to date,
few studies have utilized this theoretical framework to analyze crime scenes and
characteristics of offenders and victims. Some studies (Eck, 2002; Mandensen, 2007;
Roberts, 2007) found that increasing place manager awareness and interventions in drugrelated crimes and violent crimes in bars can play a critical role in preventing these types
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of crimes. Other studies (e.g., Block & Block, 1995; Clarke, 1997; Danner, 2003; Eck &
Weisburd, 2015; Felson, 1995; Mazerolle, Kadleck, & Roehl, 1998; Mazerolle & Roehl,
1998; Sherman, 1995) indicated that lack of active place management can be related to
facilitating crime (Mandensen, 2007). Likewise, Pires, Guerette, and Stubbert (2014)
examined whether kidnappings for ransom demonstrate connections to the crime triangle
framework. They found that there were spatial-temporal and other concentrations for
kidnappings in Colombia, South America. Yet, no studies to date have applied the crime
triangle framework to cybercrime events. Thus, the current study is the first to establish
and apply the tenets of the cybercrime triangle framework (i.e., offenders, victims,
guardians, place, and place management) to the phenomenon of cybercrime.
In contrast, for the past two decades, scholars have extended the application of
routine activity theory to virtual settings. Consistent with the application of RAT to
physical crime, researchers tested whether suitable targets with unguarded exposure to
motivated offenders are more likely to be victims of cybercrime than others. For example,
Back (2016), Bossler and Holt (2009), Choi (2008), Choi and Lee (2017), Holt and Bossler
(2008; 2013), Reyns (2013), Reyns et al. (2011), and Marcum, Higgins, and Ricketts (2010)
have found that risky online lifestyles contribute to increasing cybercrime victimization.
Holt and Bossler (2008) focused on using a lifestyle-routine activities framework to
examine the causal factors for cyber harassment victimization among college students.
Their study found that risky online activities increased college students’ risks for cyber
harassment (Holt & Bossler, 2008). Also, Reyns, Henson, and Fisher (2011) empirically
tested the cyber-lifestyle routine activities theory for assessing cyberstalking and cyber
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harassment. The findings of the study indicate that online risk-taking behaviors increase
the likelihood of cyberstalking victimization.
In addition, several studies (i.e., Back, 2016; Choi, 2008; Choi & Lee, 2017; Choi,
Choo, & Sung, 2016; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holt & Bosseler, 2013; Leukfeldt, 2014;
Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Hutchings & Hayes, 2008; Marcum, Ricketts, & Higgins, 2010;
Reyns, 2013; Reyns, 2015; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Reyns et al., 2011) have attempted to
empirically examine the associations between capable guardianship – especially digital
capable guardianship (i.e., anti-virus software and cybersecurity settings) – and cybercrime
victimization. The findings of these studies are mixed. In this regard, the findings of some
studies (see Back, 2016; Choi, 2008; Choi & Lee, 2017; Choi, Choo, & Sung, 2016;
Hutchings & Hayes, 2008; Reyns, 2013; Reyns & Henson, 2016) indicated that the
presence of digital capable guardians reduced the likelihood of cybercrime victimization,
whereas the results of other studies (see Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holt & Bosseler, 2013;
Leukfeldt, 2014; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Hutchings & Hayes, 2008; Marcum et al, 2010;
Reyns & Henson, 2016; Reyns et al., 2011; Reyns, 2013; Reyns, 2015) demonstrated that
digital capable guardianship did not mitigate cyber threats.
In accordance with the social science literature, most published research is limited
to explain how opportunities for crime in both physical space and cyberspace are created
through daily activities because the previous works mainly have examined two elements
of the crime triangle: cybercrime victimization and digital capable guardianship (MaderoHernandez & Fisher, 2013). Therefore, these limitations may preclude estimating the
relative significance of routine activity compared to other theories and preclude isolating
specific routines that consistently predict cybercrime offending, place, and victimization
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(Madero-Hernandez & Fisher, 2012). The current study attempts to overcome these
limitations of the previous studies. As an integrated theoretical framework, this study
focuses on establishing and empirically examining the groundwork of the cybercrime
triangle framework in collaboration with several theoretical concepts such as RAT, rational
choice, situational crime prevention, and place management. Even though this study is
unable to simultaneously examine the three elements of the crime triangle, it strives to
respectively explore these three components in order to portray the characteristics and
natures of cybercriminals, cybercrime victims, and place management in order to reveal
the causal factors of cybercrimes.
Conclusion
This chapter broadly explored the relevant research on cybercrime and the
cybercrime triangle framework. The chapter began by providing an overview of
cybercrime and cybercrime trends. Then, following the overview, several theoretical
frameworks relevant to the current study and the existing cybercrime research were
explored. This review identified a significant gap in the literature concerning the
application of routine activity theory to the criminological analysis of cybercrime.
Specifically, previous research has explored the cybercrime phenomenon and developed
cybercrime prevention strategies relying predominantly on cybercrime victimization and
digital capable guardianship in line with the routine activity perspective. No studies have
yet applied the broader framework of the crime triangle commonly used in the analysis and
prevention of crime to an online setting. Thus, this dissertation seeks to expand the
application of the “Crime Triangle,” a derivative of routine activity theory, to cybercrime.
In an effort to fill this gap in the literature, the following chapters (3, 4, and 5) strive to
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independently explore these components in order to portray the characteristics and natures
of cybercriminals, cybercrime victims, and place management.
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CHAPTER 3
MOTIVATED CYBER OFFENDER AND CRIME OPPORTUNITY:
AN APPLICATION OF THE CYBERCRIMINAL PROFILING MODEL
Examining the crime scene is the backbone to discover the motives, opportunities,
and means for potential perpetrators to commit crimes (Backer & Wolfer, 2003; Clarke,
1995; Cornish, 1993). In this regard, it can offer law enforcement officials with “the exact
times and kinds of offenses, the offenders’ methods of operation, the targets of attack,
crime generators, hot spot locations and the underlying causes of crime” (Backer & Wolfer,
2003, p. 48). For example, police officers analyze the problem and causal factors of
offenses in their jurisdiction, and then they can efficiently assign the department’s
personnel and assets to tackle hot spot locations. Recently, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) profiling model has been utilized to investigate common characteristics
or patterns of criminals (e.g., demographics, motives, behaviors) to various crime scenes.
Moreover, practitioners and scholars point out that the FBI’s profiling technique is a robust
tool to explain particular correlates between offender’s behaviors and victim’s patterns
(Scott, Lambie, Henwood, & Lamb, 2006).
This chapter aims to provide scholars, practitioners, and policy makers an empirical
application of the criminal profiling technique to help them better understand
characteristics of cybercriminals and the cybercrime scene. Thus, this study strives to
propose a new integrated framework of cybercriminal profiling, called the “Situational (S),
Sociodemographic Background (SBA), Cybercrime Opportunity (CO): SSBACO
Cybercriminal Profiling Model.” It reflects multidisciplinary methods such as: (1) FBI
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criminal profiling, (2) the conceptual frameworks of cybercriminal profiling provided by
Kirwan (2011), Kwan and Stephens (2008), Nachreiner (2015), and Warikoo (2014), (3)
the variables derived from the work of Beauregard, Lussier, and Proulx (2008), and (4)
the Codebook for the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset Version 1.1 provided by
Maness, Valeriano, and Jesen (2019). The following sections discuss research on
cybercriminal profiling along with sociodemographic, situational, and crime opportunity
factors. Also, these sections discuss the research questions and hypotheses to be tested, the
methods employed, and the results of the analysis.
Background
Cybercriminal Profiling. Criminal profiling is a multi-disciplinary forensic
technique in which a profiler offers personality, behavioral, and demographic
characteristics of offenders based on the analysis of crime scenes (Bartol, 1996; Douglas
& Burgess, 1986; Hicks & Sales, 2006; Turvey, 1999). Turvey (1999) asserts that modern
criminal profiling is grounded in the forensic sciences, criminology, psychology, and
psychiatry. There are two major criminal profiling approaches – “crime scene profiling”
and “investigative psychology” – utilized to explain crime scene characteristics and causal
factors of crimes (see Scott et al., 2008). Despite the development of criminal profiling
frameworks, there still exists an ongoing debate regarding the scientific rigor and accuracy
of criminal profiling (Dowden, Bennell, & Bloomfield, 2007). Moreover, few empirical
studies have been conducted to examine the validity and credibility of criminal profiling
investigation procedures. In addition, according to a systematic review of the profiling
literature provided by Dowden et al. (2007), there is an abundance of non-statistical and
conceptualized research in the literature, but few quantitative studies exist. Dowden and
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colleagues (2007) point out that researchers from criminology, forensic psychology,
forensic psychiatry, sociology, and medical fields have strived to provide evidence that
offender profiling is a useful tool for prioritizing suspects and establishing new lines of
scrutiny in serial crime investigation over the past four decades. Ten major types of crime
(e.g., serial homicide, rape, arson, homicide, burglary, unspecified, mixed, random
violence, child crimes) have been examined (see Dowden et al., 2007) to discover the
motives, opportunities, and means for potential perpetrators to commit crimes.
Attention now turns to the cybercriminal profiling approach, which may be of great
use in uncovering the characteristics of cyber offenders and cybercrime opportunities.
Cybercriminal profiling is defined as the examination of cyber offender behavior that
includes “an educated attempt to provide specific information as to the type of individual
who committed a certain crime. A profile is based on characteristics and patterns or factors
of uniqueness that distinguishes certain individuals from the general population”
(Jahankhani & Al-Nemrat, 2012; Warikoo, 2014, p 173). Currently, the FBI utilizes
inductive profiling with statistical analysis in order to identify patterns of cybercriminals,
especially cyber fraud profiles (Jahankhani & Al-Nemrat, 2012; Warikoo, 2014). In line
with the FBI’s cybercriminal profiling method, forensic psychology offender profiling
techniques also have been used as a cybercrime investigation tool (Jahankhani & AlNemrat, 2012; Warikoo, 2014). Although several researchers and practitioners have made
interdisciplinary attempts (e.g., criminology, psychology, computer science) to provide a
cybercriminal profiling framework, there is still a lack of agreement on empirical and
scientific frameworks of cybercriminal profiling (Jahankhani & Al-Nemrat, 2012;
Hadzhidimova & Payne, 2019).
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Research on Criminal Profiling. Several researchers (see Blanchette, 2002;
Holmes & Holmes, 2008; Beauregard et al., 2008) have postulated a direct relationship
between the personal characteristics of an offender (e.g., sociodemographic elements),
personal attributes of the offender (e.g., antisocial attitudes, low self-control, impulsivity,
substance abuse problems, dysfunctional family relationships), the method of criminal
operation, the signature of the offender, and the characteristics of crime scenes. They
hypothesize that personal attributes of the offender, situational conditions, and criminal
opportunity are directly associated with crime scene characteristics (Beauregard, Lussier,
& Proulx, 2008). Mokros and Alison (2002) suggested the “homology hypothesis,” which
explains when more than two offenders have similar background characteristics and
criminal opportunities, they could show similar criminal behaviors in the crime scene.
Currently, a large body of literature has focused on research pertaining to criminal
profiling of serial killing, rape, robbery, burglary, and terrorist attacks. For example,
Woodhams and Toye (2007) investigated the relationship between offender behavioral
consistency, offender behavioral distinctiveness, and homology between offender
characteristics and behavior using serial commercial robberies. The work of Woodhams
and Toye (2007) concluded that offender behavioral consistency and distinctiveness were
statistically significant predictors for commercial robbery typologies; however, there was
no significant relationship between previous convictions, sociodemographic background
factors, and commercial robbery typologies.
Several studies (Prentky et al., 1989; Safarik, Jarvis, & Nussbaum, 2000; Van
Patten & Delhauer, 2007) have attempted to examine serial sexual homicide cases to
examine associations between four independent variables (offender race, offender age,
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relationship of offender to victim, and distance of offender’s residence from victim) and a
set of dependent variables (crime scene, victim characteristics, and specific offender
behaviors). Safarik and associates (2000) and Van Patten and Delhauer (2007) found that
younger individuals (e.g., ages 20 to 35) were more likely to engage in serial sexual
homicide than older individuals. Prentky and his colleagues (1989) found that serial
murderers had a greater prevalence of violent fantasy in sexual homicide.
Using data from New Zealand, Scott, Lambie, Henwood, and Lamb (2007)
compared the offense behaviors of 114 convicted stranger rapists with previous criminal
convictions. Scott and colleagues found that intruding stranger rapists were more likely to
have prior criminal convictions than non-intruding stranger rapists. Similarly, Davies,
Wittebrood, and Jackson (1998) and Jackson, van den Eshof, and de Kleuver (1997)
examined the relationship between the rapist’s behavior and previous conviction
respectively with 210 stranger rape cases out of 322 rape cases in the Netherlands. Both
studies found that rapists who were extremely aggressive towards their victims were more
likely to have previous convictions for theft and robbery than rapists who were not
extremely violent.
In the existing literature, several scholars (Bennell & Corey, 2008; Goulette &
Tardif, 2018; Sarangi & Youngs, 2006; Van Patten & Delhauer, 2007) have strived to
explain the relationship between crime locations and the type of crime committed. Sarangi
and Youngs (2006) compared the distance travelled to offense location of 30 burglars,
committing a total of 150 crimes in India. Consistent with burglar patterns in North
America, UK, and Australia, they found that burglars in India travelled close to where he
or she lives. Bennell and Corey (2008) examined the applicability of geographic profiling
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in the context of terrorism in order to identify the location of unknown terrorists. They
pointed out that the terrorists had several anchor points (a residence or place of work) to
avoid discovery. Van Patten and Delhauer (2007) pointed out that the very young and the
very old are less likely to travel to commit sexual homicide than adults between the ages
of 26-34, who travel an average 10 miles or more. Goulet and Tardif (2018) analyzed an
offender’s journey to property crimes using 7,807 burglary offense cases. Specifically, they
examined the relationship between crime locations and generated paths based on crime
pattern theory. The findings indicated that a high percentage of crimes occurred very close
to the areas that offenders were familiar with.
Research on Cybercriminal Profiling. In efforts to better identify potential
suspects when examining crime scenes, researchers (e.g., Douglas & Burgess, 1986;
Douglas, Ressler, Burgess, & Hartman, 1986; Godwin, 2002) have attempted to establish
a scientific and reliable profiling process for crime in the physical environment. Similarly,
some scholars (e.g., Casey, 2012; Jahankhani & Al-Nemrat, 2012; Nykodym, Taylor, &
Vilela 2005; Warikoo, 2014; Yu, 2013) have proposed cybercriminal profiling techniques,
including inductive and deductive profiling (Shinder & Cross, 2008; Tennakoon, 2011;
Warikoo, 2014, p. 173):
Inductive profiling method utilizes the criminal profile database that “contain
extensive data on criminals committing a type of crime in order to analyze the data,
establish correlations, and deduce the characteristics common to statistically large
number of offenders committing a specific type of crime. Deductive profiling
method employs analysis of forensic evidence and victim profiling to determine the
motive and criminal characteristics.”
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In line with these two types of profiling methods, Shaw (2006) reviewed recent
empirical studies of insider computer attacks garnered from the inductive profiling method
and then explored illustrative case studies using a deductive profiling approach. However,
it is important to note that the application of criminal profiling techniques for cybercrime
research is still in its infancy compared to the typical criminal profiling research. Therefore,
this study seeks to provide the conceptual and operational frameworks of a cybercriminal
profiling technique, so that law enforcement can accurately identify and apprehend cyber
offenders by scrutinizing important suspect and crime scene characteristics.
SSBACO Cybercriminal Profiling Framework
Based on environmental criminological theories (e.g., the routine activity/rational
choice/situational crime prevention perspectives), and the crime triangle framework,
certain circumstances and crime opportunities can affect offender’s decision-making
pertaining to selecting targets and committing crime. In offering a conceptual framework
for examining individual cyber offending, this paper draws on a body of work that has
investigated the role of crime opportunities and situational factors as a source of
explanation for crime patterns. Specifically, building on the previous works (see
Beauregard & associates, 2008; Braga & Clarke, 2014; Cozens & Grieve, 2014; Leclerc,
Wortley, & Dowling, 2016; Moreto, 2019; Osgood et al., 1996; Wortley 2001) the study
in Chapter 3 provides a scientific method for better understanding the relationship between
cyber offenders and situational and crime opportunities through proposing the SSBACO
Cybercriminal Profiling Model.
This SSBACO Cybercriminal Profiling model is composed of Situational Factors
(S), Sociodemographic Background Factors (SBA), and Characteristics of Cybercrime
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Opportunity Factors (CO). According to criminal opportunity perspective (see Beauregard
et al., 2008), two different variables (pre-crime situation and characteristics of the
cybercriminal opportunity) can be considered as a criminal opportunity. First, situational
factors or pre-crime situational factors may include (1) alcohol or drugs use prior to the
offense, (2) pornography use prior to the offense, (3) being angry about
something/someone, and (4) presence of a political objective. Second, characteristics of
cybercrime opportunity factors may consist of (1) intimate relationship with the victim, (2)
stranger victim, (3) presence of a weapon, (4) presence of co-offenders, (5) risk of being
apprehended, (6) time spent with the victim, and (7) level of resistance of the victim or
target (e.g., cybersecurity level). According to Beauregard and colleagues’ (2008) study,
sociodemographic background factors can include age, ethnic origin, nationality,
cybercriminal type, and cybercrime recidivist. In addition, severity scale of cybercrime
damage8 and damage type9 (also see Appendix C) are reflective of cybercrime scene or
individual cyber offending characteristics. Thus, the following sub-sections briefly discuss
the literature regarding sociodemographic, situational, and cybercrime opportunity factors.
Sociodemographic Background Factors. It is worth noting and necessary to
empirically investigate the characteristics of cybercriminals such as country of origin, age,
gender, and type of cybercriminal in order to understand cyber offending and the criminal

8

Severity scale of cybercrime damage includes five-category scale: (1) probing without kinetic cyber; (2)
harassment, propaganda, nuisance disruption; (3) stealing targeted critical information; (4) widespread
government, economic, military, or critical private sector theft of information; (5) critical network and
infrastructure destruction.
9

Damage type includes four-category scale: (1) indirect and delayed; (2) indirect and immediate; (3) direct
and delayed; (4) direct and immediate. Indirect in this context means that the damage done by the cyber
incident was not the original intent of the initiator. Delayed in this context means that the impact of the
attack takes months. (Maness, Valeriano, & Jensen, 2019)
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justice system’s response to these offenses (Hadzhidimova & Payne, 2019). Thus, this
study seeks to advance scientific research on exploring the characteristics of cybercriminals.
To achieve this goal, this study addresses the following research question:
Research question [Q1]: Who, what, where, and how do criminals commit cybercrime?
Several scholars have strived to examine the demographic characteristics of cyber
offenders (age and gender), citizenship, and behavioral patterns. Rogers (2003), Fried
(2001), Warner (2011), and Hadzhidimova and Payne (2019) note that the “stereotypical”
cyber offender is 12-28 years old, single, male, and socially dysfunctional, possibly from
a dysfunctional family. Interestingly, in a study of hackers in South Korea, Back, LaPrade,
Shehadeh, and Kim (2019) found that 55% of youth hackers were motivated by monetary
gain followed by hacktivism (24%), and entertainment (13%), whereas 87% of adult
hackers were also motivated by monetary gain followed by entertainment (7%) and
blackmail (3%). In addition, they found that 90% of the adult hackers had one or more
accomplices when committing hackings, while 62% of youth hackers had one or more
accomplices.
Situational Factors. As discussed in Chapter 2, the rational choice and situational
crime prevention approaches are considered as the plausible theoretical perspectives to
explain the decision-making of offenders. Criminals decide whether or not to engage in
deviant acts by weighing the effort, rewards, and costs involved in alternative ways of
action. Furthermore, certain situational factors can facilitate potential cyber perpetrators to
engage in more severe violence (Cornish & Clarke, 2008; Leclerc, Wortley, & Dowling,
2016) and cause direct and immediate damages to targets. The review of the existing
literature reinforced the present study’s theoretical argument for a relationship between the
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situational factors and crime. Nonetheless, a clear gap was found in the previous research,
focusing on the influence of the situational factors in addressing crimes in the physical
world. In an effort to fill this gap, the present study proposes the following research
question and hypotheses:
Research question [Q2]: Is there a relationship between pre-cybercrime situational factors
and cybercrime scene characteristics?
Hypothesis [H1]: Cyber offenders who possess illicit drugs will exhibit greater odds of
committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1: harassment/propaganda, stealing
critical information, widespread theft of information, and critical network/infrastructure
destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed, direct/immediate) compared to
the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing without kinetic cyberattack; outcome
2: indirect/delayed).
To extend the application of the rational choice approach, the existing literature
looked at the decision-making of cybercriminals regarding situational factors during their
offending process. For example, Beauregard, Lussier, and Proulx (2005) explored the role
of sexual interests and situational factors on rapists’ modus operandi. Their study utilized
a sample of 118 offenders who sexually assaulted a female aged 16 or over and its data
were analyzed using multiple regression models. The findings of their study demonstrated
that there are links between sexual interests, situational factors, and rapists’ modus
operandi. First, individuals having a greater sexual interest in nonsexual violence showed
a higher level of organization in the modus operandi. Second, the findings showed that
alcohol consumption prior to the offence was positively associated with a higher level of
coercion. Lastly, a negative emotional state prior to the crime was associated with a high
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level of injury inflicted on the victim. Similar to the explanation in Beauregard et al.’s
(2005) study, other empirical studies (Lussier, Proulx, & Leblanc, 2005; Lalumiere &
Quinsey, 1996; Malamuth, 1998) have shown that offenders with a high antisocial
tendency are more likely to engage in a higher level of physical coercion and more severe
violence.
In the cyberworld, cyber perpetrators are allowed to commit cybercrime when their
moral prohibitions have been weakened due to blaming alcohol or illegal drugs for cyber
violence. Ullman (2007) found that alcohol is a common factor and one half to two thirds
of these offenders used alcohol before sexual offenses. On the role of using drugs,
Mieczkowski and Beauregard (2010) suggested that the use of drugs was positively
associated with severity of crime events. Cumulatively, this study proposes that the
possession of illicit drugs is positively associated with increased severity scale of damage
or damage type.
Hypothesis [H2]: Cyber offenders who have political motivation(s) will exhibit greater
odds of committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1: harassment/propaganda,
stealing

critical

information,

widespread

theft

of

information,

and

critical

network/infrastructure destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed,
direct/immediate) compared to the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing
without kinetic cyberattack; outcome 2: indirect/delayed).
With regard to political reason, for example, cyberterrorists and state-sponsored
cybercriminals can be motivated by a specifically political and ideological reason to attack
computer/network systems (Taylor & Colleagues, 2019). In this regard, they commonly
engage in committing massive cyberattacks (DDoS attack, ransomware attack, cyber
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espionage, botnet attack, etc.) which directly and immediately result in severe damages and
pose threats to national security (e.g., critical infrastructure) and economic systems (Taylor
& Colleagues, 2019). In the same vein, cyber offenders with a high antisocial tendency
(e.g., frustration and anger) derived from political reasons are more likely to engage in
more severe and direct cyber threats against targets.
Cybercrime Opportunity Factors. This study also seeks to advance scientific
research on examining the link between the characteristics of cybercrime opportunity and
cybercrime scene characteristics. To achieve this objective, this section addresses the
following research question.
Research question [Q3]: Is there a relationship between cybercrime opportunity factors
and cybercrime scene characteristics?
Previous studies have already demonstrated the importance of opportunity factors
for offender behaviors during the crime. Beauregard and colleagues (2008) and Warr (2001,
p. 69) contended that opportunity factors were important elements in predicting the
characteristics of the criminal event or crime scene because “opportunity becomes the
limiting factor that determines the outcome of potentially criminal situations, and thus, by
extension, the incidence of criminal behavior in a jurisdiction.”
In accordance with RAT, crime does not randomly occur in society. Wittebrood
and Nieuwbeerta (2000) explained that: (1) a criminal-opportunity structure is derived from
patterns of routine activities and lifestyles through the link between a potential criminal
and target and (2) the offender’s subjective value of the target attractiveness and situational
or crime opportunity factors impact on the determination of selecting a certain crime target.
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As a rational decision process, potential offenders generally select targets which give them
enough rewards and which lack guardianship at that specific moment (Boudreaux, Lord,
& Jarvis, 2001; Hough, 1987). Importantly, Beauregard and associates found that crime
opportunity factors were important predictors in explaining sex offenders’ behaviors such
as selecting victims or committing rape/sexual assault.
Hypothesis [H3]: Cyber offenders who are not known to their target prior to the offense
will exhibit greater odds of committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1:
harassment/propaganda, stealing critical information, widespread theft of information, and
critical network/infrastructure destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed,
direct/immediate) compared to the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing
without kinetic cyberattack; outcome 2: indirect/delayed).
Hypothesis [H4]: Cyber offenders who intentionally attack the target will exhibit greater
odds of committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1: harassment/propaganda,
stealing

critical

information,

widespread

theft

of

information,

and

critical

network/infrastructure destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed,
direct/immediate) compared to the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing
without kinetic cyberattack; outcome 2: indirect/delayed).
Hypothesis [H5]: Cyber offenders who have intimate relationship with the target will
exhibit greater odds of committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1:
harassment/propaganda, stealing critical information, widespread theft of information, and
critical network/infrastructure destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed,
direct/immediate) compared to the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing
without kinetic cyberattack; outcome 2: indirect/delayed).
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Hypothesis [H6]: Cyber offenders who attack multiple targets will exhibit greater odds of
committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1: harassment/propaganda, stealing
critical information, widespread theft of information, and critical network/infrastructure
destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed, direct/immediate) compared to
the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing without kinetic cyberattack; outcome
2: indirect/delayed).
First and foremost, establishing a relationship between an offender and
target/victim is a significant element in order for the offender to successfully select
target/victim and completes the crime. The FBI (1995) found that stranger-perpetrated
homicide occurs less frequently than homicides committed by know offenders. Also, the
work of the Goetting (1995) indicated that children were victimized by a known offender
in 69% of the cases, 17% by acquaintances, 14% by the parent’s spouse or
boyfriend/girlfriend, and others. As an attempt of the extension for the scope of RAT, the
link between offender and victim in the physical world requires a different approach. As
noted previously, Yar (2005), Choi (2008), Holt and Bossler (2008), Reyns (2013), and
Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) argue that cybercrime events are very different from
conventional crimes in the terrestrial domain because the virtual environment is zerodistance between motivated offender and suitable target. Cyber routine activity theory, as
integrated by Choi (2008, 2015), places an emphasis on the idea that cybercrime does not
require any convergence of space and time between offenders and victims (Back, LaPrade,
& Soor, 2017). Thus, inconsistent with the previous studies, the majority of cyber offenders
do not need to establish a relationship with the victim/target prior to committing the
cybercrime. As such, cyber offenders who are not known to the victim/target prior to the
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onset of an offense pervasively and severely attack random targets without convergence of
space and time between offenders and victims. In short, cyber offenders may profoundly
exploit these given crime opportunities derived from the nature of the virtual environment.
Hypothesis [H7]: Cyber offenders who have co-offender(s) will exhibit greater odds of
committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1: harassment/propaganda, stealing
critical information, widespread theft of information, and critical network/infrastructure
destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed, direct/immediate) compared to
the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing without kinetic cyberattack; outcome
2: indirect/delayed).
Warr (2001) also attested that co-offenders serve as an opportunity factor in the
commission of the crime process as well as providing motivation before or even during the
course of the attack. Likely, Osgood and his colleagues (1996) found that in the presence
of peers, it is easier for individuals to participate in deviant acts. Weerman (2003) asserts
that serious offences such as burglary and robbery are often conducted by more than one
person, whereas general assault and minor thefts or shoplifting have much lower rates of
co-offending. In a similar vein, as to tech-savvy cyber offenders against the targets/victims
with a higher level of the resistance (i.e., strong cybersecurity countermeasure) and more
valuable assets, some may require cooperation from others for completion of the crime
(e.g., getting access to the computer/network systems, controlling the network servers,
preventing resistance, and/or potential interference from cyber detection). Moreover, when
cybercriminals target large institutions such as government/military or enormous
companies, they need to have accomplices to successfully break into highly protected
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systems and complete their criminal objective(s). In turn, it can lead to more severe damage
to the targets which have more critical assets than individual online users.
Hypothesis [H8]: Cyber offenders who are further from the target will exhibit greater odds
of committing more severe damage types (i.e., outcome 1: harassment/propaganda, stealing
critical information, widespread theft of information, and critical network/infrastructure
destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed, direct/immediate) compared to
the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing without kinetic cyberattack; outcome
2: indirect/delayed).
Environmental criminologists assert that most crimes occur near locations where
the criminal is familiar or knowledgeable. The work of Brantingham and Brantingham
(1990) explains that most criminal activities occur near where offenders live or work;
however, with a buffer zone around the offender’s residence where the offender is less
likely to commit a crime due to fear of being easily recognized and apprehended (Rossmo,
2008; Block, Galary, & Brice, 2007). In the same sense, Canter and Hammond (2006)
argue that distance estimation is a significant factor when offenders in the physical world
shape their crime location choices and spatial behaviors prior to committing the crime.
Back and colleagues (2018) found that due to the collapse of spatial distance there is no
spatial border between the motivated offender and suitable target. In other words, cyber
offenders can commit crimes against targets in different real-world time zones without any
border controls. Yet, the question remains as to whether distance from the target is a key
factor of deciding to commit a cybercrime (cyber offender behavior during the cybercrime
and the level of violence) among cyber offenders. Specifically, it can be argued that the
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physical distance between cyber offender and target does matter for cybercrime
opportunity and the decision process of cyber offender.
Ouimet and Proulx (1994) provide a clear illustration that the level of violence of
the crime is positively related to the distance traveled by the offender from his home to the
target. This is because the farther offenders travel, the more they adapt a coercive approach,
which in turn frequently leads to an increase in the level of violence during the commission
of a crime (e.g., sexual offense). Moreover, although Rengert, Piquero, and Jones (1999)
assert that the conventional rational choice analysis of criminal mobility would defend a
least effort principle (e.g., there is no need to travel to a different location as opportunities
are present here), Morselli and Royer (2008) and Clarke and Cornish (2001) argue that
criminal mobility should also be considered a goal-oriented action (e.g., offenders who
travel farther to commit their crimes had good reasons to do so). For example, criminal
mobility might serve the goal of successfully completing the crime and avoiding detection
(Beauregard & Busina, 2013; Hazelwood & Warren, 2004). According to Grabosky (2015)
and Chang (2013), cybercriminals are prone to travel around the world in order to disrupt
law enforcement’s investigation and prosecution since they are likely to hide their physical
location through a number of jurisdictions on the way to their target; moreover,
cybercriminals prefer to stay in safe havens where cybercrime investigation treaties,
extradition, and law enforcement cooperation are absent. In a study of cyberattacks, Holt
and Kilger (2012) conclude that cyber offenders prefer to commit cyberattack against a
foreign country’s critical infrastructures and they tend to carefully prepare attacks against
their targets. Given this situation, cyber offenders may be prone to travel further to commit
crime with more severe damage or direct/immediate impact of damage to target. The
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current study proposes to examine criminal mobility of cyber offenders during the
cybercrime event.
Hypothesis [H9]: Cyber offenders who attack government or military entities will exhibit
greater

odds

of

committing more

severe

damage

types

(i.e.,

outcome

1:

harassment/propaganda, stealing critical information, widespread theft of information, and
critical network/infrastructure destruction; outcome 2: indirect/immediate, direct/delayed,
direct/immediate) compared to the less severe damage type (i.e., outcome 1: probing
without kinetic cyberattack; outcome 2: indirect/delayed).
According to Felson and Clarke (1998), accessibility is associated with the
construction of communities, placing goods in easily accessible locations make it easy for
offenders to commit crime. Hough (1987) asserted that the attractive targets of crime must
be more attractive in that they are more accessible, or less guarded against the crime. When
offenders search for targets, they select a certain target, which lack capable guardianship
at that specific moment. Motivated cybercriminals abuse holes, gaps, or leaks in software
(e.g., infect the online users’ systems malware/virus) in order to successfully attack users
(Leukfeldt, 2014). Additionally, Leukfeldt (2014) suggested that large organizations (e.g.,
government institutions and/or large companies) tend to defend their systems well against
cyber threats by operating a higher level of digital capable guardianship as compared to
smaller organizations or individual online users. Critical assets and sensitive information
in these large organizations might become less accessible to cyber offenders when they
take protective measures by installing and updating cybersecurity countermeasures and
software. However, if these large organizations are hacked or destroyed by cyber offenders,
it can lead to massive damage. Also, due to their higher level of cyber threat intelligence
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and detection systems, cybercriminals prefer to attack quickly, achieve their goals, and then
escape from these crime scenes as fast as they can. These offenders may also be more
deliberate in their actions which should result in more severe damage. Therefore, the
following analysis will test the hypothesis that attacks on government/military facilities
will tend to be more severe. In this regard, the current study explores the association
between the selection of cybercrime targets and cybercrime scenes.
In light of these research questions and hypotheses, this study, first, uses a
descriptive research design to provide answers to the questions of who, what, where, and
how US and international cybercrime offenders attacked suitable targets in the United
States. Also, the SSBACO Cybercriminal Profiling Model is employed to empirically test
the relationships between sociodemographic background factors, pre-cybercrime
situational factors, cybercrime opportunity factors, and cybercrime scene characteristics.
Methodology
Data. Data were extracted from the Florida International University Law library
website concerning cybercrime offense convictions. One database used for the foundation
of the search was the Bloomberg Law for Case Dockets Research which contains federal
and state court dockets and access case filings. To collect criminal record reports (i.e.,
indictment, complaints), the following terms were utilized for the query: cyber-fraud,
hacking, cyberattack, online sexual crime, online illicit trade, cyberstalking, and
cyberbullying, returning 1,829 federal court cases. Each case was read, and this search
revealed 306 U.S. Federal court cases of cybercrime occurring between 2001 and 2018
which were used to empirically investigate the cyber-criminal profiling framework.
To collect quantitative data, the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID)
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Dataset, Version 1.5 Incident framework was employed to provide coding and
interpretation of available variables applied to the 306 court cases. In fact, the DCID was
able to provide the operational ideas of the variables, including offenses and offenders’
information (i.e., age, gender, nationality, geographic information, type of cyber
interaction for incidents, cyberattack methods utilized, type of target by cybercriminal,
status of cybercriminal: individual/hacker or group/state-sponsored criminal, political
objective, objective success, third-party initiator, severity level of cybercrime, and damage
type). Previously, the DCID was designed to provide a method to construct a dataset for
identifying cybercrime events. In addition, the Cyber Conflict Data Project was created to
offer replicable and reliable datasets for all cyber threats between public and private sector
targets. The original DCID dataset framework includes variables as the following lists
(Maness, Valeriano, & Jensen, 2019) in Table 2. In other words, the DCID dataset
framework provided a significant operational definition of measurement so that this study
conceptualized and recreated new variables to measure the international and U.S. domestic
cybercriminal profiles. The following sections specifically illustrate dependent and
independent variables as well as the analytic plan.
Measures
Dependent variables. The current study focuses on measuring two dependent
variables for each of the cases included in the analysis: 1) a severity scale of damage and
2) damage type. The severity scale of damage ranged from 1 to 5. Based on the codebook
of the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID), five-category scale for the severity of
damage is as follows: 1 = probing without kinetic cyberattack, 2 = harassment, propaganda,
nuisance disruption, 3 = stealing targeted critical information, 4 = widespread government,
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economic, military, or critical private sector theft of information, 5 = critical network and
infrastructure destruction. Damage type ranged from 1 to 4. Based on the codebook of the
Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID), the four-category scale for damage type to
victim/target was as follows: 1 = indirect and delayed, 2 = indirect and immediate, 3 =
direct and delayed, and 4 = direct and immediate.
Independent Variables. As stated in the literature review, several researchers (see
Holmes & Holmes, 2008; Beauregard, Lussier, & Proulx, 2008) have postulated a direct
relationship between the personal characteristics of offender, the method of operation, the
signature of offender, and the characteristics of crime scenes. Consistent with Beauregard
and his colleagues’ study (2008), the current study employed 13 items to measure
individual characteristics of offenders, pre-cybercrime situational factors, and
characteristics of the cybercrime opportunity.
Sociodemographic background factors. Sociodemographic background factors were
measured using four variables: sex, age, offender type, and origin of cybercriminal. Sex
was coded as 0 = female and 1 = male. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 68.
The offender type variable is measured using dummy variables: individual cybercriminal
(1 = individual, 0 = otherwise), hacking group (1 = hacking group, 0 = otherwise),
organized cybercriminal syndicate (1 = organized cybercriminal syndicate, 0 = otherwise),
state-sponsored cybercriminal (1 = state-sponsored cybercriminal, 0 = otherwise). Scaling
for the cybercriminal’s nationality was coded as 0 = Cybercriminal is US national and 1 =
cybercriminal is foreign national.
Pre-cybercrime situational factors. Pre-cybercrime situational factors were
measured from two variables including presence of illicit object(s) and presence of political
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objective(s). Scaling for the above variables is as follows: presence of illicit object(s): 0 =
did not possess drug, 1 = possessed drug; presence of political objective(s): 0 = no political
objective, 1 = existence of political objective(s).
Characteristics of the cybercrime opportunity factors. To measure characteristics
of the cybercrime opportunities, seven variables were utilized: (1) offender knew victim;
(2) offender distance from victim or target; (3); single or multiple target (4) presence of cooffenders; (5) random or intended violence in cyberspace; (6) target type; (7) intimate
relationship with target (see Appendix C). Scaling for whether the offender knew the victim
is as follows: 0 = no, 1 = yes. Scaling for jurisdictional distance between offender and target
locations are as follows: intracity level (1 = intracity level, 0 = otherwise), intercity level (1

= intercity level, 0 = otherwise), interstate level (1 = interstate level, 0 = otherwise), and
international level (1 = international level, 0 = otherwise). Scaling for presence of cooffender is as follows: 0 = no, 1 = yes. Scaling for random or intended violence is as follows:
0 = random violence, 1 = intended violence. Scaling for target type variable is measured
using dummy variables: individual (1 = individual, 0 = otherwise), business sector (1 =
business sector, 0 = otherwise), government/military (1 = government/military, 0 =
otherwise). Scaling for intimate relationship with victim is as follows: 0 = no, 1 = yes.
Lastly, scaling for target count is as follows: 0 = single target, 1 = multiple targets.
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Table 2. The Original DCID Dataset Framework
Variables
Cyber incident number (decided by dyad pair number and then earliest start date)
Dyad pair (combined the Correlates of War [COW] country codes)
State A (first state in the dyad by lowest COW country code)
State B (second state in the dyad by higher COW country code)
Name of cyber incident
Incident start date
Incident end date
Type of interaction (nuisance, defensive, offensive)
Method of interaction/incident, 1-4 with decimal denotations for infiltrations
Whether or not the incident is considered an advanced persistent threat (APT)
The type of target (private/non-state, government non-military, government military)
The initiator of the interaction (COW country code)
The specific coercive strategy of the cyber incident (disruption, short or long-term
espionage)
Whether or not an information operation was used as a result of the cyber incident
Whether or not the incident successfully achieved its objective; did it breach the target’s
network and fulfill its intended purpose
Whether or not a third party was involved in the initiation or a target of the interaction
Whether or not an official government statement was issued by the initiator
Severity level on the 0-10 scale level
Damage type/period (1. Direct and immediate, 2. Direct and delayed, 3. Indirect and
immediate, 4. Indirect and delayed)
Stated or interpreted strategic/political objective of the cyber incident
Key sources for the cyber incident
Analytic Method. All models were estimated using Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) 23. First, a series of descriptive statistics were employed in order
to provide the information regarding sociodemographic background factors (i.e., sex, age,
cybercriminal types, domestic or international cyber offenders), situational factors (i.e.,
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possessing illicit drugs, presence of political objectives), and criminal opportunity factors
(i.e., offender distance, co-offending, type of targets, intimate relationship with target), and
characteristics of cybercrime scenes. Second, Pearson’s r was used to investigate
correlations between variables. Third, multinomial logistic regression (MLR) equations10
were utilized to model the associations between covariates, severity scale of damage, and
damage type. The MLR is “a promising statistical technique that can be utilized to predict
the likelihood of a categorical outcome variable” (Abdulhafedh, 2017; Peng & Nichols,
2003, p. 177). The MLR model estimates (k – 1) models, where k is the number of outcome
levels of the dependent variable, and the kth equation is associated with the reference group
(Abdulhafedh, 2017); therefore, the categories “probing without kinetic cyberattack” and
“indirect and delayed” are considered as the reference groups in these analyses.
Results
Descriptive Statistics. Descriptive analyses were performed to demonstrate the
sample characteristics and responses to the candidate variables. Table 3 provides the
descriptive statistics (i.e., minimum and maximum counts, means, standard deviations, and
a number of the sample) for each dependent and independent variable in the bivariate and
multivariate analyses in this study.

10

Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variables (severity scale of damage and damage type) in this
chapter, a viable analytical strategy would be to use an ordinal regression equation. The issue, however, is
that the model specification did not pass the test of parallel lines rendering the cumulative ordered logit
estimates inaccurate. To clarify, the slope varies across each regression line generated from the equation,
making the singular parameter estimate inaccurate. To remedy this situation, this study utilizes multinomial
regression which generates a unique parameter estimate between each category in the outcome variable to
preserve the accuracy of the interpretations in this dissertation.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: SSBACO Variables
Variables
Dependent Variables
Severity scale of damage
Period of damage initiation to victim/target
Background of Sociodemographic Factors
Offender sex (Male =1)
Offender age
Offender type
Individual criminal
Hacking group
Organized criminal group
State sponsored
International vs. U.S. cyber offender
Situational Factors
Presence of illicit object (drugs)
Presence of political objective(s)
Characteristics of the Cybercrime
Opportunities
Offender knew victim or target
Random or intended violence (Intended = 1)
Intimate relationship with victim
Single or multiple victim/target (Multiple =1)
Presence of co-offender(s)
Jurisdictional distance between offender and
target
Intra-city level
Inter-city level
Inter-state level
International level
Victim or target type
Individual online user
Business
Government & military
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Mean

SD

Min

Max

2.26

1.24

1

5

1.92

1.19

1

4

.94

.24

0

1

34.24

9.95

18

68

.65

.47

0

1

.10

.30

0

1

.16

.36

0

1

.08

.26

0

1

.35

.47

0

1

.05

.21

0

1

.06

.23

0

1

.40

.49

0

1

.42

.49

0

1

.07

.24

0

1

.76

.42

0

1

.63

.48

0

1

.20

.39

0

1

.11

.31

0

1

.39

.48

0

1

.30

.46

0

1

.48

.50

0

1

.31

.46

0

1

.19

.39

0

1

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: Cybercriminals by country of origin
N

%

199

65.0

Russia

22

7.2

Nigeria

16

5.2

Iran

14

4.6

Romania

12

3.9

Ukraine

8

2.6

China

5

1.6

Kazakhstan

5

1.6

Canada

4

1.3

UK

3

1.0

India

2

.7

Pakistan

2

.7

Israel

2

.7

12

3.6

Country of origin (N = 306)
USA

Other (Australia, German,
Italy, Moldova, North Korea,
Sweden, Turkey, Latvia,
Lebanon, Dominican
Republic, Greece, Macedonia)

Table 4 shows that 65% of cybercrime incidents originated from the United States
to victimize American citizens or targets followed by Russia (7.2%), Nigeria (5.2%), Iran
(4.6%), Romania (3.9%), Ukraine (2.6%), China (1.6%), Kazakhstan (1.6%), Canada
(1.3%), UK (1.0%), India (0.7%), Pakistan (0.7%), and Israel (0.7%).
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics: Cybercriminals by sex, age, accomplice, and type of
targets
N

%

19

6.2

287

93.8

18 to 24

51

16.7

25 to 34

131

42.8

Over 34

124

40.5

No

115

37.5

Yes

191

62.4

Individual user

148

48.0

Business sector

98

32.0

Government & Military

60

20.0

Sex (N = 306)
Female
Male
Age (N = 306)

Accomplice (N = 306)

Type of Targets (N = 306)

Table 5 indicates the descriptive statistics: cybercriminals by sex, age, accomplice,
and type of targets. The results show that cybercrime was a male-dominated criminal
activity (male, 93.8% and female, 6.2%). Inconsistent with literature (e.g., Back, LarPrade,
Shehadeh, & Kim, 2019; Hadzhidimova & Payne, 2019) which contended the youth
offenders are major populations of cybercrimes, 83% of cyber offenders were over age 25
(adult criminals). Further, 62.4% of cyber perpetrators have co-offended with one or more
criminal(s). The most frequently targeted entities of cybercrime were individual users
(48%), followed by the business sector (32%), and government and military (20%).
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Regarding cybercriminal types in Table 6, 65% of offenders were individual
cybercriminals followed by hacking groups (10.5%), organized crime groups (15.7%),
and state-sponsored cybercriminals (7.8%). According to the results of the cybercrime
typology (see Table 6), cyber fraud (39.5%) and hacking (31.4%) have been most
pervasively committed by cybercriminals followed by cyberattacks (12.4%), online
sexual crime (8.2%), online illicit trade (4.2%), and cyberstalking and cyberbullying
(3.6%).
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: Cybercriminal types and typology
N

%

199

65.0

Hacking group

32

10.5

Organized group cybercriminals

48

15.7

State-sponsored cybercriminals

24

7.8

121

39.5

Hacking

96

31.4

Cyberattack

38

12.4

Online sexual crime

25

8.2

Online illicit trade

13

4.2

Cyberstalking & Cyberbullying

11

3.6

Cybercriminal types (N = 304)
Individual cybercriminal

Cybercrime typology (N = 304)
Cyber-fraud

Bivariate Relationships. The current study examines the relationships between
sociodemographic background factors (i.e., sex, age, cybercriminal types, domestic or
international cyber offenders), situational factors (i.e., presence of drugs or political
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objectives), criminal opportunity factors (i.e., offender distance, co-offending, type of
targets), severity scale of damage, and damage type.
Table 7 shows the bivariate correlations of the study variables. Certain SSBACO
variables were significantly correlated with both the cybercrime severity scale of damage
and damage type. First, state-sponsored cybercriminals (r = 0.41, p < .01), political
objective (r = 0.33, p < .01), international level distance (r = 0.24, p < .01), and
government/military (r = 0.44, p < .01) were significantly correlated with cybercrime
severity scale of damage. Second, individual cybercriminal (r = 0.29, p < .01), organized
criminal group (r = - 0.31, p < .01), co-offending (r = -0.27, p < .01), and intra-city level
distance (r = 0.31, p < .01) were correlated with damage type. In accordance with the
bivariate relationships, the cybercriminals who were international cyber offenders with
political objective(s) were more likely to cause more severe damage to targets. Also,
individual cybercriminal and organized cybercriminal group were more likely to engage in
indirect and delayed cybercrime damages to targets; cyber offenders who were from other
states or international cybercriminals tended to engage in direct and immediate damages to
targets.
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Table 7. Correlation Matrix: SSBACO Variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

1

2

.54**

1

3

-.04

.02

1

4

-.07

-.04

-.11*

1

5

-.12*

.29**

-.07

-.02

1

6

-.11

-.05

-.01

.12*

-.46**

1

7

-.05

-.31**

.07

-.05

-.58**

-.14**

1

8

.41**

-.01

.02

-.01

-.39**

-.10

-.12*

1

9

.24**

-.06

.10

-.01

-.35**

-.04

.24**

.37**

1

10

-.01

-.10

.06

.01

.01

-.07

.10

-.06

-.10

1

11

.34**

.08

.06

.03

-.16**

-.08

-.11

.54**

.19**

-.05

11

1

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; 1 = Severity scale of damage; 2 = Damage type; 3 = Offender sex; 4 = Offender age; 5 = Individual
cybercriminals; 6 = Hacking group; 7 = Organized criminal group; 8 = State-sponsored cybercriminals; 9 = International
cybercriminals vs. U.S. cyber offenders; 10 = Possession of illicit objects; 11 = Political objectives
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Table 7. Continued
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1

1

2

.54

1

3

.17**

.15**

1

4

.22**

.15**

.89**

1

5

-.02

.10

.33**

.25**

1

6

-.03

-.15**

-.35**

-.30**

-.10

1

7

.05

-.27**

-.29**

-.27**

-.10

.20**

1

8

-.06

.31**

.16**

.16**

.17**

-.13*

-.45**

1

9

-.07

.04

.10

.06

-.04

-.20**

-.17**

-.17**

1

10

-.13*

-.21**

-.05

-.05

-.02

.01

.16**

-.39**

-.27**

1

11

.24**

-.07

-.15**

-.12*

-.09

.24**

.32**

-.32**

-.23**

-.53**

11

12

-.28**

-.11*

-.15**

-.20**

.24**

.27**

-.02

.15**

-.20**

.21**

-.22**

1

13

-.09

.01

.01

.06

-.18**

-.28**

-.09

-.06

.19**

-.11

.04

-.65**

1

14

.44**

.10

.19**

.19**

-.09

-.01

.12*

-.09

-.01

-.14**

.24**

-.46**

-.32**

14

1

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; 1 = Severity scale of damage; 2 = Damage type; 3 = Offender knew victim; 4 = Random or Intended
violence; 5 = Intimate relationship with target; 6 = Single or Multiple target(s); 7 = Co-offender; 8 = Intra-city; 9 = Inter-city; 10
= Inter-state; 11 = international; 12 = Individual user; 13 = Business sector; 14 = Government/military
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Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) Results of Severity Scale of Damage.
Table 8 presents the results of the series of MLR models conducted in order to investigate
the relationships between sociodemographic background factors, situational factors, and
cybercrime opportunity factors and the dependent variable (severity scale of damage) in
this study. To that end, in the regression models, “individual cybercriminal” is the reference
for offender type variable; “international level” is the reference for jurisdiction distance
between offender and target variable; “individual online user” is the reference for target
type variable. The Goodness of Fit Table shows that Pearson’s chi-square and a deviance
chi-square for the tests were not statistically significant. The pseudo R-square values
produced in these MLR models are 0.65 (Cox and Snell) and 0.69 (Nagelkerke)
respectively, suggesting that between 65% and 69% of the variability is explained by this
set of variables used in the models. Given these results of statistics, data fits the model used
in this dissertation very well.
To scrutinize the relationship of independent and dependent variables, the
likelihood ratio test evaluates the overall relationship between independent and dependent
variables. As shown in Table 8, organized criminal groups were on average 4.12 times
more likely to engage in harassment, propaganda, and nuisance disruption in comparison
to probing than individual offenders (OR = 4.12, 95% CI = [1.21, 14.05]). Overall, however,
there were no statistically significant effects for sociodemographic background factors.
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Table 8. MLR Results of Severity Scale of Damage (N = 306)
Harassment,
Stealing
Widespread
Propaganda
Critical Info
Theft
B
OR
B
OR
B
OR
Sociodemographic
2.40
11.07
16.99
24.21
-.60
.54
Offender sex
.01
1.01
.04
1.05
-.08
.99
Offender age
Offender type
.68
1.98
.06
1.06
-1.51
.22
Hacking groupa
Organized
criminal groupa
State sponsoreda

Critical Infra
Destruction
B
OR
-1.13

.32

-.04

.95

-17.40

2.76

1.41*

4.12

.74

2.09

-.18

.83

-16.04

1.08

17.12

101.3
3
.36

-1.06

.34

17.34

34.68

15.31

44.86

-1.00
-1.37
.25
.46
1.58
.73
International vs.
U.S. offender
Situational Factors
-15.21
2.46
1.67
5.33
1.02
2.79
-31.62
Presence of illicit
drugs
Presence of political 15.79** 72.67 17.96** 63.16 17.57** 43.61 18.39**
*
*
*
*
objective(s)
Cybercrime
Opportunities
-1.38
.24
-.97
.37
-1.14
.31
-.65
Offender knew
target
1.46
4.31
2.40
11.09
2.35
10.53
1.82
Random or intended
violence
32.35
112.9
-1.25
.28
-2.38
.09
29.92
Intimate
2
relationship with
target
.52
1.69
-.09
.90
-.80
.44
-.31
Single or multiple
target(s)
-1.44**
.23
-.71
.48
1.25
3.50
.19
Presence of cooffender(s)
Distance between
offender and target
.35
1.42
-3.15*
.04
-1.26
.28
-.17
Intra-cityb
b
.34
1.41
-1.04
.35
-2.32
.09
-16.35
Inter-city
b
-.44
.64
-3.15**
.04
-.71
.49
.81
Inter-state
Target type
-1.27*
.28
-.92
.39
.50
1.65
-1.22
Businessc
.70
2.02
-.52
.59
2.81***
16.62
2.18*
Government &
militaryc
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; a reference for offender type variable is
individual cybercriminal; b reference for jurisdictional distance variable is
international; c reference for target type variable is individual online user

64

2.09

1.83
97.16

.52
6.20

99.79

.73

1.21

.83
7.86
2.26
.29
8.86

Also, Table 8 indicates that there is a statistically significant, positive association
between presence of political objective(s) and severity scale of damage. For example, when
cyber offenders have political objective(s), they caused 72, 63, 43, and 97 times more
severe damages to the target (i.e., harassment, propaganda, and nuisance disruption [OR =
72.67]; stealing targeted critical information [OR = 63.16]; widespread theft [OR = 43.61];
critical network/infrastructure destruction [OR = 97.16]) in comparison to probing. In
contrast, there were no statistically significant effect for presence of illicit drugs.
Cyber offenders had 77% lower odds of working with an accomplice when
committing harassment, propaganda, and nuisance disruption in comparison to probing
(OR = 0.23, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.66]). As a type of targets, business sectors had 72% lower
odds of being targeted for harassment, propaganda, and nuisance disruption in comparison
to probing than individual online users (OR = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.78]). On the other
hand, government sectors exhibited 16 times greater odds of being targeted for widespread
theft in comparison to probing than individual online users (OR = 16.62, 95% CI = [3.47,
79.65]). Similarly, government sectors experienced 8 times greater odds of being targeted
for critical network and infrastructure destruction in comparison to probing than individual
online users (OR = 8.86, 95% CI = [1.02, 76.86]). As offender’s distance level from target,
intra-city level distances exhibited 96% lower odds of engaging in stealing targeted critical
information in comparison to probing than international level distances (OR = 0.04, 95%
CI = [0.003, 0.530]). Also, inter-state level distances exhibited 96% lower odds of engaging
in stealing targeted critical information in comparison to probing than international level
distances (OR = 0.04, 95% CI = [0.005, 0.382]).
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As with these findings, cybercriminals with political objective(s) had greater odds
of causing more severe damage than cybercriminals without political objective(s); cyber
offenders who were close to the victim/target had lower odds of engaging in severe damage
than cybercriminals residing far from the victim/target; cyber offenders who attacked
governmental/military targets had greater odds of engaging in more severe damage than
cyber offenders who attacked individual online users. Of these, the findings of this study
provide support for hypothesis 2, 8, and 9.
Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) Results of Damage Type. Table 9
displays the results of the series of MLR models conducted in order to examine associations
between situational factors, cybercrime opportunity factors, sociodemographic factors, and
a dependent variable (damage type) in this study. Likewise, in the regression models,
“individual cybercriminal” is the reference for offender type variable; “international level”
is the reference for jurisdiction distance between offender and target variable; “individual
online user” is the reference for target type variable. The Goodness of Fit Table shows that
Pearson’s chi-square and a deviance chi-square for the tests were not statistically
significant. The pseudo R-square values produced in these MLR models are .53 (Cox and
Snell) and 0.59 (Nagelkerke). Thus, the model with the variables fit well to analyze the
proposed hypotheses in the present study.
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Table 9. MLR Results of Period of Damage Type (N = 306)
Indirect&Immediate
Direct &
Delayed
B
OR
B
OR
Sociodemographic
17.83
55.19
-.09
.90
Offender sex
.04
1.04
-.01
.98
Offender age
Offender type
.17
1.19
-1.60
.20
Hacking groupa
Organized
criminal groupa
State sponsoreda
International vs. U.S
Situational Factors
Presence of illicit
drugs
Presence of political
objective(s)
Cybercrime
Opportunities
Offender knew target

Direct&Immediate
B

OR

.47

1.60

-.02

.97

.28

1.32

-2.68

.06

-3.26

.03

-17.35

2.90

2.29

9.87

-19.44

3.59

-2.74

.06

.92

2.51

.69

2.01

-.76

.46

.68

1.98

-18.30

1.12

-1.76

.17

.06

1.06

1.77

5.89

2.25

9.57

.30

1.35

.16

1.17

-.33

.71

-.79
.45
.09
1.10
.07
Random or intended
violence
1.68
5.37
3.48***
32.55
.32
Intimate relationship
with target
-.72
.48
1.41
4.12
-1.01
Single or multiple
target(s)
-.41
.66
.07
1.07
-.50
Presence of cooffender(s)
Jurisdictional
distance between
offender and target
-1.49
.22
1.62
5.09
-.11
Intra-cityb
b
.80
2.22
1.44
4.24
-2.79*
Inter-city
b
-1.28
.27
-.03
.96
-1.91*
Inter-state
Target type
-.29
.74
.67
1.95
-.01
Businessc
.86
2.37
-1.44
.23
1.26*
Government &
militaryc
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; a reference for offender type variable is
individual cybercriminal; b reference for jurisdictional distance is international; c
reference for target type variable is individual online user
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1.07

1.38

.36

.60

.89
.06
.14
.99
3.55

According to Table 9, cyber offenders who had an intimate relationship with targets had
32 times greater odds of causing direct and delayed damage in comparison to indirect and
delayed damage than cyber offenders who did not have intimate relations with targets (OR
= 32.55, 95% CI = [4.10, 258.40]). In this case, cybercriminals who had an intimate
relationship with targets tend to cause direct damages to the target; however, the costs of
damage would be felt at a future point in time. For example, the former employee of a
nuclear plant who had an intimate relationship with an employer could disrupt its facility
by directly damaging the centrifuges, but the impact of this attack might take a number of
months. To that end, this result provides support for hypothesis 5.
In terms of the offender’s distance from the target, Table 9 indicates that cyber
offenders at inter-city level distances had 94% lower odds of causing direct and immediate
damage in comparison to indirect and delayed damage than international level distances
(OR = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.007, 0.55]). Likewise, cyber offenders at inter-state level
distances had 86% lower odds of causing direct and immediate damage in comparison to
indirect and delayed damage than international level distances (OR = 0.14, 95% CI = [0.03,
0.68]). Given these results, cyber offenders who were close to the victim/target had lower
odds of engaging in direct/immediate damage initiation than cyber offenders residing far
from the victim/target. As such, the results in Table 9 provide support for hypothesis 8.
Lastly, cyber offenders who attacked government sectors had 3.55 times greater
odds of causing direct and immediate damage in comparison to indirect and delayed
damage than individual online users (OR = 3.55, 95% CI = [1.05, 11.97]). As stated in the
literature

review

section,

the

large

organizations

such

as

businesses

and

governmental/military entities have better protective measures through cybersecurity
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countermeasures. Therefore, to avoid detection and prosecution by information security
officers or law enforcement, cybercriminals who attack government/military entities might
prefer to directly conduct their criminal operations against its targets which lead to
immediate damages occurred. In this sense, this result provides support for hypothesis 9.
However, there were no statistically significant effects for sex or age or offender type or
international cyber offender/U.S. domestic cyber offender.
Discussion and Conclusion
While previous research has applied criminal profiling techniques to empirically
examine patterns and crime event for conventional criminals (e.g., theft, serial killer, serial
sexual offender, terrorists, etc.), little has empirically been conducted on cybercriminal
profiles and cybercrime scenes. In addition, there is lack of cybercriminal profiling
theoretical framework. Thus, this study contributes to the existing literature by proposing
a theoretical framework, called the SSBACO cybercriminal profiling model, for assisting
law enforcement in solving an emerging field of crime. As such, this study sought to
examine whether there were relationships between the sociodemographic background
characteristics of offenders, pre-cybercrime situational factors, and characteristics of the
cybercrime opportunity factors, and cybercrime damage and type. To that end, the main
findings of this study support the extension of the crime triangle framework (i.e., motivated
offender) to the context of cybercrime offenses.
Sociodemographic Factors. This study shows that, overall, sociodemographic
factors were not strongly associated with the characteristics of the cybercrime scene.
Interestingly, cybercriminals affiliated with an organized crime group caused less severe
damage to targets than individual cybercriminals. Otherwise, the findings of this study
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show that other sociodemographic background factors (i.e., gender, age, and
international/US offenders) were not statistically significant predictors of the severity of
damage and damage type. Nevertheless, in light of interpersonal cybercrime patterns in the
analysis, one thing that needs to be discussed is that female cyber offenders have rarely
been involved in online sexual crimes (e.g., presence or production and distribution of child
porn, online sexual solicitation), whereas some female offenders have engaged in
cyberstalking and cyberbullying offenses. In other words, online sexual crimes have been
male-dominated cybercrime (Shannon, 2008; Taylor et al., 2019).
Situational Conditions and Cybercrime Opportunity Factors. Similar to
previous studies (Marshall & Barbaree, 1990; Earls & Marshall, 1983; Salfati, 2000;
Beauregard et al., 2008), the results indicated that some situational/opportunity factors
influenced the characteristics of cybercrime scenes. First, there is a relationship between
pre-crime situational factor (presence of political objective) and the characteristics of
cybercrime scenes. For example, when cybercriminals had political objective(s), they were
97 times more likely to engage in critical network/infrastructure destruction in comparison
to probing than cybercriminals did not have political objective(s). This result may suggest
that, in response to a political situation or conflict, these motivated offenders might want
to immediately demonstrate more aggressive political protests or damage targets more
severely through cyberattacks or cyberterrorism.
Second, this study also found that certain cybercrime opportunities – (1) offender’s
distance from target, (2) type of target, and (3) intimate relationship with target – were
significant predictors for cybercrime scenes. Remarkably, cyber offenders tended to select
and attack targets in different jurisdictions (different countries or states) and targets’
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physical location are farther from where they live (Hadzhidimova & Payne, 2019). In
addition, 211 out of 304 cybercrime cases were committed beyond the intercity level. This
pattern can trigger the jurisdiction issue for cybercrime investigation and prosecution. This
finding does not support the evidence (Block & Block, 1999; Canter & Gregory, 1994;
Jahankhani, & Al-Nemrat, 2012; Sarangi & Youngs, 2006; Jansen & van Koppen, 1998)
provided from prior studies in which the offender in the physical world travelled close to
where he or she lives. Moreover, when cyber offenders travelled further, they were more
likely to engage in more severe types of cybercrime and damage with direct and immediate
impact of damage to target.
Given the borderless nature of cybercrime, cyber perpetrators can more easily
victimize many people all over the globe including the United States. They can commit
cybercrime more severely and anonymously without ever setting foot in the targeted
victim’s location. Grabosky (2015) asserted that cyber offenders attempt to conceal their
physical location through a number of jurisdictions on the way to their target. Sophisticated
cybercriminals have more opportunities to reach into the targets over the Internet from the
nations called safe havens where cybercrime investigation treaties, extradition, law
enforcement cooperation, and technical capacity are absent in order to hide in the shadows
of Internet. In short, the findings of these characteristics of crime events may explain that
cyber offenders’ geospatial behaviors differ from offenders in the physical world due to
the collapse of spatial and temporal orderings. However, offender- and victim- physical
locations are still crucial factors to effectively prosecute cybercrime scene and to reduce
cybercriminal opportunities.
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Lastly, the results indicated that target type was a significant predictor of the
severity of damage and damage type. In particular, government/military entities or some
business sectors (Simon, 2017) oversee the operation of critical infrastructures (e.g., water
and food supplies, electricity and gas, telecommunications and broadcasting, health
services, the financial system and the transportation system). Recently, these critical
infrastructures are driven by computer/network systems as a result of the growing
interconnectedness. This reliance on computers and networks raises critical infrastructure’s
vulnerability since disrupting these high-value cybercrime targets results in massive
economic, political and social effects (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). Thus, normally these
entities have higher level of cybersecurity systems and agile cyber threat detection systems.
However, if a cyber offender exploits a vulnerability in the system, it can cause a massive
damage to critical infrastructure. In line with offender decision making perspective,
cybercriminals may want to quickly approach these entities and achieve their criminal
goals and then immediately escape from cybercrime investigation and prosecution. As such,
government/military targets were more likely to be experienced in more severe damage
and direct/immediate cyber threats.
In sum, the major findings suggest that the SSBACO Cybercriminal Profiling
model can be a scientific and useful tool to prioritize suspects, establishing new lines of
scrutiny in cybercrime investigation. In this study, the findings highlight that
situational/opportunity factors (i.e., pre-crime situational conditions, offender’s geospatial
behaviors, victim/target type) are associated with cybercrime scene, especially cybercrime
damage.
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Policy Implications. The findings of this study provide significant implications
for practice. First, according to the results of cybercriminals’ geospatial behaviors, cyber
offenders often commit cyber violence from one jurisdiction against a target in another
jurisdiction (e.g., state or country). For example, an American prosecutor indicted two
Russian state-sponsored hackers who resided in Bulgaria and Ukraine for their commission
of cyberattacks and cyber espionages against US government agencies. The hackers never
set foot in the United States. Thus, the question remains: who is responsible for
investigating and prosecuting the cybercrime case (Grabosky, 2016)? The lack of
extradition relationships between certain nations makes it hard to proactively deter
cybercrimes (Holt, 2013; Brenner, 2010; Holt & Bossler, 2013; Holt, Freilich, & Chermak,
2017). As such, it is necessary to improve the jurisdiction issue along with cybercrime
investigation treaties or extraditions as well as international cooperation with foreign law
enforcement partners, which eventually facilitates reduced cybercriminal opportunities
derived from the borderless nature of cybercrime.
Second, cyber patrol can reduce cybercriminal opportunities. Cybercrime units or
specialized forces are essential to patrol cyberspace, and to detect high tech cybercriminals
who strive to hide behind geographic borders by using various encryption and hacking
toolkits or the dark web, which makes it very difficult to identify a suspect. Thus, through
enhancing cybercrime units or specialized cybercrime forces, law enforcement can have
an exponential impact on detecting and prosecuting cybercrime offenses, which will help
to disrupt cybercriminal opportunities.
Limitations. The study in this chapter had two noteworthy limitations. First,
although court complaint/indictment documents provided significant information
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regarding features of cybercriminals and victims, and cybercrime scenes, there is room to
fill in the gaps in order to increase the accuracy and validity of cybercriminal profiling. For
example, there is an absence of information concerning victim’s characteristics (e.g.,
gender, age, address, type of damage, occupation, online activity at the time of the crime),
making it difficult to examine the relationships between victim’s characteristics, crime
scene, and offender features as well as offender-victim interaction. Thus, future studies of
cybercriminal profiling can fruitfully analyze the following features in light of the work of
Farrington and Lambert (1997):
1. Offender: Address, sex, age, ethnicity, marital status, nationality, distinctive
physical features, felony history, occupation, accomplice, intent, motivation.
2. Offense: Location, site, physical location of computer server to attack, time, day,
date, cybercrime method, instruments or weapons, methods of escape, offender
using drink or drugs or pornography, presence of illicit objects, severity of damage,
typology.
3. Victim: Address, sex, age, ethnicity, marital status, occupation, online activity at
the time of the crime, type of damage, monetary loss.
4. Victim report of offender: All offender variables except address.
A second limitation highlights the difficulty of measuring the relationships between
individual characteristics of the offender (i.e., motivation, antisocial tendency,
psychosocial deficits) and severity of damage and typology using court documents. As
such, I was unable to reveal the causal factors about why the offenders engage in the
commission of cybercrime. Third, many potential profiles of cyber offenders were not
included in this cybercriminal profiling analysis because the current study has only utilized
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the profiles of the offenders who have been sentenced during a particular time-period
(2001-2018) in the United States. Therefore, it may lead to errors and misleading results
due to a sample selection bias. Lastly, the present study was limited to reveal the
relationship between the use of drug(s) and cybercrime offending since the court
documents analyzed in this study did not provide information as to whether cyber offenders
had taken illegal drug(s) when they committed cyber violence. Thus, future research should
address these issues stated above by including qualitative interviews and self-report survey
methods which help provide an in-depth understanding of cyber offender’s motive,
psychosocial status, etc.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPACTS OF PERCEIVED RISK OF CYBER-THREATS, DIGITAL CAPABLE
GUARDIANSHIP, AND ONLINE ACTIVITY ON CYBERCRIME
VICTIMIZATION
Following the exploration of cybercrime offenses, this chapter seeks to explore
another dimension of the cybercrime triangle – cybercrime victimization. According to the
literature review chapter, a large body of research has been conducted in order to examine
the application of routine activity theory to cybercrime victimization. Many criminologists
contend that traditional routine activity theory can be a useful framework to explain the
occurrence of cybercrime victimization. Specific behaviors and the status of online users
can generate new opportunities for criminals to commit cyber-threats when capable
guardians are absent. For example, researchers (e.g., Choi, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2008;
Bossler, Holt, & May, 2012; Newman & Clarke, 2003; Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns et al., 2011;
Wilsem, 2011, 2013) argue that online exposure (e.g., spending time online and purchasing
from online retailers) and digital capable guardianship (e.g., target hardening techniques)
might be significantly associated with cybercrime victimization. However, these empirical
tests have generated mixed results (Williams & Levi, 2015).
To prevent cyber-threats, state-of-the-art cybersecurity systems and cyber hygiene
– maintaining healthy circumstances of computer/network systems from malicous codes or
viruses – are the most important factors; however, cybersecurity professionals also say
human factors can be critical components of cybercrime prevention strategies. On one hand,
the human element is a pivotal component to disrupt cyber threats. On the other hand,
humans can be very vulnerable and easily deceived by advanced technologies and social
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engineering schemes along inadequate countermeasures in the combat against cybercrime
(Back & LaPrade, 2019). In a broad sense, some scholars (Lee & Downing, 2019; Lee,
Choi, Choi, & Englander, 2019) assert that certain human factors (e.g., the perceived risk
of crime or online users’ behavior) can be crucial predictors to decrease the likelihood of
crime victimization in the physical and cyber world. Typically, the perceived risk of crime
threats may alter a potential victim’s routine activities, which may lead to fewer risky
situations (Rengifo & Bolton, 2012). Unfortunately, the risk perception factor has rarely
been applied to empirically examine cybercrime victimization. Most studies focused on
examining the relationships between online behavior, online lifestyle, cybersecurity
management, and cybercrime victimization. Nevertheless, few studies have investigated
the link between perceived risk of cyber-threats and cybercrime victimization. To fill the
gaps in the literature, this study focuses on the concepts of perceived risk of cyber-threats,
online activity, and digital capable guardians as predictors of cybercrime victimization.
The following sections in this chapter discuss the theoretical background (i.e., online
routine activity, digital capable guardian, perceived risk of crime), research questions,
hypotheses, methods, variables, and major findings.
Background
From the crime triangle framework, capable guardian and routine activity tenets
contribute to the cybercrime victimization model in this study. In addition, perceived risk
of cybercrime victimization derived from the perceived risk of crime literature was
employed to test mediation effects on the relationship between online routine activity,
capable guardianship, and cybercrime victimization.
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Digital Capable Guardianship and Online Routine Activity. Since the original
RAT developed by Cohen and Felson (1979), a large body of research focused on
examining the capable guardian measure and routine activity to explain how the absence
of capable guardian and regular routines of potential victims can increase the risk of crime
victimization. The capability of persons and/or objectives that protect citizens and facilities
against criminals are regarded as guardianship. Typically, capable guardians, especially
physical capable guardians, have been commonly utilized to prevent residential burglary.
Existing studies found that burglar alarms, external lights, extra locks, and other security
devices help decrease the risk of burglar and larceny victimization (Coupe & Blake, 2006;
Cromwell & Olson, 2004; Miethe & McDowall, 1993). Routine activity refers to the daily
routine activities, some of which can put individuals in greater danger of crime in physical
and virtual spaces, since certain activities place individuals in closer proximity to motivated
offenders (Cohen & Felson, 2016; Bossler & Holt, 2009). In the cyber world, daily routine
activities include online banking, online shopping, accessing social network sites, and
email. Newman and Clarke (2003) were the first criminologists to apply the concepts of
Internet target accessibility (increased by the absence of capable guardianship) and
visibility (increased by the variety and frequency of online routine activities, e.g., shopping
and banking) derived from RAT to cybercrime (Williams, 2016, p. 23). Bossler and Holt
(2009), Reyns (2013), and Williams (2016) assert that Choi (2008) was the first cybercriminologist to examine the relationship between physical capable guardians (i.e., antivirus software), online routine activities, and cybercrime victimization.
Grobosky and Smith (2001) argue that capable guardianship has commonly been
used to protect online users from cyber-threat since the 1990s. According to Williams
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(2016), the forms of personal capable guardianship can be composed of three types: (1)
passive physical guardianship, (2) active personal guardianship, and (3) avoidance personal
guardianship. First, passive physical guardianship includes individuals’ protective
behaviors such as using only their own computer, email spam filtering, installing anti-virus
and secure browsing. Second, active personal guardianship consists of active protective
actions (e.g., changing security settings and passwords). Third, avoidance personal
guardianship is composed of passive online actions (e.g., doing less online banking and
shopping).
The applications of capable guardianship to various cybercrimes (e.g., malware
infection, cyber piracy, cyberbullying, cyber-harassment, cyberstalking, unauthorized
access, and identity theft) have been empirically tested and obtained mixed results (Welsh
& Farrington, 2014; Wilcox & Cullen, 2018; William, 2016). For example, digital capable
guardianship was not a significant predictor of cyber-harassment or hacking attacks (e.g.,
Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holtfreter et al, 2008; Marcum et al., 2010). Consistent with prior
research, Leukfeldt (2014) explored the relationship between digital capable guardians and
phishing victimization; however, no relationship was observed between the two variables.
Interestingly, some studies found that passive physical guardianship (e.g., Choi, 2008; Choi
& Lee, 2017; Williams, 2016) is a strong predictor to mitigate the risk of computer crime
(e.g., malware infection and identity theft) or cyber-harassment (e.g., Back, 2016).
Remarkably, Williams (2016) applied RAT to online identity theft in Europe at the
country and individual level. Similar to the current study, the work of Williams used data
derived from the Special Eurobarometer 390 survey on cybersecurity, collected in 2012.
The sample size was 26,593 and country-level multistage random probability sampling was
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adjusted. Williams’ study focused on the concepts of online routine activities, active
personal, avoidance personal and passive physical guardianship as predictors of online
identity theft victimization. In addition, he tested the relationships between the country
level capable guardianship, Internet penetration, economic performance, and level of
urbanicity through the series of multi-level Poisson regression models.
Similar to the application of digital capable guardianship to cybercrime
victimization, criminological research has largely explored various types of cybercrime
victimization using the online routine activity component of RAT as a framework (Holt &
Bossler, 2013). Choi (2008, 2017), Reyns (2013), and Williams (2016) elaborate that the
online routine activity tenet includes Internet activities (online banking and shopping, and
social networking and emailing), location of Internet access (home, university, public, café,
work), and frequency of Internet use. Accordingly, there are also mixed results for the
association between online routine activities and cybercrime victimization. In this regard,
while many researchers (e.g., Al-Nemrat, Jahankhani, & Preston, 2010; Bossler & Holt,
2009; Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Marcum, Higgins, &
Ricketts ,2010; Pratt et. al, 2010; Pyrooz, Decker, & Moule, 2015; Reyns, 2013; Reyns,
2015; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Williams, 2016; Wolfe et al., 2016) provide support for the
hypothesis that online routine activity (e.g., online exposure) increases the likelihood of
cybercrime victimization, some studies found that there is no effect of online routine
activity on cybercrime victimization (e.g., Holt & Bossler, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2013).
Interestingly, online routine activity is strongly associated with interpersonal
cybercrime (e.g., cyberbullying, cyberstalking, cyber-harassment, internet fraud), whereas
online routine activity is less likely to influence the likelihood of computer crime
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victimization (e.g., hacking, malware infection, unauthorized access, identity theft). For
instance, Pratt and associates (2010) empirically examined the associations between
personal characteristics, online routines, and Internet fraud victimization. Data from a
representative sample of 922 respondents from a statewide survey in Florida were analyzed.
Pratt and colleagues assessed whether online routine activities and sociodemographic
characteristics increase the likelihood of Internet fraud victimization. The findings of their
study showed that online routine activities such as online purchases and visiting online
forums were statistically significant factors to increase the risk of internet fraud
victimization. Additionally, Reyns (2013) found that online routine activity variables –
online banking, online shopping, e-mail or IM, and downloading free software/music/video
– were positively related with the odds of identity theft victimization.
Despite numerous studies estimating the effects of capable guardianship and online
routine activity theory on reducing cybercrime victimization, there is a gap in the literature.
For example, Williams’ study was limited due to only focusing on the online identity theft
victimization. Also, other studies (e.g., Bossler & Holt, 2009; Reyne, 2013; Choi, 2008;
Choi & Lee, 2017) have significant limitations with their sample derived from college
student populations that may make the findings hard to generalize to the broader population.
Therefore, the present study contributes to extend previous works aimed at testing the
effect of guardianship on various types of cybercrime victimization (i.e., online identity
theft, phishing email, purchase fraud, extremist materials, and cyberattack) and diverse
population with the Special Eurobarometer Surveys from 2012 through 2014.
Perceived Risk of Cybercrime Victimization. Several studies have suggested that
there is a link between perceived risk of crime and crime victimization. Rader, May, and
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Goodrum (2007) and Ferarro (1995) contend that perceived risk is a cognitive or rational
judgment that determines the likelihood of crime victimization. The perceived risk of crime
may be directly/indirectly formed by experience of crime victimization or certain crime
awareness programs. Further, Reisig, Pratt, and Holtfreter (2009) and Warr (2000) assert
that perceived risk of crime victimization may cause individuals to constrain themselves to
change their daily routine activities.
It is important to note that perceived risk of cyber-threats, in conjunction with
individuals’ online routine activities and implementing digital capable guardians, operates
to increase or decrease the likelihood of cybercrime victimization (Reyns, 2013). Few
studies have been conducted on the relationship between perceived risk of cyberadversaries and cybercrime victimization. For example, Reyns (2013) found that perceived
risk of identity theft victimization was statistically and positively associated with the odds
of identity theft victimization. The finding of Reyns’ (2013) study revealed that those
perceiving themselves as at high risk of identity theft were three times more likely to be
victimized for identity theft. Consistent with previous research, Riek, Bohme, and Moore
(2015) examined whether the relationship between cybercrime experience and avoidance
of online services is mediated by perceived risk of cybercrime. They asserted that
individuals who perceived less cybercrime risk are more likely to participate in online
activities. To that end, findings of the relationship between perceived risk of cyber-threats
and cybercrime victimization have been inconsistent or in an unpredicted (inverse)
direction. Illustrating the causal relationship between perceived risk of cyber-threats and
cybercrime victimization remains an open empirical question; thus, future studies are
needed to clarify the nature of those associations. This study employed a single pooled
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sample drawn from three existing cohort studies which have been collected at three
consecutive time points (i.e., 2012, 2013, 2014) from individuals across twenty-eight
European countries because integrative data analysis can have “the potential to provide
substantial increases in statistical power for testing research hypotheses through the
combination of multiple individual data sets” (Cohen, 1992; Maxwell, 2004; Curran &
Hussong, 2009, p, 5).
Mediation Effects on Cybercrime Victimization Through Perceived Risk. To
date, studies concerning mediation effects of perceived risk on cybercrime victimization
are very rare. Riek, Bohme, and Moore (2015) found the relationship between cybercrime
victimization and avoidance intention from online services is mediated by perceived risk
of cybercrime. Although Riek and colleagues’ (2015) study applied the perceived risk of
cybercrime concept to measure the mediation effect on avoidance intention from online
services, it was not a study to investigate the mediation effect on the relationship between
perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization. To that end, there is no study
investigating whether online routine activity and capable guardianship mediate the impact
of perceived cyber threat risk on cybercrime victimization. This phase of the dissertation
examines whether the variables (online routine activity and digital capable guardianship)
mediate the relationship between perceived risk of cyber threats and cybercrime
victimization. As a result, the current study contributes to the existing literature by testing
the theoretical explanation and the statistical significance of mediating analysis for the
associations between human factors (e.g., perception of risk and online behavior) and the
nature of cybercrime victimization.
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In reviewing the literature, previous studies provide mixed evidence regarding the
associations between online routine activity (i.e., online exposure), digital capable
guardianship, and cybercrime victimization. In a broad sense, there is no specific study to
provide support that these variables have mediation effects on the relationship between
perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization. Therefore, the current study
aims to build on the study of the existing literature (e.g., Riek, Bohme, & Moore, 2015)
and add to the embryonic literature on cognitive and behavioral research of cybercrime.
The specific research questions and hypotheses related to the relationships between the
perceived risk of cyber-threat, online routine activity, digital capable guardianship, and
cybercrime victimization among European citizens are described below.
First, Riek, Bohme, and Moore (2015) found that perceived cybercrime risk
decreases the likelihood of online activities (e.g., online shopping, banking, emails, social
networking). Similar to the work of Riek and colleagues (2015), these two hypotheses test
the associations between perceived risk of cyber-threat, online routine activity, and digital
capable guardianship.
Research question [Q4]: Is there a relationship between online routine activity, digital
capable guardianship, perceived risk of cyber-threat, and cybercrime victimization?
Hypothesis [H10]: Perceived risk of cyber-threat is negatively associated with online
routine activity.
Hypothesis [H11]: Perceived risk of cyber-threat is positively associated with digital
capable guardianship (avoidance personal guardianship and passive physical guardianship).

84

Hypothesis [H12]: Perceived risk of cyber-threat is negatively associated with cybercrime
victimization.
Hypothesis [H13]: Online routine activity is positively associated with cybercrime
victimization.
Hypothesis [H14]: Digital capable guardianship (avoidance personal guardianship and
passive physical guardianship) is negatively associated with cybercrime victimization.
Lastly, the final hypothesis in this chapter tests the mediation effect of perceived
risk of cyber-threat on cybercrime victimization through online routine activity and digital
capable guardianship.
Research question [Q5]: Is the relationship between perceived risk of cyber-threat and
cybercrime victimization mediated by online routine activity or digital capable
guardianship?
Hypothesis [H15]: Online routine activity and digital capable guardianship mediate the
relationship between perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization.

Figure 4. Mediation Effects
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Methodology
Data. Data used in this study was derived from the Special Eurobarometer Surveys,
which were conducted from 2012 through 2014. The Eurobarometer series is a crossnational survey program conducted on behalf of the European Commission. The main
purpose of the Eurobarometer survey is to monitor public opinion in the European Union
(EU) member countries. The Eurobarometer consists of standard modules and special topic
modules. The special topic modules include Quality of Transport, Cyber Security, Value
Added Tax, and Public Health. Regarding the topic of cybersecurity, citizens in the
European countries were asked their views concerning risks of cybercrime, respondents’
use of the internet, how cybersecurity concerns have altered respondents’ online behavior,
prevention of online harassment of household children, and concern about and experience
with being victims of cybercrime. In addition, demographic and other background
information (i.e., age, gender, nationality, marital status, occupation, political preference,
education, household composition, ownership of a fixed or mobile telephone and other
goods, and Internet use) were collected.
Face-to-face survey interviews were implemented in participant’s homes in the
appropriate national language. Also, Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) was
utilized in those countries where this technique was applicable. The process of data
collections has been sequentially carried out by different sample populations in the
European Union member countries. First, the data collection of Eurobarometer 77.2:
Economic and Financial Crisis, Helplines for Social Services, Railway Competition, Food
Production and Quality, and Cyber Security, March 2012 was conducted for 26,593
respondents (the 27 nationalities of the European Union) aged 15 and over between March
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10-25, 2012 (67.4% response rate). Second, the data collection of Eurobarometer 79.4:
Economic and Financial Crisis, Helplines for Social Services, Railway Competition, Food
Production and Quality, and Cyber Security, May-June 2013 was executed for 27,680
respondents aged 15 and over between May and June 2013 (67.5% response rate). Third,
the data collection of Eurobarometer 82.2: Economic and Financial Crisis, Helplines for
Social Services, Railway Competition, Food Production and Quality, and Cyber Security,
October 2014 was executed for 27,868 respondents (the 28 nationalities of the European
Union) aged 15 and over between October 11-20, 2014 (70.5% response rate). Using
listwise deletion, all cases with missing values are dropped from the analysis. To that end,
a sample of 51,407 was utilized in this study in order to maintain the consistency of using
exact same question items for independent and dependent variables from 2012 to 2014.
Measures. According to Haynes and Giblin (2014), some researchers apply factor
analysis to decrease the number of survey items to a single causal factor (e.g., Pelfrey,
2007), or sum the survey items into a single additive index (e.g., Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer,
2010; Randol, 2012). While the current study employs a single additive index to create a
dependent variable, factor analysis is applied for creating independent variables.
Dependent variable. A dependent variable for cybercrime victimization was
created through adding five survey items. The experience of cybercrime was measured by
asking the question: “How often have you experienced or been a victim of the following
cybercrime types in the past year?” To answer the question, respondents chose from the
following lists: 1) identity theft, 2) fraudulent e-mail, 3) purchase fraud, 4) extremist
materials, and 5) cyberattacks. In the present study, survey responses for each of the five
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items were coded (0 indicating never; 1 indicating occasionally; 2 indicating often) and
summed into an index ranging from 0 to 10 (α = .64).
Independent variables. Eighteen survey items were gathered to measure five
aspects of the online users’ behaviors and perception, including perceived risk of cyberthreat, online exposure, and cybersecurity actions. A series of factor analyses, specifically
principal components extraction with varimax rotation, was employed to reduce the
number of survey items into each component without significant loss of items (see Table
11). Rather than enter all 18 items simultaneously, items were entered into individual
analyses based on Cronbach’s Alpha reliability tests and empirical literature (Back, Sung,
& LaPrade, 2017; Engel, de Vasconcelos, & Zannin, 2014; Haynes & Giblin, 2014;
Monyai, Lesaoana, Darikwa, & Nyamugure, 2016).
Perceived risk of cyber-threat. Survey respondents were asked: “How concerned
are you personally about experiencing or being a victim of the following cybercrimes?”
Responses to six items, each reflecting a different type of cybercrime (identity theft,
fraudulent e-mail, purchase fraud, child pornography, extremist materials, cyberattacks),
were scored on a scale (1 indicating not at all concerned; 2 indicating not very concerned;
3 indicating fairly concerned; 4 indicating very concerned). The scores created a single
perceived risk component accounting for 70% of the variance in the indicators (α = .91)
which means that 70% variance will be explained by the other factor.
Online routine activity. Online routine activity was measured as the second
component. Online exposure is captured using measures derived from Holt and Bossler
(2013), Reyns and Henson (2016), Choi and Lee (2017). Respondents were asked: “Which
of the following activities do you do online?” The routine online activities include online
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banking, online purchase, online selling, using social networking sites, and using email.
Original survey responses were dichotomously coded (0 indicating no; 1 indicating yes).
The scores provided a single online routine activity component accounting for 38% of the
variance in the indicators (α = .59) which means that 38% variance will be explained by
the other factor.
Avoidance personal guardianship. Consistent with Williams’ (2016) definition,
“avoidance personal guardianship” was assessed with 2 survey items. Respondents were
asked: “Has concern about cyber-threat issues made you less likely to engage in online
purchases?” and “Has concern about cyber-threat issues made you less likely to engage in
online banking?” Responses were dichotomously coded (0 indicating no; 1 indicating yes).
A correlation matrix indicates that there is an association between these two items (r = 0.42,
p < .001). The scores established a single additive component accounting for 65% of the
variance which means that 65% variance will be explained by the other factor.
Passive physical guardianship. Passive physical guardianship consists of target
hardening efforts (e.g., anti-virus software execution, using only one computer, using spam
filtering system), which can reduce the likelihood of a cybercriminal event occurring
(Bossler & Holt, 2009; Choi, 2008; Choi & Lee, 2017; Choi, Scott, & LeClair, 2016; Holt
& Bossler, 2008; Reyns et al., 2011; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Williams, 2016).
Respondents were asked: “Has concern about cyber-threat issues made you only visit
websites you know and trust?,” “Has concern about cyber-threat issues made you not open
emails from people you don’t know?,” “Has concern about cyber-threat issues made you
only use your own computer?,” and “Has concern about cyber-threat issues made you
install anti-virus software?” Responses were dichotomously coded (0 indicating no; 1
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indicating yes). The scores provided a single passive physical guardianship component
accounting for 46% of the variance in the indicators (α = .61) which means that 46%
variance will be explained by the other factor.
Control variables. Control variables in this study include two demographic
background variables: gender (0 = female, 1= male) and age (ranged from 15 to 99).
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics (N = 51407)
Variables

Mean

SD

Min

Max

.90

1.87

0

10

Identity theft experience

.07

.29

0

2

Fraudulent email experience

.40

.62

0

2

Purchase fraud experience

.11

.35

0

2

Extremist materials experience

.17

.43

0

2

Cyberattacks experience

.15

.38

0

2

Perceived risk: Identity theft

2.71

.97

1

4

Perceived risk: Fraudulent email

2.49

.97

1

4

Perceived risk: Purchase fraud

2.46

.96

1

4

Perceived risk: Child pornography

2.50

1.07

1

4

Perceived risk: Extremist materials

2.29

.98

1

4

Perceived risk: Cyberattacks

2.42

.95

1

4

Online activity: Online banking

.57

.49

0

1

Online activity: Online purchase

.52

.50

0

1

Online activity: Online selling

.19

.38

0

1

Online activity: Social network

.57

.49

0

1

Online activity: Email

.86

.35

0

1

Digital guardian 1: Less online purchase

.16

.36

0

1

Digital guardian 1: Less online banking

.12

.33

0

1

Digital guardian 2: Only trusted websites

.36

.47

0

1

Digital guardian 2: Reject unknown email

.47

.49

0

1

Digital guardian 2: Only use own computer

.34

.47

0

1

Digital guardian 2: Anti-virus

.55

.49

0

1

.47

.49

0

1

42.92

16.10

15
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Dependent Variable:
Cybercrime Victimization
Items for variables

Control Variables
Gender
Age
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Table 11. Four-Factor Analysis Solutions with Indicators
Analysis

Components

Indicators

Cronbach’s

Factor

Percent of variance

Alpha

loadings

explained by factor

.91

.70-.80

70.07

.59

.60-.80

38.60

.50

.80-.90

65.91

.61

.60-.75

46.13

reliability
1

Perceived risk Level of concern for (1) identity theft, (2) fraudulent
of cyber-

emails, (3) online fraud for purchase, (4) child

threat

pornography, (5) extremist material, and (6)
cyberattack

2

3

Online

Online backing, online purchase, online selling,

exposure

using social networking sites, and using email

Avoidance

Less likely to buy goods online, less likely to bank

personal

online

guardianship
4

Passive

Only visit websites you know and trust, do not open

physical

emails from people you don’t know, only use your

guardianship

computer, have installed anti-virus software
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Analytic Method. All models were estimated using SPSS 23. First, a correlation
matrix was provided to show bivariate relationships between variables. Second, a series of
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were employed in order to test hypothesis 1015 concerning the association between perceived risk of cyber-threat, online routine
activity, and digital capable guardianship (avoidance personal guardianship and passive
physical guardianship). The OLS regression models were suitable to analyze this data since
the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable were linear. The
Shapiro-Wilk test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (K-S Test) determined that the
dependent variable (see Flatt & Jacobs, 2019) was normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test:
p > .05; 1-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test: p > .05). In addition, all the tolerance values
are over .20 and all the VIF statistics are less than 10; therefore, there is no problem for
multicollinearity among variables. The analyses began with a bivariate regression where
perceived risk of cyber-threat is modeled as the sole predictor of cybercrime victimization
in order to obtain a baseline association. Next, demographic variables (i.e., gender and age)
were added to the OLS regression model. Also, online exposure and cybersecurity action
1 and 2 variables were added to the model.
To measure meditation effects between perceived risk of cyber-threat, avoidance
personal guardianship and passive physical guardianship, and cybercrime victimization,
the Process macro for SPSS developed by Hayes (2017) was employed. The analysis
proceeds in a series of steps for mediation testing. As the first step, this analysis starts with
establishing a baseline model determining the direct effects of the independent variables
(e.g., perceived risk of cyber-threat) on cybercrime victimization. The second step included
estimating the direct effects of the perceived risk of cyber-threat on three mediators (e.g.,
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online routine activity, avoidance personal guardianship, and passive physical
guardianship) respectively. In the third step, three mediators were added as a full model to
estimate both the direct effects on cybercrime victimization and the mediating effects on
the relationship between the perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization.
The results of the OLS regression models via Process macro are displayed in Table 14, 15,
and 16.
Results
Bivariate Relationships. Table 12 shows the bivariate correlations of the study
variables. Perceived risk of cyber-threat and online routine activity had positive
relationships with cybercrime victimization. Other independent variables (i.e., avoidance
personal guardianship, passive physical guardianship, and gender) were positively, though
weakly, correlated with cybercrime victimization, whereas age was negatively correlated
with cybercrime victimization. Overall, in Table 12, the independent variables were small
effects on the dependent variable. However, as the concept of substantive significance,
when considering the very large amount of sample size (N = 51,407) in this study, it was
meaningful to explain the likelihood of cybercrime victimization by using these five
independent variables. Additionally, small effects may also be considered meaningful if
they trigger big consequences, if they change the perceived probability that larger outcomes
might occur, or they accumulate into larger effects (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Liao, 2003;
Ellis, 2010).
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Table 12. Correlations of the Study Variables

1

2

3

4

5

1. Cybercrime
Victimization

1

2. Perceived
risk of cyberthreat

.140**

1

3. Online
routine
activity

.197**

-.037**

4. Avoidance
personal
guardianship
(APG)

.034**

.133**

-.178**

5. Passive
physical
guardianship

.034**

.080**

.238**

.057**

6. Gender

.066**

-.088**

.021**

-.016**

-.024**

-.095**

-.086**

-.093**

.019**

.121**

7. Age

6

7

1

1

1

1
.022**

1

Note: **p < .01

Regression Analyses. Table 13 presents the results of the series of ordinary least
squares (OLS) hierarchical regressions and mediation analyses conducted in order to
investigate the hypotheses. Model 1 indicates that there is a statistically significant, positive
relationship between perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization (b = .20,
SE = .001, β = .14, p < .001).This finding indicates that individuals with higher perceived
risk of cyber-threat are more likely to experience cybercrime victimization which is the
opposite of the predicted direction of hypothesis 12. Model 2 adds the demographic
variables to account for differences in gender and age. As shown, gender (b = .22, SE = .012,
β = .08, p < .001) and age (b = -.01, SE = .001, β = -.09, p < .001) variables are respectively
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significant; moreover, the effect of perceived risk of cyber-threat was statistically
unchanged (b = .20, SE = .001, β = .14, p < .001). These results reveal that male individuals
were more likely to experience cybercrime victimization than females. Older individuals
were less likely to experience cybercrime victimization.

Table 13. Ordinary Least Squares Results of Predicting Cybercrime Victimization
(N = 51407)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Variables

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

Perceived
risk

.20***

.001

.20***

.001

.20***

.001

Online
routine
activity

.29***

.004

Avoidance
personal
guardianship

.08***

.005

Passive
physical
guardianship

-.03***

.011

Gender

.22***

.012

.21***

.012

Age

-.01***

.001

-.01***

.001

R2

.020

.033

.074

Note: ***p < .001

As predicted, Model 3 shows that greater online routine activity was positively
associated with cybercrime victimization, while passive physical guardianship was
negatively associated with cybercrime victimization. Specifically, individuals with higher
levels of online routine activity were more likely to experience cybercrime victimization
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(b = .29, SE = .004, β = .21, p < .001); individuals with a higher level of passive physical
guardianship were less likely to experience cybercrime victimization (b = -.03, SE = .011,
β = -.12, p < .001). Interestingly, avoidance personal guardianship was significant, but the
sign was in the direction opposite to what was hypothesized; individuals with a higher level
of avoidance personal guardianship were more likely to experience cybercrime
victimization (b = .08, SE = .005, β = .05, p < .001).
Table 14. Testing for online routine activity as a mediator between perceived risk of
cyber-threat and
cybercrime victimization
b

SE

95% CI

β

.19***

.006

.18, .20

.14

-.03***

.004

-.04, -.02

-.03

Mediator: online routine
activity (Path b)

.27***

.005

.26, .28

.20

Predictor: perceived risk (Path
c’)

.20***

.005

.19, .21

.14

Steps in testing for mediation
Testing Step 1 (Path c)
Outcome: cybercrime
victimization
Predictor: perceived risk

Testing Step 2 (Path a)
Outcome: online exposure
Predictor: perceived risk
Testing Step 3 (Paths b and c’)
Outcome: cybercrime
victimization

Note:
***p < .001
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Mediation Effects. Table 14 contains the analyses to investigate the mediation
hypothesis. Perceived risk of cyber-threat was significantly associated with cybercrime
victimization (b = .19, β = .14, p < .001), path c was significant and the requirement for
mediation in Step 1 was met. In Step 2, perceived risk of cyber-threat was also significantly
associated with online routine activity (b = -.03, β = -.03, p < .001); therefore, the condition
for Step 2 was met (Path a was significant).
To test whether the hypothesized mediator, online exposure, was related to the
outcome, cybercrime victimization was regressed simultaneously on both perceived risk of
cyber-threat and online routine activity (Step 3). Step 3 of the mediation process showed
that the mediator (online routine activity) was significantly associated with cybercrime
victimization controlling for perceived risk (b = .27, β = .20, p < .001). Path b was
significant and the condition for Step 3 was met. When path c’ is zero or lessened, there is
evidence for complete mediation. However, path c’ was still significant, and it was larger
than path c (b = .20, β = .14, p < .001). As such, online routine activity did not mediate the
relationship between perceived risk and cybercrime victimization.
Table 15 presents the analyses of the mediation effect between avoidance personal
guardianship, perceived risk of cyber-threats, and cybercrime victimization. Perceived risk
of cyber-threats was significantly associated with cybercrime victimization (b = .19, β = .14,
p < .001), path c was significant and the requirement for mediation in Step 1 was met. In
Step 2, perceived risk of cyber-threat was also significantly associated with avoidance
personal guardianship (b = .13, β = .13, p < .001), and thus the condition for Step 2 was
met (Path a was significant).
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Table 15. Testing for avoidance personal guardianship as a mediator between
perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization
b

SE

95% CI

β

.19***

.006

.18, .20

.14

.13***

.004

.12, .14

.13

Mediator: avoidance personal
guardianship (Path b)

.02***

.006

.01, .03

.01

Predictor: perceived risk (Path c’)

.19 ***

.006

.17, .20

.14

Steps in testing for mediation
Testing Step 1 (Path c)
Outcome: cybercrime victimization
Predictor: perceived risk
Testing Step 2 (Path a)
Outcome: avoidance personal
guardianship
Predictor: perceived risk
Testing Step 3 (Paths b and c’)
Outcome: cybercrime victimization

Note:
***p < .001

To test whether the hypothesized mediator, avoidance personal guardianship, was
related to the outcome, cybercrime victimization was regressed simultaneously on both
avoidance personal guardianship and perceived risk of cyber-threat (Step3). Avoidance
personal guardianship was significantly associated with cybercrime victimization
controlling for perceived risk of cyber-threat (b = .02, β = .01, p < .001). Thus, path b was
significant and the condition for Step 3 was met. When path c’ was zero or lessened, we
have evidence for complete mediation. Path c’ was still significant, also it was same as path
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c (b = .19, β = .14, p < .001). In short, avoidance personal guardianship did not mediate the
relationship between perceived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization.
Table 16. Testing for passive physical guardianship as a mediator between perceived
risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization
B

SE

95% CI

β

.19***

.006

.18, .20

.14

.07*

.004

.07, .08

.07

Mediator: passive physical
guardianship (Path b)

-.03***

.006

.02, .04

.02

Predictor: perceived risk (Path c’)

.18 ***

.006

.17, .20

.13

Steps in testing for mediation
Testing Step 1 (Path c)
Outcome: cybercrime victimization
Predictor: perceived risk
Testing Step 2 (Path a)
Outcome: passive physical
guardianship
Predictor: perceived risk
Testing Step 3 (Paths b and c’)
Outcome: cybercrime victimization

Note:
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 16 contains the analyses to examine the mediation hypothesis for perceived
risk of cyber-threat, which was significantly associated with cybercrime victimization (b
= .19, β = .14, p < .001), path c was significant and the requirement for mediation in Step
1 was met. As Step 2, perceived risk of cyber-threat was also significantly associated with
passive physical guardianship (b = .07, β = .07, p < .001), and thus the condition for Step
2 was met (Path a was significant). To test whether the hypothesized mediator, passive
physical guardianship, was related to the outcome, cybercrime victimization was regressed
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simultaneously on passive physical guardianship and perceived risk of cyber-threat (Step
3). Passive physical guardianship was significantly and negatively associated with
cybercrime victimization controlling for perceived risk of cyber-threat (b = -.03, β = .02, p
< .001). Therefore, path b was significant and condition for Step 3 was met. When path c’
was zero or lessened, there was evidence for complete mediation. Path c’ was still
significant, but it was smaller than path c (b = .18, β = .13, p < .001). As such, passive
physical guardianship did partially mediate the relationship between perceived risk of
cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization. This means that perceived risk of cyber-threat
increased the mediator (passive physical guardianship), and the mediator was in turn 4%
more likely to reduce cybercrime victimization. While the findings indicate that the effect
was partially mediated, it still remains the case that the association between perceived risk
and victimization was positive, which was opposite to what was hypothesized.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite a large body of literature that has estimated direct effects of digital capable
guardianship (e.g., Choi, 2008; Choi & Lee, 2017; Williams, 2016; Back, 2016) and online
routine activity (e.g., Al-Nemrat, Jahankhani, & Preston, 2010; Bossler & Holt, 2009;
Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Marcum, Higgins, &
Ricketts ,2010; Pratt et. al, 2010; Pyrooz, Decker, & Moule, 2015; Reyns, 2013; Reyns,
2015; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Williams, 2016; Wolfe et al., 2016) on cybercrime
victimization, few studies have empirically examined this association through perceived
risk of cyber-threat for mediation effects. Thus, first, the present study contributes to the
literature revealing the associations between perceived risk of cyber-threat, online routine
activity, avoidance personal guardianship, passive physical guardianship, and cybercrime
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victimization. Further, it sought to determine whether online routine activity, avoidance
personal guardianship, and passive physical guardianship would fully or partially mediate
the impact of perceived risk of cyber-threat on cybercrime victimization. The findings of
this study provide support for the theoretical explanation of the crime triangle framework
to illustrate cybercrime victimization risk. In this section, the results suggest implications
for theory and practice as well as important directions of future criminological research.
The main findings of this study support the extension of the crime triangle
framework to the context of cybercrime victimization. In terms of capable guardianship,
first, passive physical guardianship was negatively associated with cybercrime
victimization. It means that individuals with higher level of passive physical guardianship
are less likely to experience cybercrime victimization. This finding is consistent with what
Back (2016), Choi (2008), Choi and Lee (2017), and Williams (2016) reported. Second,
the study showed that online routine activity was positively associated with cybercrime
victimization. To do this, individuals who are with higher level of online exposure are more
likely to experience cybercrime victimization. This finding is also consistent with what
several researchers (Back 2016; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Choi, 2008; Choi & Lee, 2017;
Holtfreter et al, 2008; Marcum et al., 2010; Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns, 2013) have reported.
Third, similar to the results of Williams’ (2016) study, avoidance personal guardianship
was positively associated with cybercrime victimization which was the unpredicted
direction of hypothesis 14. Fourth, the results indicate that perceived risk of cyber-threat is
positively associated with cybercrime victimization which is the unpredicted direction of
hypothesis 12, though it is consistent with what Renys (2013) reported. In line with
previous research’s findings for demographic profiles of cybercrime victims (e.g.,
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Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008), these results also found that individuals who were female
and older are less likely to experience cybercrime victimization.
Further, with respect to mediation effects, the results in this study provide evidence
that passive physical guardianship has a mediation effect on the relationship between
pereived risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimization; however, online routine activity
and avoidance personal guardianship did not mediate the relationship between perceived
risk of cyber-threat and cybercrime victimzation. There is a possible explanation as to why
the passive physical guardianship had mediating effects. Higher perceived risk of cyberthreat reinforces the passive physical guardianship, and the higher passive physcial
guardianship is in turn reducing the likelihood of cybercrime victimization. Overall, the
main results hightlight that strong passive physical guardianship (e.g., installing/operating
anti-virus software, avoiding to visit untrustful websites) is a key factor to efficiently
protect online users against cybercriminals. Lastly, as stated above, there is no study to
empirically test the mediating effect of percieved risk of cyber-threat on cybercrime
victimization through capable guardianship; therefore, this study contributes to the existing
literaure in cybercriminology and victimology.
Policy Implications. The findings of this study provide significant implications
for practice. From a policy and practice standpoint, the findings of this study in table 12
and 13 point out the importance of efforts to reduce the potential for cybercrime
victimization through reinforcing the level of passive physical guardianship.

In fact,

individuals’ protective behaviors (e.g., using only their own computer, email spam filtering,
running anti-virus and secure browsing) appear to be able to reduce the likelihood of
cybercrime victimization. Holt, Lee, Liggett, Holt, and Bossler (2019) claim that training
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programs can also effectively improve the importance of cybersecurity awareness in which
it increases individuals’ competence and preparation to prevent cybercrime rather than
experience crime victimization. For instance, the City of London Police have had success
by implementing the Economic Crime Academy Training series which trained stakeholders
in the typology of the cybercrime, cybercriminals’ behavior and victim response in a way
that efficiently reduced their victimization experiences online (Levi, Doig, Gundur, Wall,
& Williams, 2016). Similarly, according to Cyber-Digital Task Force Report provided by
the U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ, 2018), DOJ attempts to help victims of
cybercrime dampen the effects of exploitation and speed their recovery though building
relationships and sharing cyber threat information with private and public sectors. For
example, the FBI disseminates numerous reports geared directly to the private sector
regarding ongoing or emerging domestic- and international level cyber threats. Recently,
the FBI hosted workshops targeting multiple levels of stakeholders in collaboration with
the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service, Healthcare and
High-Risk Security Services, and the National Council of ISACs to implement a
ransomware campaign which educated over 5,700 individuals about one of the emerging
cyber threats, ransomware. As such, the dissemination of cybersecurity awareness can
effectively reinforce individuals’ protective behaviors for the online domain which may
help defend themselves against sophisticated cyber threats.
Limitations. There are several limitations of this study in this chapter that must be
discussed. First, although a series of cross-sectional datasets (2012, 2013, 2014) were
utilized in this study, and thus, the findings provided correlations between perceived risk
of cyber-threat, online activity, guardianships, and cybercrime victimization, it was unable

104

to reveal the time-ordering of causal effects. Bivariate relationships can exist between
dependent variable and independent variables. For example, individuals who experience
cybercrime victimization may be more likely to have higher level of perceived risk of
cyber-threat or individuals who experiene cybercrime victimization may be less likely to
engage in online activity. For future study, it will be beneficial to use panel data to better
establish proper temporal order between perecived risk of cyber-threats, online activity,
guardianship, and cybercrime victimization.
Second, although the current study has attempted to explain how perceived risk,
online routine, capable guardianship would act as preventative predictors on cybercrime
victimization, there were some measurement issues such as the low value of Cronbach’s
Alpha reliability and variations for principle components extraction. It is possible that the
low alpha value occurred due to a low number of items for variables and the poor interrelatedness between items of heterogeneous constructs. Another measurement issue is
related to construct validity. The current study utilized online routine activity (e.g., online
banking/shopping/selling/using SNSs) to explain how online exposure influence the
likelihood of cybercrime victimization. However, it was limited to test the validity of the
criminological theory (e.g., individuals who engage in risky online lifestyle are more likley
to experience cybercrime victimization than individuals who engage in ordinary online
lifestyle such as online banking and online shopping). Lastly, omitted-variable bias might
occur in this study. The survey items utilized for creating variables in this study were
somewhat changed at three consecutive time points (i.e., 2012, 2013, 2014). To that end,
the statistical models leave out some relevant variables (e.g., active personal guardianship
– changing security settings and use different passwords for different sites); thus, it may
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result in the model attributing the effect of the missing variable to the estimated effects of
the included variables (Riegg, 2008).
Future studies should seek to improve upon the measurement issues stated above to
increase the vailidity of research. In addition, further research is needed to expand the
application of risky online lifestyles element to cybercrime victimization and more specific
measures of mediation effects for perceived risk of cybercrime and protective actions on
cybercrime victimizaiton.
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CHAPTER 5
CYBER PLACE MANAGEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING AGAINST A PHISHING
CAMPAIGN
Recently, criminologists and crime prevention practitioners have recognized the
importance of place to criminal activities and found that place management can effectively
prevent potential crime events. For example, several studies demonstrate that increasing
place manager awareness and involvement in or near bars can play a critical role in
preventing drug and violence related crimes (Mandensen, 2007). In a systematic review of
place-focused interventions, Eck (2002) concludes that interventions by owners of
apartment buildings to deal with drug selling on their properties had positive results. In a
broad sense, researchers (e.g., Block & Block, 1995; Clarke, 1997; Danner, 2003; Eck &
Weisburd, 2015; Felson, 1995; Mazerolle, Kadleck, & Roehl, 1998; Mazerolle & Roehl,
1998; Sherman, 1995) suggest that a lack of active place management can facilitate crime
(Mandensen, 2007).
Likewise, in the cyber world, place managers (e.g., information security officials)
are key personnel in the implementation of cybercrime control strategies. In particular,
through the management of accurate cybersecurity settings, the guiding of online users’
behavior, or enforcing cybersecurity regulation, they can create a cybercrime-free
environment for their institutions (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, Son, & Benbasat, 2009). Place
managers (e.g., information security officials) can also implement security awareness
programs in their institutions, which can enhance online users’ protection. In addition,
cybersecurity managers can facilitate the minimization of losses in these organizations and
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mitigate any vulnerabilities, which can help entities increase the resiliency level of the
emergency response to future cyber threats.
To that end, a large body of work (e.g., Block & Block, 1995; Clarke, 1997; Danner,
2003; Eck, 2002; Eck & Weisburd, 2015; Felson, 1995; Mazerolle, Kadleck, & Roehl,
1998; Mandensen, 2007; Sherman, 1995) has highlighted the significance of physical place
and neighborhood, which has influenced criminal activities over the past several decades.
Nevertheless, there has been a paucity of research evaluating virtual place management
strategies and addressing cyber incident response tactics. Thus, this chapter seeks to
investigate the effectiveness of the application of place management on crime prevention
in an online setting. The next sections will discuss background, the research question,
hypothesis, methods used, the variables included in the analysis and their
operationalization criteria, and the major findings.
Background
Research on Cybersecurity Awareness Programs. Cybersecurity awareness
program evaluations are important for assessing the effectiveness of and weaknesses in
existing awareness programs in the chosen strategy and methods (Rantos, Fysarakis, &
Manifavas., 2012). First, previous research (see Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010;
Labuschagne, Burke, Veerasamy, & Eloff, 2011; Rantos et al., 2012; Rezgui & Marks,
2008; Pastor, Diaz, & Castro, 2010) regarding cybersecurity awareness programs has
focused on demonstrating a conceptualized framework of cybersecurity awareness
programs. For example, Rantos, Fysarakis, and Manifavas (2012) proposed an evaluation
framework to assess cybersecurity awareness programs. This evaluation methodology
includes the evaluation of user cybersecurity awareness and cybersecurity management.
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The work of Labuschagne and colleagues (2011) proposed an interactive game hosted by
social media sites in order to increase users’ cybersecurity awareness level. They explained
this training platform includes game-based applications such as hypermedia, multimedia,
and hypertext in order to improve the effectiveness of online cybersecurity awareness
programs.
Several studies have investigated the relationships between perception of risk for
cybercrime, computer self-efficacy, attitude to cybersecurity, and the awareness of
cybersecurity training. Generally, research found support (Kim, 2013; Mani, Choo, &
Mubarak, 2014; Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2014; Ryan, 2007;
Slusky & Partow-Navid, 2012) that the perceived risk of cyber-threats, computer selfefficacy, and personal innovation measures are positively associated with the awareness of
information security practices. In an information security awareness evaluation study,
Ryan (2007) pointed out that individuals with a higher level of personal innovation and
computer self-efficacy were more likely to have a higher level of information security
awareness.
Next, a large body of research has tested whether cybersecurity awareness
programs are effective enough to make people aware of their roles, vulnerability, and cyber
threats. Previous studies have examined the effectiveness of various platforms of
cybersecurity awareness programs (e.g., web-based training, brochures and company
magazine, posters, emails, interactive video games, puzzles). To measure effectiveness,
several types of methods (interview, self-report survey, pre- and post- experimental study,
vocabulary test, game tool, clicking on the phishing link) have been utilized. Most studies
(e.g., Albrechtsen, 2007; Ariyapperuma & Minhas, 2005; Charoen, Raman, & Olfman,
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2008; Chen, Shaw, & Yang, 2006; Cone, Irvine, Thompson, & Nguyen, 2007; Dasgupta,
Ferebee, & Michalewicz, 2013; Denning, Lerner, Shostack, & Kohno, 2013; Drevin,
Kruger, & Steyn, 2007; Furnell et al., 2010; Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Ole Johnsen, 2011;
Talib, Clarke, Furnell, 2010) have found that the existing cybersecurity awareness
programs have effectively increased user cybersecurity awareness. For example, the work
of Charoen, Raman, and Olfman (2008) tested the issues inherent in password management
and revealed that a cybersecurity training program helped to improve system user’s
behavior relevant to password management. Interestingly, Chen, Shaw, and Yang (2006)
evaluated whether online users from the U.S. and Taiwan who received information
security training in off-line and online platforms show different levels of cybersecurity
awareness. The results in Chen and colleagues’ (2006) study found that these training
programs were effective to American users who received these training, whereas the
programs did not have any impact on Taiwanese users who received this training. In
addition, several scholars contend that traditional security awareness platforms such as
classroom-based teaching, online education and poster/email campaigns are not effective
in enforcing users’ information security awareness or practice. Cone and colleagues (2007)
and Foreman (2004) asserted that interactive computer-based training (e.g., video games)
are powerful teaching tools for effective cybersecurity awareness training.
Cyber Awareness Programs. Previous studies have found that place managers
build crime-free environments in certain locations by enforcing rules of conduct, acting as
guardians, or providing employees and students with crime intervention training programs.
Cybersecurity awareness or information security awareness programs are designed to train
individuals regarding safety precautions and online defense methods (e.g., protecting
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existing resources [Banerjee, Cronan, & Jones, 1998; Denning, 1999; Halibozek &
Kovacich, 20017; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Zegiorgis, 2002]). Drevin, Kruger, and Steyn
(2007) explicated that cybersecurity awareness can assist in decreasing human error,
identity theft, internet fraud, and misuse of digital assets. Given the importance of
cybersecurity awareness, relevant training programs are considered as a vital prevention
strategy to inspire, stimulate, establish, and rebuild information security capabilities for
online users as a method of cyber place management (Dlamini & Modise, 2013).
In the last two decades, cybersecurity or information security awareness training
programs have been implemented in academia, and private and public sectors. In order to
create efficient cybersecurity awareness programs, these stakeholders (academia, private
and public sectors) have had interdisciplinary approaches to develop various learning
platforms such as off- and on-line training sessions, email messages, video games, intranetbased access, and poster campaigns. These cybersecurity awareness programs educate
targeted audiences about up-to-date cyber threats and good cybersecurity practices (Piazza,
2006; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Rantos, Fysarakis, & Manifavas, 2012).
In alignment with the trends of security education among universities, FIU’s
Division of Information Technology (DIT) initiated a Cybersecurity Awareness Training
program aimed at enhancing the university community’s awareness of protecting its data
and facilities from cyber adversaries. The purpose of this cybersecurity awareness program
is to enhance the awareness level of cyber threats as well as provide FIU’s employees selfprotection knowledge against potential cyber-threats. The FIU cybersecurity awareness
training program is an online-based course. Online learning has several distinct advantages
such as extendibility, accessibility, and suitability (Bonk, 2002; Habibi & colleagues, 2018;
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James, 2002). For instance, online users can proceed through an online training at their
own pace/place and access the training at any time. Also, online learning platform can save
travel cost and time because learners directly received training materials through Web
browsers and Internet connections instead of the other way around.
Given the significance of its purpose and convenience, this online cybercrime
prevention program is in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
and the U.S. National Cyber Security Alliance. In order to help the University community
identify and prevent the loss of sensitive data and protect existing resources, FIU requires
all FIU employees to take the training within 3 months of assignment. Specifically, the
FIU’s DIT provides this online training program to FIU employees with the option to
complete a pretest for 18 Cybersecurity Core Knowledge modules or FIU employee can
watch the video lectures for each module and complete the corresponding module quizzes
(Awareness Training, 2019). The total view time for the cybersecurity awareness training
is 1 hour and 10 minutes but the training ought not to be completed in one sitting. The
topics of these training modules include social engineering, email and phishing, browsing
safety, social networks, mobile devices, passwords, data security, hacking, targeted attacks,
and malware. FIU is the fourth-largest university in the United States with 55,112 students
and 2,900 faculty members (US News, 2019). Considering the tremendous population size
and various academic facilities of FIU, the initiative of the cybersecurity awareness
program can be a very significant strategy to help one of the biggest universities in the U.S.
maintain its assets under cyber-hygiene.
Research Testing Cybersecurity Awareness Programs and Phishing
Campaign Tests. Importantly, to date, few studies (Caputo, Pfleeger, Freeman, & Johnson,
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2013; Kumaraguru & associates, 2009; Nyeste & Mayhorn, 2010; Sheng et al., 2007) have
examined the practical phishing campaign to test online users’ vulnerability against
cybercrime. Phishing is defined as an act in which fraudulent email or websites or links
make targeted online users succumb to a data breach or reveal their personal information,
similar to identity theft (Kumarguru et al., 2009). The body of research examining the
effectiveness of cybersecurity awareness programs via the application of phishing
campaigns tests is mixed. For instance, in an evaluation study of anti-phishing training by
Kumarguru et al. (2009), 515 individuals were randomly assigned to three groups (control
group, 1st training session group, and 2nd training session group) and all participants
received a series of 3 legitimate and 7 phishing campaign emails over the course of 28 days.
Similar to Kumarguru et al.’s study, Caputo et al.’s (2014) study empirically investigated
whether individuals who received a phishing training program would be less likely to click
on spear phishing links as compared to others who were not recipients of the training. Shen
et al. (2007) designed a cybersecurity awareness game and tested whether its game was
influential in increasing participants’ capability in identifying fraudulent web sites after the
training. Nyeste and Mayhorn (2010) employed an experimental design study with a
treatment group and control group in order to assess the effectiveness of anti-phishing
programs.
While three studies (i.e., Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2007; Nyeste &
Mayhorn, 2010) found that anti-phishing awareness programs were effective in reducing
the number of users falling for phishing attacks, the results of Caputo et al.’s (2014) study
revealed that phishing training programs did not help the treated group reduce the
likelihood of falling for phishing attacks. Therefore, these observations call attention to the
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goals of this chapter. The studies by Kumarguru et al., Caputo et al., and Sheng et al. were
based on the computer science field of study, whereas Nyeste and Mayhorn’s study was
relied on the discipline of psychology.
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, the roles of the victim, capable
guardians, and place manager are very significant factors to fight against sophisticated
cyber offenders. Wortley, Sidebottom, Tiley, and Laycock (2018) pointed out that place
managers can play crucial roles in reducing the likelihood that cyber offenders exploit new
crime opportunities in online platforms. In line with that, Wortley and colleagues (2018)
and Scott et al. (2008) argued that the problem analysis triangle (crime triangle) can
provides an efficient framework for enhancing existing approaches to cybercrime
prevention. In considering this need, the literature may need to think carefully about the
extension of place management theoretical perspective derived from cybercrime triangle
framework to cybercrime prevention. Nevertheless, to date, there is no research to devise
a comprehensive cybercrime triangle framework, especially with virtual place management.
Despite the known implications of cyber place management (i.e., cybersecurity awareness
programs) for enhancing online users’ capabilities to defend against cyber threats, little
attention has been directed at examining the effectiveness of cybersecurity awareness
training or phishing awareness training on preventing cybercrime victimization by
criminologists. Of these, the current study builds on this small body of research by the
extension of crime triangle framework with place management to cyberspace and
examining the effectiveness of an existing cybersecurity awareness training program
through a criminological framework.
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As a cyber place management strategy, currently, FIU cybersecurity online training
teaches FIU employees a complicated set of rules for differentiating between safe and
unsafe links; moreover, its training educates employees to never click a suspicious link and
never give out personal information in response to suspicious requests. The existing
literature (e.g., Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2007; Nyeste & Mayhorn, 2010;
Broadhurst, Skinner, Sifniotis, Matamoros-Macias, & Lpsen, 2018) indicates that
individuals who were trained by cybersecurity awareness programs were less likely to fall
for phishing attacks. In order to build upon previous research, the current study in this
chapter specifically seeks to investigate whether a cyber place management method (i.e.,
FIU’s web-based cybersecurity awareness training program) successfully assists users in
not falling prey to a phishing campaign. Similar to the works of Kumarguru et al. (2009)
and Caputo et al. (2014), the research question and hypothesis are as the follows:
Research question [Q6]: As a cyber place management strategy, is the cybersecurity
awareness training program at question effective in reducing the incidence of cybercrime,
including phishing scams?
Hypothesis [H16]: An individual who completed the cybersecurity awareness training is
less likely to fall for the phishing campaign trial than someone who did not complete this
training.
Methodology
Data. The current study uses data derived from the Division of Information
Technology (DIT) at FIU. This data includes 1) whether the FIU employees (i.e., student
assistants, temporary non-student workers, staff, administration, faculty, and executives)
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fell for the phishing campaign and 2) the FIU employees’ status of completing the
cybersecurity awareness program. As stated above, the main objective of the FIU’s
cybersecurity awareness program is to enhance the awareness level of cyber threats and
provide FIU employees the self-protection knowledge to defend themselves – and thereby
the institution itself – against potential cyber-threats. In October 2018, FIU’s DIT launched
its online based “Cybersecurity Awareness Training” to assist all FIU faculty and staff
identify and prevent the loss of sensitive data.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the cybersecurity awareness program, a quasiexperimental research design was used. According to some scholars (Campbell & Stanley,
2015; Randolph, Falbe, Manuel, & Balloun, 2009; Thyer, 2012), quasi-experimental
designs in evaluation are frequently employed in the evaluation of educational programs
when random sample selection is not practical or possible. At the start of this study, the
FIU’s DIT staffs selected one group of the FIU staffs (1000 individuals) who completed
the FIU cybersecurity awareness program between October 2018 and April 2019 while the
FIU’s DIT staffs selected the other group of the FIU staffs (1000 individuals) who did not
complete the FIU cybersecurity awareness program from 41 departments or offices across
the University. Additionally, the FIU’s DIT staffs assigned them into two groups, one
trained group comprising 1000 participants who completed the FIU cybersecurity
awareness program and one comparison group comprising 1000 participants who did not
complete the FIU cybersecurity awareness program (see Table 17).
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Table 17. Participants from Each Organization
Organization
1. ACAD PLAN & ACCOUNTABILITY
2. ACADEMIC AND CAREER SUCCESS
3. ACADEMIC PROGRAM & PARTNER
4. ADVANCEMENT
5. ATHLETICS
6. BUSINESS AND FINANCE
7. COLL COMM ARCH & THE ARTS
8. COLL OF ENGINEERING & COMPUT
9. COLL OF NURSING & HLTH SCIENC
10. COLL PUBLIC HEALTH & SW
11. COLLEGE ARTS SCIENCES & EDU
12. COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
13. COLLEGE OF LAW
14. COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
15. CONTROLLERS
16. ENROLLMENT SERVICES
17. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
18. FACILITIES
19. FIU ONLINE
20. FROST ART MUSEUM
21. GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
22. HEALTH CARE NETWORK
23. HONORS COLLEGE
24. HUMAN RESOURCES
25. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
26. JEWISH MUSEUM OF FLORIDA-FIU
27. LIBRARY OPERATIONS
28. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS&INFO MGNT
29. OPERATIONS AND SAFETY
30. PRESIDENT OFFICE
31. PROVOST & EXEC ACAD AFFAIRS
32. REGIONAL LOC & INSTL DEV
33. RESEARCH
34. SCH OF HOSPT & TOURISM MGMT
35. SCHOOL INT'L & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
36. STUDENT ACCESS AND SUCCESS
37. STUDENT AFFAIRS
38. THE WOLFSONIAN
39. UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL
40. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
41. GENERAL COUNSEL
Total

Frequency

Percent

17
23
9
18
49
27
56
118
30
43
482
70
25
203
1
30
75
16
77
54
3
2
1
14
7
18
57
5
37
6
44
4
20
6
81
15
72
13
141
6
25
2000

.9
1.2
.4
.9
2.5
1.4
2.8
5.9
1.5
2.2
24.1
3.5
1.3
10.2
.1
1.5
3.8
.8
3.9
2.7
.2
.1
.1
.7
.4
.9
2.9
.3
1.8
.3
2.2
.2
1.0
.3
4.1
.8
3.6
.7
7.0
.3
1.3
100.0

All participants received one simulated phishing attempt between May 15 and 21,
2019. The phishing email indicated that they are a support team from “UTSHelp FIU”,
which did not officially exist on the FIU internal university listserv. The phishing email
announced that someone has attempted to sign into a user’s university web service account,
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called MyFIU (see Figure 5). The phishing email recommended users to click an inserted
link, sending their personal information (e.g., full name, Panther ID, email address,
password, phone number) to UTSHelp FIU. During each trial, FIU security officers
recorded clicks on the phishing links.
Measures
Dependent variables. The dependent variable was whether or not the FIU employee
experienced a ‘fall-for’ cybercrime incident –the phishing scams – after completing (or not
completing) the “Cybersecurity Awareness Program” provided by FIU’s DIT. In this
regard, FIU’s DIT purposely committed the phishing attacks against the treatment group
(who did complete the cybersecurity awareness training course) and the comparison group
(who did not complete the cybersecurity awareness training course). Specifically, FIU’s
DIT distributed phishing campaign emails, which were composed of an illegitimate
authority’s name (i.e., UTSHelp FIU). Afterwards, FIU’s DIT tested whether individuals,
in the treatment/comparison groups, fell victim to these phishing scams. Three dependent
variables are measured using dummy variables: opened email (1 = opened email, 0 =
otherwise), clicked the inserted fraudulent link (1 = clicked link, 0 = otherwise), and
submitted personal information to the inserted fraudulent link (1 = submitted information,
0 = otherwise).
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Figure 5. Template of Phishing Campaign

Treatment indicator. The treatment group was composed of 1000 staff members
who completed the cybersecurity awareness program, whereas the comparison group
consisted of 1000 staff members who did not complete the awareness program. The
assignment to the treatment program is represented by the binary variable TREAT. Subjects
coded 1 were those in the treatment group (TREAT = 1), and subjects who were coded 0
did not participate in the training program and thus were assigned to the comparison group
(CONTROL = 0).
Sociodemographic background variables. Sociodemographic background factors
are included in this study as statistical controls: age (ranged from 17 to 81), gender (0 =
female, 1= male), education (1 = less than high school education, 2 = GED/high school
graduation, 3 = technical school, 4 = Associate degree, 5 = Bachelor’s degree, 6 = Master’s
degree, 7 = Doctoral degree), and length of employment (ranged from 1 year to 47 years).
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The FIU DIT, first, received the information of these sociodemographic background for
both treatment and comparison group from the Division of Human Resources at FIU. It
was then combined with the results of the phishing campaign emails. Afterward, the
identifiable information (i.e., name, FIU Panther Identification number [Panther ID]) have
been deleted to keep the confidentiality of the participants in this study. The race variable
is measured using dummy variables: white (1 = white, 0 = otherwise), black (1 = black, 0
= otherwise), Latino (1 = Latino/Hispanic, 0 = otherwise), and Asian (1 = Asian, 0 =
otherwise); White is used as the reference category. The job category variable is measured
using dummy variables as well: temporary non-student workers (1 = temporary nonstudent workers, 0 = otherwise), work study student (1 = work study student, 0 = otherwise),
student assistant (1 = student assistant, 0 = otherwise), graduate assistant (1 = graduate
assistant, 0 = otherwise), staff (1 = staff, 0 = otherwise), administrative (1 = administrative,
0 = otherwise), faculty (1 = faculty, 0 = otherwise), and executive service (1 = executive
service, 0 = otherwise); Faculty is used as the reference.
Analytic Method. Over several decades, researchers have applied various tests
(e.g., t-test, ANOVA, chi-square test, Mann-Whitney U-test, Mood’s median test, KruskalWallis test) of normality in order to choose statistically appropriate methods for parametric
and non-parametric data (Wilcox, 2003, 2005; Zimmerman, 2011). In fact, when the
dependent variable is normally distributed, the t-test is one of the most common methods
to investigate potential differences between any two groups on a dependent variable; on
the other hand, when the dependent variable is not normally distributed, the Mann-Whitney
U-test can be suggested to examine potential differences between two groups on a
dependent variable (William, 2009). In addition, when researchers suspect that the data is
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non-normal distribution, both t-test and the Mann-Whitney U-test can be applied. As a
result, the current study utilized the t-test and Mann-Whitney test to examine the
differences between the treatment group (those who completed the cybersecurity
awareness training) and the comparison group (those who did not complete the
cybersecurity awareness training) on the dependent variable (i.e., status of response to
phishing campaign).
Further, the Binary Logistic regression model was employed to examine
associations between the dependent variable, cybersecurity awareness training, and
sociodemographic background factors. According to Goodness-of-Fit in the logistic
regression models, Pearson’s Chi-square (i.e., 1.21; 1.20; 1.15) and Deviance measures are
close to 1 — these logistic regression models (see Table 23) were fit to analyze the data.
Also, Omnibus tests are statistically significant (p < .001). The full models with all the IV
is a major improvement over the baseline model.
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Table 18. Descriptive Statistics (N = 2000)
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Opened email

.41

.49

0

1

Clicked link

.19

.39

0

1

Submitted info

.04

.19

0

1

.50

.50

0

1

40.70

14.26

18

82

.43

.49

0

1

White

.24

.42

0

1

Black

.15

.35

0

1

Latino/Hispanic

.53

.49

0

1

Asian

.08

.26

0

1

Education

5.09

1.68

1

7

Length of employment

6.72

6.93

1

47

.18

.38

0

1

Work study

.02

.13

0

1

Student assistant

.06

.24

0

1

Graduate assistant

.04

.20

0

1

Staff

.13

.33

0

1

Administrative

.34

.47

0

1

Faculty

.22

.41

0

1

Executive service

.00

.04

0

1

Response to phishing email

Cybersecurity training
Age
Gender (Male = 1)
Race

Job category
Temporary
non-student worker
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Results
Descriptive Statistics. Tables 18 and 19 present the descriptive statistics for these
data. These tables show mean, standard deviation, frequency and percent of responses to
the phishing email, status of cybersecurity awareness training completion, and
sociodemographic variables. In particular, Table 18 indicates the descriptive statistics of
the dependent and independent variables. Also, Table 19 shows relative sequential
percentages for the group responses to phishing campaign.

Table 19. Descriptive Statistics of the Group Responses to Phishing Campaign
Cybersecurity Awareness Training
Not completed
Frequency

Relative Sequential

Completed
Frequency

Percentages

Relative Sequential
Percentages

Opened email

190

Clicked link

83

44%

301

48%

Submitted data

22

27%

60

19%

627

123

%

%

%

Figure 6. CI Bar Errors for Cybersecurity Training
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Bivariate Relationships. First, Confidence Interval (CI) error bars were employed
to scrutinize whether there are significant differences between the treated group and the
comparison group for the dependent variables (i.e., the behaviors of opening email,
clicking link, and submitting personal information). First, Figure 6 includes three error bars
to further illustrate the differences revealed in the means tests (Cumming, Fidler, & Vaux,
2007). CI error bars do not overlap, which implies that there may be a significant difference
between completing the cybersecurity awareness training and the phishing scam
susceptibility. Since error bars provide clues about statistical significance, the statistical
tests are therefore recommended to draw conclusions. As such, the t-test and Mann
Whitney U-test were utilized to examine the relationships between these variables, as the
following section will show.
Second, an observed correlation matrix is present in Table 20. Those correlations
indicated that cybersecurity awareness training (r = .28, p < .01), age (r = -.06, p < .01),
and Asian (r = .05, p < .05), were statistically correlated with the phishing campaign – the
behavior of clicking the link. Also, it shows that cybersecurity awareness training (r = .10,
p < .01), length of employment (r = .06, p < .01), temporary non-student worker (r = -.11,
p < .01), staff (r = .09, p < .01), administrative (r = .06, p < .01), and faculty (r = -.04, p
< .05) were statistically correlated with the phishing campaign – the behavior of submitting
personal information. Lastly, cybersecurity awareness training (r = .45, p < .01), length of
employment (r = .16, p < .01), temporary non-student worker (r = -.24, p < .01), staff (r
= .06, p < .01), and administrative (r = .18, p < .01) were statistically correlated with the
phishing campaign – the behavior of opening the email.
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Table 20. Correlations of the Study Variables
1
1. OE
2. CL
3. SI
4. CyberT
5. Age

2

3

4

5

1

.25**

.42**

1

.45**

.28**

.10**

1

-.01

-.04

-.06
**

-.01

1

6. Gender

.03

.01

-.03

-.07
**

7. White

.04*

.01

.01

.03

.14*
*
.21*
*

-.06
**

-.01

-.01

-.02

.01

-.02

.03

.05*

.01

.05*

.07*
*

-.01

-.02

.06**

-.01

9.
Hispanic
10. Asian
11.
Education
12. LE
13. TNS
14. WS
15.SA
16.GA
17. Staff

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1
.58**

8. Black

6

.16*
*
-.24
**
-.02
-.05
*
.05*
.06*
*

-.11*
*

.01
.01
-.02
.09**

-.03
-.01
.03
.03
.04

1
.12**

1

-.01

-.08
**

-.23

-.16*

-.09*

-.60

*

*

**

-.01

-.03

.07**

-.04

.22**

.02

.17**

.53**

-.04*

-.01

-.07*
*

-.16*
*

-.28*
*

.02
-.03
-.02
.20**

-.17*
*

-.31*
*

-.14*
*

.14**

.01
-.04
.01
.01

**

1
-.44
**

1

-.16

-.11*

**

*

.21*

-.11*

-.17*

*

*

*

.06*
*

-.10
**

-.07
**

-.06
**

.04*
-.10
**

.07**

-.31
**

-.06*
*

.24**

-.03

.03

.05*

.02
-.04*
-.01

1
.13
**

1

-.01

-.02

1

-.07

-.21

**

**

-.19

-.19
**
-.08*

**

*

-.32

-.18*

-.06
**
-.12*

**

*

*

-.11*

-.09*

*

*

-.02

-.18*

-.05

-.05
*
-.09

*

*

**

-.02

.04

.01

-.12*

.20*

*

*

.13**
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.04*

-.05

-.34

**

**

.17**

1
1
-.03

1
1
-.08
**

1

18

19

20

18.Admin
19.
Faculty
20.
Executive

.18*
*

.06**

-.01

-.01

-.04
*

-.03

.01

.03

-.01

-.08*

-.13*

-.04

-.09*

*

*

*

*

.15**

.32**

.17**

.27*

-.10*

*

*

*

.00

.05*

.02

.01

-.01

.28**
-.17*

-.10

.15*

**

*

-.24*

.14*

.52*

*

*

*

.14**

-.01

.02

.03

.01

.07**

-.34*

-.09

-.18

-.15*

*

**

**

*

-.25*

-.07

-.13

-.11*

-.20*

*

**

**

*

*

-.02

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.27
**

1
-.38
**

1

-.03

.24

1

Note: Opened email (OE); Clicked link (CL); SI (Submitted information); Cybersecurity training (Cyber-T); Length of employment (LE); Temporary non-student
employee (TNS); Work study (WS); Student assistant (SA); Graduate assistant (GA). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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T-test Analysis. The independent t-tests were employed to determine if there were
statistically significant variances of falling for the phishing campaign trial between these
two groups. As shown in Table 21, surprisingly, the treated group had a higher probability
of falling for the phishing campaign trial than the comparison group. The F-ratio under the
“Levene Test” indicates a corresponding probability (sig.) of .000; therefore, the unequal
variance t-test was accurate in this analysis. First, for opening the email, the t-test of rank
scores were statistically different (t (1916.48) = 344.19, p < .001) between the treated group
(M = .63, SD = .48) and the comparison group (M = .19, SD = .39). Second, for clicking
the link, the t-test of rank scores were statistically different (t (1638.13) = 835.32, p < .001)
between the treated group (M = .30, SD = .45) and the comparison group (M = .08, SD
= .27). Last, for submitting personal information, the t-test of rank scores were statistically
different (t (1664.38) = 76.77, p < .001) between the treated group (M = .06, SD = .23) and
the comparisongroup (M = .02, SD = .14). Importantly, however, all these results were in
the unpredicted (inverse) direction. It means that the treated group was more likely to fall
for the phishing campaign trial rather than the comparison group. Thus, hypothesis 16 is
not supported.
Table 21. The t-Test Information to Test a Hypothesis
Cybersecurity training

t-Test for equality of means

Not completed

Completed

M (SD)

M (SD)

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Opened email

.19 (.39)

.63 (.48)

-22.18

1916.48

.000

Clicked link

.08(.27)

.30 (.45)

-12.87

1638.13

.000

Submitted info

.02 (.14)

.06 (.23)

-4.30

1664.38

.000

Response to phishing email

***p < .001
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Mann Whitney U-test Analysis. To compare whether there is a difference in the
dependent variables (submitted information, clicked link, and opened email) for two
independent groups, the Mann-Whitney U-test was applied (see Table 22). Interestingly,
the Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the level of submitting data susceptibility was
greater for individuals who completed cybersecurity awareness training (Mean = 10019.50)
than for individuals that did not receive the cybersecurity awareness training (Mean =
981.50), U = 481000.00, p = .000; the level of clicking inserted link susceptibility was
greater for individuals who did complete cybersecurity awareness training (Mean =
1090.50) than for individuals that did not receive the cybersecurity awareness training
(Mean = 910.50), U = 410000.00, p = .000. For the Mann Whitney U-test model for the
phishing campaigns, the effect size is 0.43, which means there was a moderate effect
between the treatment and comparison groups, according to Cohen’s classification of effect
sizes (0.1 = small effect, 0.3 = moderate effect, and 0.5 and above = large effect). In other
words, the FIU cybersecurity training for online users at FIU had a moderate effect on the
online users’ behaviors to engage in the phishing scam, but in the direction opposite to
what was hypothesized.
Table 22. Mann Whitney U-test Information to Test a Hypothesis
Variable
Opened email
Clicked link
Submitted
information

Group

N

Mean rank

U

P

Not Completed

190

782.00

281500.00

.000

Completed

627

1219.00

Not Completed

83

891.50

391000.00

.000

Completed

301

1109.50

Not Completed

22

981.50

481000.00

.000

Completed

60

1019.50
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Logistic Regression Analysis. In Table 23, the phishing campaign measure was
regressed on the independent variables. As the table illustrates, some independent variables
included in the model are significant predictors of falling for the phishing campaign.
Importantly, few variables (i.e., cybersecurity training, age, and Asian) were significantly
associated with the falling for the phishing campaign: clicked link and submitted personal
information in the logistic regression. Overall, the three models in Table 23 also indicate
there were no statistically significant effects for gender, education, length of employment,
and job category.
Model 1 indicates that FIU employees who completed the cybersecurity awareness
training (b = 1.84, SE = .11, Exp(B) = 6.31, p < 001) had 6.31 times greater odds of opening
the email than FIU employees who did not complete the training. In addition, male
employees had greater odds of opening the email than female employees (b = .30, SE = .10,
Exp(B) = 1.35, p < 01). Those employed longer had slightly greater odds of opening the
email (b = .04, SE = .01, Exp(B) = 1.04, p < 001). The model also showed that those who
were older had lower odds of opening the email (b = -.01, SE = .01, Exp(B) = .98, p < 001).
Temporary non-student workers had lower odds of opening the email (b = -.96, SE = .23,
Exp(B) = .38, p < 001).
Model 2 and 3 introduce the variables to test hypothesis 16 – An individual who
completed the cybersecurity awareness training was more likely to fall for the phishing
campaign trial than someone who did not complete the training. Model 2 and 3 failed to
provide support for the hypothesis 16. Specifically, individuals who completed the
cybersecurity awareness training had 4.35 times greater odds of clicking the inserted link
(b = 1.47, SE = .14, Exp(B) = 4.35, p < 001). Also, the individuals who completed the
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cybersecurity awareness training had 2.65 times greater odds of submitting personal
information than individuals who did not complete the training (b = .97, SE = .27, Exp(B)
= 2.65, p < 01). In sum, the treated group exhibited greater odds of submitting personal
information or clicking a faked link and submitting personal data than the comparison
group.
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Table 23. Logistic Regression Results of Cybersecurity Training and Phishing Campaign
Model 1: Opened email
Variables

Coefficient

SE

Exp (B)

Model 2: Clicked link
Coefficient

Model 3: Submitted Info

SE

Exp (B)

Coefficient

SE

Exp (B)

.27

2.65

Cybersecurity training

1.84***

.11

6.31

1.47***

.14

4.35

Age

-.01***

.01

.98

-.01**

.01

.98

-.02*

.01

.97

.30**

.10

1.35

.21

.12

1.24

-.31

.24

.72

White

.11

.13

1.12

.05

.15

1.05

.40

.30

1.49

Black

.03

.16

1.03

.16

.18

1.18

.06

.36

1.06

Asian

.33

.20

1.39

.09

.23

1.09

.83*

.38

2.30

Education

.06

.04

1.06

.03

.05

1.03

.01

.09

1.00

Length of employment

.04***

.01

1.04

.02

.01

1.02

.01

.02

1.00

Temporary

-.96***

.23

.38

-.38

.27

.68

.01

.52

1.00

Work study

-.40

.47

.66

.03

.52

1.03

-.44

.16

.64

Student assistant

-.48

.32

.61

.14

.36

1.15

.26

.65

1.30

Graduate assistant

.46

.28

1.59

-.09

.34

.91

.25

.56

1.29

-.17

.23

.83

.28

.26

1.32

.49

.50

1.64

Administrative

.02

.18

1.02

-.08

.19

.92

-.07

.39

.93

Executive

.36

.09

1.44

1.78

.05

5.98

-.42

.08

.00

Gender

.97**

Race

Job category

Staff

Sig.

.000

-2 Log Likelihood
Nagelkerke

R2

2192.94

.000
1772.67

.305

.141

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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.001
646.69
.065

As shown in Table 23, those who were older had lower odds of clicking the inserted
link (b = -.01, SE = .01, Exp(B) = .98, p < 01) and the behavior of submitting personal
information (b = -.02, SE = .01, Exp(B) = .97, p < 05). In terms of the race variable, Asians
had 2.3 times greater odds of engaging in “falling for” behavior of submitting personal
information than Hispanics. Most of the job position categories were not statistically
associated with the behavior of submitting personal data and clicking the inserted link. In
accordance with the results of the logistic regression, the sociodemographic variables (i.e.,
age and race) were significant predictors for the dependent variable (falling for the phishing
campaign).
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter examined whether place manager interventions suppress crime
opportunities in the online domain. Previous research (e.g., Eck, 2002; Eck & Guerette,
2012; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2006; Roberts, 2007) provided strong support that changes in
place management strategies had the potential to decrease crimes in the physical space.
Kumaraguru et al. (2009), Sheng et al. (2007), and Nyeste and Mayhorn (2010) found that
a phishing prevention training could assist online users in preventing themselves from
phishing scam victimization. As such, this study hypothesized that a cybersecurity
awareness program deters online users’ risky behaviors, which could lead them to falling
for a phishing campaign. In this final section, the findings and policy implications, the
limitations of the study, and future research are discussed.
In alignment with the t-Test and Mann Whitney U-test analysis, the results of this
study indicate that the FIU cybersecurity training for the employees had a moderate effect
on the online users’ behaviors to engage in the phishing campaign email, but in the
133

direction opposite to what was hypothesized. To supplement these findings derived from
the -Test and Mann Whitney U-test, Logistic regression models were employed. To that
end, these regression models show that the treated group was more likely to engage in
clicking a faked link or submitting personal data than the comparison group. Currently, the
FIU community, especially the Division of Information Technology in collaboration with
the SANS institute and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or the U.S. National
Cybersecurity Alliance, has put their efforts into combating cybercrime (e.g., phishing
scam for online users at FIU). Despite their effort, the findings show that the cybersecurity
awareness training did not help to prevent participants from engaging in “falling for”
behaviors in the quasi-experimental phishing campaign derived from the FIU’s DIT. As
stated above, these results did not provide support that there is a link between the cyber
place management (cybercrime prevention training) and the reduction of cybercrime
incidents.
Unfortunately, this study was limited in explaining why the treated group was more
likely to fall for phishing scams rather than the comparison group did use this phishing
campaign data derived from the FIU’s DIT. The body of literature (Choi, 2008; Holt &
Bossler, 2009, 2013; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Reyns, 2013; Reyns & Henson, 2016)
found that greater exposure (e.g., time spent online, including shopping, playing video
games, emailing, using social networking media, using chat rooms, and instant messaging)
to motivated cyber offenders increases online users’ likelihood of being cybercrime
victimization. According to the results in Table 23, the treated group who participated in
the cybersecurity awareness program were 6 times more likely to open emails than the
comparison group. One possible explanation for these results is that, as shown in Table 23,
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the treated group might have been more likely to engage in online activities (i.e., emailing
and using social networking sites), than the comparison group was, increasing the
possibility of the treated group falling for the phishing campaign.
In spite of the conclusion of this study, the significance of cybersecurity awareness
practice cannot be overlooked. This is considering that many cybersecurity experts and
scholars assert that cybersecurity awareness education and training is one of the most
significant aspects of an institution’s security posture for individuals to effectively fight
against cyber threats (Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007; Abawjy, Thatcher, & Kim, 2008).
According to a European Cyber Security Perspective 2019 report, cutting-edge technology
cannot be the only remedy to mitigate the cybercrime phenomenon. The human element is
also a crucial component in the solution to disrupting cyber threats. As such, considering
that human factors still play a significant role in the ongoing development of cybersecurity
and protecting critical information infrastructures, it is important to note that cyber place
management strategies along with implementing cybersecurity awareness training, and a
resilient incident response system are all crucial means to effectively mitigating the
likelihood of cybercrime victimization and minimization of losses in an online setting.
Next, the findings of this study revealed that some sociodemographic factors such
as age, race, length of employment, and job category were associated with participants
falling for phishing tests. This analysis explained that the older generation was more
resistant to cyber deception than the younger generation; also, it suggested that individuals
who were in a higher job position and a longer period of employment were more likely to
engage in “falling for” behaviors during a phishing attack. In a broad sense, it seems
reasonable to expect that employees can be influenced by their subculture and attitude
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regarding cybercrime and cybersecurity issues in their work environment. Therefore, this
suggests that cyber place managers not only need to be considerate about external cyber
threats, but they also should concern themselves about whether employees are proactively
engaging in preventing cybercrime victimization through daily life, or what sort of
subculture in their community regarding cybersecurity and cybercrime exists in order to
improve their perception and attitude about cybersecurity awareness training.
Inevitably, the online training platform at FIU might face disadvantages with the
limited formatting of contents and the lack of interactivity. For example, the online training
platform was limited to effectively deliver the cybersecurity awareness contents along with
page-turning training and few videos. In accordance with the previous research (e.g.,
Holmberg, 2007; Kirtman, 2009; McCrory, Putnam, & Jansen, 2008; Menchaca, 2008),
active learning and participation are keys to effective teaching and learning. Thus, it can
be similarly applied to online teaching and learning to educate online users to effectively
deal with crime in the online domain.
Policy Implications. Although the findings of this study did not directly add to a
large body of evidence that cybersecurity awareness training is effective to proactively
encourage online users to avoid cybercrime victimization, this study can provide
significant implications for safer practices. With regard to practice, the findings suggest
that higher education institutions may need to improve the existing training program as a
pragmatic place management strategy so that it can actually help members of the university
community improve their knowledge and skills to wisely deal with cybercrime. In
particular, it is important to develop a tailored cybersecurity training program that can
apply to the university community. For example, higher education institutions can utilize
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a gaming platform for their cybersecurity awareness program. Cone, Irvine, Thompson,
and Nguyen (2007) and Labuschagne, Burke, Veerasamy, and Eloff (2011) found that an
interactive web-based game platform for cybersecurity awareness training was
exponentially more effective in improving the cybersecurity efficacy of general computer
users. It suggests that the use of gaming learning platforms can be successful in fully
supporting cybersecurity awareness programs. In short, it is a crucial moment for the
launching of a taskforce team from academia to the public and private sectors to develop
the best practices (e.g., anti-phishing games) that can make our community and society
more safe and secure from these risks.
Second, some of the sociodemographic factors were significant predictors for
cybercrime prevention strategies; therefore, these aspects must be considered once
cybersecurity managers implement their awareness program. Given this situation,
establishing a cybersecurity awareness culture and environment may be a prerequisite
condition in the enhancement of cybercrime prevention strategies. Online users’ attitude
and motivation towards cybersecurity guidelines, and the needs of cybersecurity awareness
training can be enforced by providing the user community with regular updates on stateof-the-art cybercrime information and cybersecurity issues (Abawajy, Thatcher, & Kim,
2008). Current efforts (i.e., Ransomware Attacks Alert, Email Scams Alert, Security Alert:
Update Your Zoom for Mac Application) derived from the FIU Division of Information
Technology are good examples to build this cybersecurity awareness culture (see Appendix
E). Thus, taken as a whole, this proactive and holistic approach can create an institutional
environment where people encourage each other to have preventative actions and attitudes.
In a broad sense, the tactics for phishing campaigns and cyber fraud have changed so
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quickly and continuously. As a result, the more place managers and members in higher
education are aware of the various and novel methods of phishing campaigns, the more
online users in higher education can accurately disrupt cybercriminals’ opportunities.
Accordingly, cyber place managers (i.e., cybersecurity officers in universities) can develop
or apply more agile real-time detection systems or behavioral-pattern threat detection
systems for identifying the emerging phishing campaign or other types of cybercrime.
Because the trends of cybercrime change and turn over so quickly, notification of a novel
cybercrime is necessary for online users. Additionally, higher education institutions in
collaboration with law enforcement agencies (e.g., FIU Police Department, the United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team [CERT], Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency [CISA] of the Department of Homeland Security), need to quickly
disseminate this information to online users as soon as cybersecurity officers identify it.
Limitations. The present study also has several limitations. First, because the
selection of the treatment group individuals was voluntary and not randomly assigned, it
is possible that there are inherent differences between them and the comparison group.
These differences could be what is responsible for the findings reported herein. However,
because the multivariate logistic regression analyses revealed very few differences among
the control variables overall, this seems less likely to be case. Nonetheless, it is possible
that there exists an inherent difference between the treatment group individuals and
comparison group individuals along with their online habits. For example, the treatment
group might have been more likely to engage in online activities (i.e., using email and
social media sites) than the comparison group. Consequently, their active online
behaviors might facilitate the treatment group individuals to have greater chances for
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opening the phishing email, clicking the inserted link, and submitting personal
information than the comparison group individuals. Unfortunately, this study was limited

in measuring the activeness of online activities for individuals in the treatment and
comparison groups. In short, future studies can consider revealing whether there are
relationships between cybersecurity awareness training, online behavior, and falling for
phishing scams in order to enhance the validity of research design.
Second, similar to Caputo et al.’s (2014) study, this study was limited to

observing the difference of “falling for phishing scams” among participants who
completed the cybersecurity awareness program. This is because 2000 participants who
completed the training were selected by the FIU’s DIT staffs and there was no
identifiable information to determine how long the training effect lasts. For example,
someone who completed the training on November 1, 2018 as opposed to a participant
who completed the training on April 25, 2019. Given this, there may be a gap for
remaining effectiveness of the FIU’s cybersecurity awareness training between those
participants. Thus, this study was not able to clarify how much of an impact the training
has lasted in enhancing participants’ preventative behaviors during the phishing scam
trial.
Third, this research was limited to accurately determine all the participants’ click
rates and submitted data rates because the rate of participants’ response to the phishing
campaign email was unexpectedly low. For example, the first 1000 phishing email trial had
been executed to determine the participants’ response between May 15 and 18, 2019; the
second 1000 phishing email trial collected the participants’ responses between May 17 and
21, 2019. In particular, even if all the participants received the phishing email trial, 1183
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(59.2%) out of 2000 individuals did not open this email during the trial. Unfortunately, this
study was unable to exactly point out why the participants’ response to the phishing
campaign emails in this study was low when compared to the existing studies (i.e.,
Kumaraguru et al., 2009). This raises the question of how Kumaraguru et al.’s study
retained such high rate of participants’ response to the phishing campaign emails in their
study. In this case, Kumaraguru et al.’s (2009) study held a long-term retention period
(i.e., 28 days), it might be a sufficient amount of time to determine all the participants’
exact response rates. Specifically, Kumaraguru and colleagues designed it to send the 7
simulated phishing emails for 28 days. Moreover, the participants of the treated groups
(343 out of 515) in Kumaraguru et al.’s study have received the phishing emails right
before- or after- the phishing awareness training within 28 days. To that end, it might
increase the participants’ response rates to the phishing email.
As discussed above, lastly, the findings of this study were unable to reveal the
explanation why the treated group was more likely to fall for the phishing campaign rather
than the comparison group. In a study of “Online training: An evaluation of the
effectiveness and efficiency of training law enforcement personnel over the Internet,”
Schmeekle (2003) found that no meaningful learning differences occurred between the
online training group and the classroom training group. More importantly, the online
training group reported lower motivation and positive feelings concerning their training
course than did the classroom group. In line with Schmeeckle’s findings, it is possible to
explain that although the treated group have participated in the FIU’s cybersecurity online
training course, they might not pay attention to the training contents and materials so that
its online training was not as effective an instructional method as classroom training.
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Future research should attempt to accurately design and implement methods to
reduce these weaknesses discussed above. Also, future studies can consider evaluating the
effectiveness of cybersecurity awareness programs similar to that of Rezgui and Marks’
(2008) study, through more diverse methods (e.g., survey-based questionnaire, observation,
interview, and systematic document review). In addition, future studies can evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiencies of online training as it compared to classroom training for
cybersecurity awareness courses through the measuring of trainees’ learning outcome,
motivation, and attitudes.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: PROJECTION OF THE CYBERCRIME TRIANGLE
In the age of unprecedented information inundation, the global community is facing
emerging challenges. Internet and information technology systems provide cybercriminals
great opportunities to exploit online users all over the globe. In this sense, due to the global
nature of crime, cyber adversaries attack suitable targets located in different real-world
time zones without border controls. Therefore, global cyber threats trigger direct and
indirect damages to the economic well-being and national/international security.
To effectively combat against these growing state-of-the-art cyber threats, it is
important to apply a holistic framework as a cybercrime prevention strategy. Many
criminologists (Madesen & Eck, 2013; Wilcox & Cullen, 2018) assert that if criminals are
properly handled, suitable targets are protected, or places are well-guarded, crime can be
discouraged. Although previous studies have focused on elaborating and empirically
testing the crime triangle framework rooted in the notion of Routine Activity Theory (RAT)
to establish crime control strategies, to date, there is no empirical study to apply the crime
triangle concept to cybercrime prevention strategies. The main purpose of this dissertation
was to fill this gap in the literature by empirically exploring and proposing the cybercrime
triangle framework to help establish a solid blueprint of cybercrime prevention strategies.
This conclusion chapter is divided into four major areas. It begins with a layout of
the dissertation, and then address the contributions of this dissertation. Also, this chapter
examines the implications of the research approach in terms of design limitations and the
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adequacy of the theoretical framework. Lastly, the future research in this area of study is
discussed.
Layout of Dissertation
This dissertation sought to magnify the lens of the cybercrime triangle framework
in order to understand why and how each element of cybercrime triangle dynamics
(motivated offender, suitable target, and place) has connected each other in the virtual
world. In order to answer this question, a quantitative research methodology was employed
to provide more perspective linking cybercrime offenses to cybercrime victimization and
place management strategies.
This dissertation was organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on the
topic examined in this study. This was followed by a look into the overall trends in
cybercrime over 18 years. It also included a review of the literature linking (1) routine
activity theory to cybercrime and (2) crime triangle tenets to crime. Furthermore, a
discussion of the theoretical background of routine activity and the crime triangle
framework for cybercrime events was specifically reviewed. The second chapter concluded
with the identification of gaps in the research literature and the importance of the
application of the crime triangle to cybercrime.
In Chapter 3, this study explored the characteristics of cybercriminals via a criminal
profiling method using criminal record documents (i.e., indictments/complaints) collected
from the FIU Law School library website. This study used descriptive and regression
models to provide answers to the questions of which, what, where, and how cybercrime
offenders attacked suitable targets in the United States. After conducting a cybercriminal

143

profiling analysis, this study delineated the situational/opportunity factors, attack severity,
geographic factors, and sociodemographic background factors.
In Chapter 4, the associations between cybercrime victims, digital capable
guardians, perceived risk of cybercrime, and online activity were examined using
Eurobarometer survey data. This phase used a cross-sectional design to reveal the nature
of cybercrime victimization. The findings of the correlation and regression analyses were
discussed. A discussion of the results, conclusions, and limitations of the study closed
chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, the association between place management activities and cybercrime
prevention was examined using “Phishing Campaign” and “Cybersecurity Awareness
Training Program” related data derived from FIU’s information technology division. This
phase employed a quasi-experimental design. The data was analyzed by t-test, Mann
Whitney U-test, logistic regression methods to evaluate the effectiveness of phishing
prevention training program at FIU. The results of the effectiveness of the cybercrime
prevention program were then presented.
Contributions and Implications
This section discusses the contributions of this dissertation. Importantly, the present
study provides support for the theoretical, methodological, and practical extensions of
criminological research to explain cybercrime phenomenon and cybercrime prevention.
First, the RAT approach contributes significantly to the theoretical framework of the
cybercrime triangle framework. The application of this concept provides some holistic
insight into the cybercrime triangle mechanisms to effectively deal with cyber threats in
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information era. RAT suggests that cyber offenses are influenced by situational factors and
crime opportunity factors; moreover, cyber threats can be prevented by digital capable
guardians and place management tactics. In other words, if appropriate prevention
strategies executed by capable guardians and place managers were in the virtual world,
cyber offenders are unable to obtain and use the crime opportunities for achieving their
vicious purposes. Although the importance of criminological theory into cybercrime and
cybersecurity fields have been considered, the lack of criminological theory has been rarely
applied to devise an effective blueprint of cybercrime prevention strategies. Thus, one of
the contributions of the current study is the importation and advocation of criminological
theories (e.g., RAT, crime triangle framework) for cybercrime research.
Second, this research is grounded on new analytic models that reveal uncovered
social contexts such as cyber offending and the perceived risk of cyber-threats. To date,
there is no study to conduct on the associations between cybercrime offending, situational
factors, and cybercrime opportunity factors through cybercriminal profiling analytic
framework. As such, this dissertation contributes significantly to providing a solid analytic
method to analyze cyber offending using the SSBACO Cybercriminal Profiling framework.
In addition, a large body of literature was reviewed testing the direct effects of digital
capable guardianship and online routine activity on cybercrime victimization. However,
few studies have examined this relationship through perceived risk of cyber-threat for
mediation effects. Given that situation, this study contributes to the existing literature via
an application of a new statistical approach in order to analyze the relationships between
cybercrime victimization and cyber offending, and human factor (i.e., perception of risk).
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Third, the practical contributions of this study stem mainly from the theoretical
importation of criminological theory into the cybercrime and cybersecurity fields.
Specifically, this study provides explicit explanations how the cybercrime triangle
perspective and framework lead to devise cybercrime preventions strategies in addressing
new forms of crime opportunity and offending in the virtual world. For example, in line
with the cybercrime triangle perspective, cyber place manager interventions and capable
guardianship suppress crime opportunities in the online domain, albeit of the intangible
variety (e.g., anonymity, collapse of spatial/temporal borders) of cyber environment. In this
regard, practitioners and organizations can utilize these examples derived from
criminology, such as a cyber place manager (i.e., information security official), enhancing
digital capable guardians over their computer/network systems and proving tailored
cybersecurity awareness trainings to improve individual online users’ preventive capacities.
In summary, this research has contributed to the knowledge of the cybercrime
prevention along with the theoretical, methodological, and practical extensions of
criminological research. It has shown that (1) cyber offending are related with situational
and crime opportunity factors; (2) increasing digital capable guardians and the use of
strategic management of cyber place can mitigate cybercrime victimization; (3) human
factor (perception of risk of cyber-threat) can enhance online users’ efficiency and
performance in preventing cybercrime victimization.
In alignment with these findings, this dissertation suggests three major policy
implications in the following dimensions:
1. The cybercriminal profiling analysis results indicate that the ‘SSBACO
Cybercriminal Profiling Model’ can be a scientific and useful method. This
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suggests that it can be to help law enforcement establish new lines of scrutiny
in cybercrime investigations.
2. The findings of this study provide significant implication of reinforcing the
level of perceived risk of cyber-threat. In a related sense, disseminating efforts
to improve the level of perceived risk of cybercrime (e.g., Cyber-Digital Task
Force Report provided by the U.S. Department of Justice) are key practices
to help online users to protect themselves against advanced cybercriminal
typology.
3. Although the findings of this study did not directly add to a large body of
evidence that cybersecurity awareness training is effective to proactively
encourage online users to deal with cybercrime, the findings suggest that
organizations may need to improve the existing training program as a
pragmatic place management strategy. To that end, it can actually help online
users improve their knowledge and skills to wisely deal with cybercrime.
Limitations and Future Research
Despite the contributions of this study, there are several issues that were pointed
out as the limitations of this research. In this section, the limitations of this study and future
research are discussed. There were theoretical and methodological issues in this study. First,
this study relies primarily on a new integrated theoretical (cybercrime triangle) perspective
so that the existing literature might be limited to directly provide enough suggestions and
construct on the theoretical background of cybercrime triangle framework. The lack of
conceptual sophistication is evidence when discussing the issue of cyber offending in
Chapter 3. Second, this study used limited data (e.g., court record documents, cross147

sectional datasets, and dichotomized measure of survey items) to reveal causal factors of
cyber offending and cybercrime victimization. For instance, a series of cross-sectional
datasets utilized in this study were unable to reveal the time-ordering causal effects.
Future research should strive to properly design and implement research methods
to reduce these weaknesses discussed above. First and foremost, further research should
address the theoretical shortcomings of the cybercrime triangle model. Another area for
future research should be to apply the relevant theoretical concepts and propositions to
explain cyber offending and cyber place management. Finally, the current study concludes
that the key strategy to combat cybercrime is that experts from government, law
enforcement, private sector, and academia need to closely work together to discuss and
coordinate strategies to reduce cyber threats. Through the application of the cybercrime
triangle framework to cybercrime events, the findings of this study are expected to benefit
the global community and strengthen efforts to effectively fight against malicious and
state-of-the-art cybercriminals.
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Note
1. Definitions of Key Terms for Cybercrime Typology
To better understand cybercrime typology, the top 10 types of cybercrime utilized
over the 17 years need to be briefly discussed as the followings: 1) auction fraud, 2) nondelivery fraud, 3) Nigerian letter fraud, 4) credit/debit card fraud, 5) identity theft, 6)
financial institution fraud, 7) FBI scams, 8) romance scams, 9) real estate fraud, and 10)
ransomware scams.
“Auction fraud” is defined as “a fraudulent transaction or exchange that occurs in
the context of an online auction site” (IC3, 2009, p. 17). “Non-delivery fraud” can be
defined as an incident in which customers purchase goods in online markets, but they never
receive it. “Nigerian letter fraud” is defined as an act in which Nigerian criminals send an
unsolicited email message, in which the criminals give the recipient guarantee to obtain a
vast amount of money. At the same time, the criminals request the recipient to transmit “an
advance fee or offer identity, credit card or bank account information” (IC3, 2007, p.19).
“Credit/debit card fraud” is defined as a fraudulent act that purposes to achieve anything
of monetary gain via any unauthorized use of a credit/debit card. “Identity theft” is defined
as an illicit behavior that steals some individual’s identifying information: name, birth date,
social security number, credit/debit card number, etc. (IC3, 2007). “Financial institution
fraud” is defined as deviant behavior that is to defraud someone “to induce a business, an
organization through misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact” (IC3,
2007, p. 19). As discussed previously, “FBI scams” is defined as a fraudulent act that is to
request individual’s money, identity information, etc. by criminals who exploit the FBI or
government agents’ name (IC3, 2007). “Romance scams” is defined as an act in which
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perpetrators search individual targets on chat rooms, dating sites, and social networking
sites, and these criminals request victims to transmit money for helping their severe
hardships after a building-up relationship or companionship (IC3, 2013). “Real estate fraud”
is defined as a fraudulent act in which perpetrators exploit information from legal ads and
post this information on online advertising sites to attract potential victims; then these
criminals usually ask victims to send money overseas for purchasing houses (IC3, 2013).
“Ransomware scams” is defined as an act in which perpetrators send the virus to encrypt
computer database and files, and after encrypting these, they extort funds from victims by
intimidating them (IC3, 2013).
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Appendix A
Studies of Criminological Theories and Cybercrime
Authors/Theory

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Authors/Theory

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Al-Nemrat
(2010)/Routine
activity theory
(RAT)

DVs:

Quantitative
research
approach;
Confirmatory
factor
analysis;

Formal social
control and
awareness
(impact);

Choi (2008)/
Lifestyle-routine
activity theory
(L-RAT)

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Structural
equation
model;
Student
population

Digital
guardian
(+) →
Victim (-);

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Student
population

Digital
guardian (-)
→ Victim
(+); Risky
online
behavior
(+) →
Victim (+)

Exploratory
study;
Ordinary
least squares
(OLS)
regression;

Digital
guardian
(+) →
Victim (-);

Cybercrime
victimization (multiple
types)
IVs:

Online exposure
(+) → Victim (+);

IVs:

Digital guardian

Digital
guardian;
Online
lifestyle

(formal/informal social
control/target
hardening/awareness);
Online exposure
Arntfield
(2015)/ RAT

DVs:
Cyberbullying
victimization

Exploratory
study

Conceptualization

IVs:

Choi & Lee
(2017)/Cyberroutine activity
theory (CyberRAT)

Social media
environment; Capable
guardian

Back (2016)/
RAT

DVs:
Cyber-harassment
victimization
IVs:

Computercrime
victimization

DVs:
Cyberinterpersonal
violence
victimization
IVs:

Adequate
online
lifestyle (+)
→ Victim
(-)

Digital
guardian;
Online
lifestyle
Crosssectional
research
design;
Population

Digital guardian
(-) → Victim (+);
Risky online
behavior (+) →
Victim (+)
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Choi et al.
(2016)/CyberRAT

DVs:
Ransomware
victimization
IVs:

Adequate
online

Bossler & Holt
(2009)/ RAT

Digital guardian (target
hardening); Risky
online behavior

(aged 15 and
older)

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Student
population

Malware victimization
IVs:
Digital guardian (target
hardening); Risky
online behavior; Online
exposure

Digital guardian
(no impact);
Risky online
behavior (+) →
Victim (+);
Online exposure
(+) → Victim (+)
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Holt & Bossler
(2009)/L-RAT

Digital
guardian;
Online
lifestyle

Police
agencies

lifestyle (+)
→ Victim
(-)

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Student
population

Social
guardian (-)
→ Victim
(+);
Physical
guardian
(no
impact);

Cyberharassment
victimization
IVs:
Digital
guardian
(physical
guardian;
social
guardian);
Risky online
behavior

Risky
online
behavior
(+) →
Victim (+);
Online
exposure
(no impact)

Continued
Authors/Theor
y

Variables

Design/Dat
a

Conclusion

Authors/Theor
y

Variables

Design/Dat
a

Conclusion

Holt & Bossler
(2013)/RAT

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Student
population

Digital guardian

Leukfeldt
(2014)/RAT

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Structural
equation
model

Financial characteristics
(no impact);

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression

Remote purchasing
(+) → Victim (+);
Low self-control
(no impact)

Crosssectional
research
design;
Multivariat
e analysis;
Sample
(21,800
citizens
aged 15
years and
older)

Value (+) → Malware
victim (+);

Crosssectional
research
design;

Online exposure (+) →
Victim (+);

Malware
victimization
IVs:
Digital
guardian
(target
hardening);
Risky online
behavior;
Online
exposure

Holtfreter et al.
(2008)/L-RAT;
Self-control

DVs:
Fraud
victimization
IVs:

(mixed results);
Risky online
behavior (+) →
Victim (+);

IVs:
Financial
characteristics
; Online
exposure;
Antivirus
software;
Computer
knowledge;
Online risk
perception

Online exposure
(no impact)

Leukfeldt &
Yar
(2016)/RAT

DVs:
Phishing
victimization

DVs:
6 types of
cybercrime
victimization
IVs:

Remote
purchasing;
Low selfcontrol

Hutchings &
Hayes
(2008)/RAT

Phishing
victimization

Value;
Visibility;
Technical
guardian;
Personal
guardian
Crosssectional
research
design;

Email filters (+) →
Victim (-);

Marcum et al.
(2010)/RAT

Internet use (no
impact); Internet
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DVs:

Online exposure (no
impact);
Antivirus software (no
impact); Computer
knowledge/Online risk
perception (no impact)

Visibility (+) →
Hacking/malware/stalkin
g victim (+);
Technical guardian (no
impact);
Personal guardian (+) →
Hacking (-)

IVs:
Email filters;
Internet use;
Internet
banking

Kigerl
(2012)/RAT

DVs:
Spam rate;
Phishing rate
IVs:
Percent
Internet users;
Unemployment
; GDP per
capita

Logistic
regression;

banking (+) →
Victim (+)

Cyberharassment
victimization
IVs:
Online
exposure;
Target
suitability;
Protective
software

Exploratory
study;
Negative
binomial
regression

Internet users (+)
→ Spam/phishing
(no impact);
Unemployment (no
impact on
spam/phishing
victim)

Marcum et al.
(2010)/RAT

DVs:
Cyberbullying
victimization
IVs:
Online
exposure;
Parental
mediation

GDP
(+)→Spam/phishin
g victim (-)
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Logistic
regression;
Sample
(744
college
students)

Target suitability (+) →
Victim (+);

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample
(935 teens
ages 12-17
years)

Online exposure (+) →
Victim (+);

Protective software (no
impact)

Parental mediation
(mixed results)

Continued
Authors/Theo
ry

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Authors/Theor
y

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Navarro &
Jasinski
(2012)/RAT

DVs:

Quantitative
research
approach;
Confirmator
y factor
analysis

Formal
social
control and
awareness
(impact);

Reyns
(2015)/RAT

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample
(19,422
households)

Online
exposure (+)
→ Victim (+);

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample
(19,422
citizens aged
15 years or
older)

Online
exposure (+)
→ Victim (+);

Cybercrime
victimization
(multiple types)
IVs:
Digital guardian
(formal/informal/soci
al control/target
hardening/awareness)
; Online exposure

Pratt et al.
(2010)/RAT

DVs:
Internet fraud
victimization
IVs:
Routine online
activities; Personal
characteristics

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (922
adults)

IVs:

Online
exposure
(+) →
Victim (+)

Routine
online
activities
(+) →
Victim (+);

Phishing/hacking/malwa
re victimization

Online guardian; Online
exposure; Online target
suitability

Reyns &
Henson
(2016)/RAT

DVs:
Identity theft
victimization
IVs:

Personal
characterist
ics (no
impact)

Online exposure; Online
proximity; Online target
suitability; Online
guardian (target
harderning)

Online
guardian/onlin
e target
suitability
(mixed results)

Online
proximity (+)
→ Victim (+);
Online target
suitability (+)
→ Victim (+);
Digital
guardian (-) →
Victim (+)

Pyrooz et al.
(2015)/RAT

DVs:
Crime and deviance
online
IVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (418

Internet use
(impact);

Reyns et al.
(2011)/

Social
network
use
(impact);

Cyber
lifestyle-RAT
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DVs:
Cyberstalking
victimization
IVs:

Exploratory
study;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (974

Online
exposure/proxi
mity (weakest
effect)
Online target
suitability/guar

Internet use;
Social network use;
Technological
capacity

Reyns
(2013)/RAT

DVs:
ID theft victimization
IVs:
Online routine
activities; Individual
characteristics;
perceived risk of
victimization on
identity theft

current and
former gang
members)

Technologi
cal
capacity
(no impact)

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample
(5,985
citizens)

Online
routine
activities
(+) →
Victim (+);

Reyns et al.
(2016)/RAT

Online exposure; Online
proximity; Online target
suitability; Online
guardian; Online
deviance

college
students)

DVs:

Offline/online
guardian (no
impact);
Online target
hardening (+)
→ Victim (-)

Guardianship (offline
and online); Online
target hardening

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (850
college
students)

Cyberstalking
victimization
IVs:

Individual
characterist
ics
(impact);

dian (moderate
effect)
Online
deviance
(strongest
effect)

Perceived
risk of
victim (+)
→ Victim
(+)

Continued
Authors/Theo
ry

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Authors/Theor
y

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Navarro &
Jasinski
(2012)/RAT

DVs:

Quantitative
research
approach;
Confirmator
y factor
analysis

Formal
social
control and
awareness
(impact);

Reyns
(2015)/RAT

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample

Online
exposure (+)
→ Victim (+);

Cybercrime
victimization
(multiple types)
IVs:

Phishing/hacking/malwa
re victimization
IVs:

Online
exposure
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Online
guardian/onlin
e target

(+) →
Victim (+)

Digital guardian
(formal/informal/soci
al control/target
hardening/awareness)
; Online exposure
Pratt et al.
(2010)/RAT

DVs:
Internet fraud
victimization
IVs:
Routine online
activities; Personal
characteristics

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (922
adults)

Routine
online
activities
(+) →
Victim (+);

Reyns &
Henson
(2016)/RAT

Online guardian; Online
exposure; Online target
suitability

(19,422
households)

suitability
(mixed results)

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample
(19,422
citizens aged
15 years or
older)

Online
exposure (+)
→ Victim (+);

Identity theft
victimization
IVs:

Personal
characterist
ics (no
impact)

Online exposure; Online
proximity; Online target
suitability; Online
guardian (target
harderning)

Online
proximity (+)
→ Victim (+);
Online target
suitability (+)
→ Victim (+);
Digital
guardian (-) →
Victim (+)

Pyrooz et al.
(2015)/RAT

DVs:
Crime and deviance
online
IVs:
Internet use;
Social network use;
Technological
capacity

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (418
current and
former gang
members)

Internet use
(impact);

Reyns et al.
(2011)/

Social
network
use
(impact);
Technologi
cal
capacity
(no impact)

Cyberlifestyle
-RAT

DVs:
Cyberstalking
victimization
IVs:
Online exposure; Online
proximity; Online target
suitability; Online
guardian; Online
deviance
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Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample (974
college
students)

exposure/proxi
mity (weakest
effect)
Online target
suitability/guar
dian (moderate
effect)
Online
deviance
(strongest
effect)

Reyns
(2013)/RAT

DVs:
ID theft victimization
IVs:
Online routine
activities; Individual
characteristics;
perceived risk of
victimization on
identity theft

Crosssectional
research
design;
Logistic
regression;
Sample
(5,985
citizens)

Online
routine
activities
(+) →
Victim (+);

Holt &
Bossler
(2009)/L-RAT

DVs:
Cyber-threat
victimization
IVs:

Individual
characterist
ics
(impact);

Offline routine activities;
Digital routine activities;
Low self-control; Online
deviance

Perceived
risk of
victim (+)
→ Victim
(+)

Crosssectional
research
design;
Multilevel
multinomial
regression;
Sample
(6,896
citizens aged
16 years or
older)

Offline routine
activities and
digital routine
activities (no
impact);
Low selfcontrol (+) →
Victim (+);
Online
deviance (+)
→ Victim (+)

Continued
Authors/Theory

Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Williams
(2015)/RAT

DVs:

Crosssectional
research
design;
Multilevel
Poisson
regression;
Sample
(26,593
citizens)

Capable
guardian (mixed
findings);

Crosssectional
research
design;

Exposure-based
routine cell
phone activities
(+) → Victim

Identity theft
victimization
IVs:
Online routine
activities;
Capable
guardianship;
Physical
guardianship

Wolfe et al.
(2016)/RAT

DVs:
Sexting
victimization

Authors/Theor
y

Yar (2005)/
RAT

Physical
guardian (+) →
Victim (-);
Online routine
activities (+) →
Victim (+)
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Variables

Design/Data

Conclusion

Value; Inertia;
Visibility;
Accessibility;
Convergence in
space and time of
cyberspace

Exploratory
study

Conceptualization

IVs:
Exposure-based
routine cell
phone activities;
Supervisionbased routine
cell phone
activities

Logistic
regression;
Sample (800
teenagers
aged 12-17)

(+); Supervisionbased routine
cell phone
activities (+) →
Victim (+)
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Appendix B
Studies of Cybersecurity Awareness Program
Authors

Type

Methods

Findings

Authors

Type

Methods

Findings

Kruger &
Kearney (2006)

Web-based
review/
brochures &
company
magazine/

Vocabulary test

Effective

Kritzinger &
von Solms
(2010)

Conceptualization
for information
security
awareness model

E-learning

Not applicable

Pre-& postexperimental
study

Mixed

Hagen et al.
(2010)

E-learning

Pre-& postexperimental
study/ surveybased
questionnaire

Effective, but a
need for
repeated
training for
long-term
effects

posters
Chen et al.
(2006)

In-person
lecture/
Online lecture

Drevin et al.
(2007)

Value focused

Interview

Effective

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Survey-based
questionnaire

Exploring
users’ attitude,
normative
beliefs, and
self-efficacy
for
cybersecurity
programs

Furnell et al.
(2007)

Web-based
training modules

Survey-based
questionnaire

Ineffective

Labuschagne et
al. (2011)

Interactive game
hosted by social
networking sites

Game tool

Development
of a conceptual
prototype

Albrechtsen
(2007)

Mass-media
based awareness
campaigns/ userinvolving
approach

Interview

Mixed

Rantos et al.
(2012)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Descriptive
study

Development
of a conceptual
framework for
cybersecurity
awareness
evaluations
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Cone et al.
(2007)

Interactive video
game
(CyberCIEGE)

Game
evaluation tool

Effective

Furman et al.
(2012)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Interview

Users’
perceived risk
of cyberthreats, attitude
and awareness
to
cybersecurity

Charoen et al.
(2007)

Focus group
training

Survey-based
questionnaire/

Effective

Kim (2013)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Kruskal-Wallis
test

Users’
perceived risk
of cyberthreats, attitude
and awareness
to
cybersecurity

Interview

Power (2007)

Web-based
training modules

Survey-based
questionnaire

Not available

Mani et al.
(2013)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Survey-based
questionnaire/
interview

Users’
perceived risk
of cyberthreats, attitude
and awareness
to
cybersecurity

Rezgui &
Marks (2008)

No
cybersecurity
awareness
training

Survey-based
questionnaire/
Observation/
Interview/

Recommend
cybersecurity
awareness
program

Parsons et al.
(2013)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Survey-based
questionnaire

Users’
perceived risk
of cyberthreats, attitude
and awareness
to
cybersecurity

Recommend
cybersecurity
awareness
program

Caputo et al.
(2014)

Anti-Phishing
Web-based
training

Clicking on the
phishing link

Ineffective

Effective

Kumaraguru et
al. (2009)

Anti-Phishing
Web-based
training

Clicking on the
phishing link

Effective

Document
review
Furnell et al.
(2008)

Kruger et al.
(2010)

No
cybersecurity
awareness
training

Interview

Web-based
review/ 44

Vocabulary test

Computer
Science
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university
students
Talib et al.
(2010)

Web-based
review/
brochures &
company
magazine/

Computer
Science
Survey-based
questionnaire

Effective

Slusky &
Navid (2012)

No cybersecurity
awareness
training

Survey-based
questionnaire

posters

Users’
perceived risk
of cyberthreats, attitude
and awareness
to
cybersecurity

Studies on Evaluations of Gamification for Cybersecurity Awareness
Authors

Type

Methods

Findings

Authors

Type

Methods

Findings

Arachchilage
& Love (2013)

No
cybersecurity
awareness
training

Pilot study/

Effective

Gondree et al.
(2013)

Mobile board
game

Multi-player
assessment
(group study)

Effective, but
need for more
evaluation

Arachchilage
& Love (2014)

No
cybersecurity
awareness
training

Pilot study/

Effective

Dasgupta et al.
(2013)

Mobile puzzle
game

Assessment
based on
Puzzles

Effective

Nyeste &
Mayhorn
(2010)

Anti-Phishing
mobile gaming
application:
Training for
links (URL)
safety

Pre-& postexperimental
study

Effective

Denning et al.
(2013)

Web based
review

Survey of
teachers

Effective

Web based
gaming
applications

Review

Effective

Geers (2010)

Training
exercise with
virtual
attackers and
defenders

Review

Recommendations
for improved IT
infrastructure

Computer
Science

Psychology

Ariyapperuma
& Minhas
(2005)

Usability
questionnaire

Usability
questionnaire
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Kayali et al.
(2014)

Puzzle game

Experimental
study

Effective

Pastor et al.
(2010)

Multiple games

Review

Recommended
developing and
using more tools
in games

Irvine &
Thompson
(2003)

Web based
review

Review

Positive impacts
of games with
recommendations

Schweitzer &
Brown (2009)

Visual
presentation

Presentation
(Education)
case study

Positive
experience of
users in using
interactive
visualization

Sheng et al.
(2007)

Anti-Phishing
Training (game,
reading online
training)

Pre-& postexperimental
study

Effective

Ryan (2007)

No
cybersecurity
awareness
training

Survey-based
questionnaire

Users’ perceived
risk of cyberthreats, attitude
and awareness to
cybersecurity

Computer
science
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Appendix C
Cyber Criminal Profiles

Cybercriminal
profiles

Motive

Structure

Motivat
ion
level

Skill
level

Attack
severit
y

Crime (or
attack)
method

Cyberstalking/Cy
berbullying
perpetrators

Entertainme
nt/

Unorganized

Low to
high

Basic
to
interme
diate

Low to
mediu
m

SNS/

Unorganized

Mediu
m to
high

Basic
to
interme
diate

Low to
high

Child porn/
sexual
solicitation

personality
disorder/

hacking
tools

extortion
Online sexual
perpetrators

Entertainme
nt/Personali
ty disorder/
extortion

Online illegal
trader

Monetary
gain

Unorganized
with some
level of
collaboration

Mediu
m to
high

Interm
ediate

Mediu
m

Dark/
Crypto
currency/
Hacking
tools

Cybercrime
syndicates

Monetary
gain

Organized/
Well-funded

High

Interm
ediate
to
advanc
ed

Mediu
m to
high

Phishing/
Spamming/
Malware

Hackers

Monetary
gain/
Entertainme
nt/

Unorganized
with some
level of
collaboration

Mediu
m

Highly
advanc
ed

Mediu
m to
high

Malware/
Botnet/
/DDoS/
Ransomwar
e

Cyber spices

Espionage/
IP theft

State
sponsored/
Highly
organized/
Well-funded

High

Highly
advanc
ed

Critical

Customized
codes/
Zero-day
attacks/
Spyware

Cyber terrorists

Monetary
gain/
Entertainme
nt/ Political
hacktivism

State
sponsored/
Organized/
Well-funded/
Work in small
modules

High

Highly
advanc
ed

Critical

Botnet/
Stuxnet/
DDoS/
Ransomwar
e

189

Codebook Instructions for Cybercriminal Profiling
1. Offender name

e.g., Charles Edward

2. Offender sex

If 0 = female, 1 = male

3. Offender age

Age of apprehension/trial (e.g., 28)

4. Offender type

0 = individual cybercriminal
1 = hacking group (i.e., Anonymous group)
2 = organized cybercriminals (i.e., Mafia, Drug
cartels, etc.)
3 = state-sponsored cybercriminals (i.e.,
hackers sponsored by Russian government or
Chinese government, or North Korean
government)

5. Offender geo location/nationality

City (i.e., Maimi) and state (i.e., FL) or
Nationality (i.e., Nigeria):
If 0 = USA; 1 = Argentina; 2 = Australia; 3 =
Bangladesh; 4 = Belgium; 5 = Brazil; 6 =
Cameron; 7 = Canada; 8 = Chez Republic; 9
= China; 10 = Croatia; 11 = Estonia; 12 =
Finland; 13 = France; 14 = Georgia; 15 =
Germany; 16 = Hungary; 17 = India; 18 =
Iran; 19 = Ireland; 20 = Israel; 21 = Italy; 22
= Japan; 23 = Kosovo; 24 = Lithuania; 25 =
Malaysia; 26 = Mexico; 27 = Moldova; 28 =
Netherland; 29 = Nigeria; 30 = North Korea;
31 = Pakistan; 32 = Poland; 33 = Philippine;
34 = Romania; 35 = Russia; 36 = Saudi
Arabia; 37 = South Africa; 38 = South
Korea; 39 = Spain; 40 = Sweden; 41 =
Taiwan; 42 = Thailand; 43 = Turkey; 44 =
UK; 45 = Ukraine; 46 = Vietnam; 47 =
Colombia ; 48 = Venezuela; 49 = Ecuador; 50
= Algeria; 51 = Morocco; 52 = Uruguay; 53 =
Latvia; 54 = Lebanon; 55 = Belarus; 56 =
Dominican Republic; 57 = Egypt; 58 =
Kazakhstan; 59 = Greece; 60 = Macedonia;

6. The type of target

If 1 = private
2 = business sector (e.g., company, bank,
news media company, etc.)
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3 = government/military
7. Cybercrime method utilized

If 0 = Vandalism (i.e., defacement; sabotage),
1 = Denial of Service
(i.e., DDoS; zombies; botnets)
2 = Intrusion
(i.e., unauthorized access; ransomware scams;
Trojans; trapdoors; backdoors; identity theft;
intellectual property theft; cyber-espionage)
3 = Infiltration
(i.e., worms; virus; sniffers; logic bombs; and
keystroke loggings)
4 = Extortion and Exploitation
(i.e., sex solicitation; intent of purchasing sex;
harassing with constant messages or sexual
images/videos; sexting; revenge pornography;
spreading rumors; stalking social networking
accounts; cyberbullying; cyber-harassment)
5 = Deception
(i.e.,
phishing;
spear-phishing;
social
engineering scams; financial institution
scheme;
investment
scheme;
internet
confidence scheme; online auction scheme;
online dating scheme; the Nigerian 419
scheme).
6 = Online illegal trade
(i.e., drug trafficking; organ trafficking; illegal
weapon/counterfeit trades; stolen personal
information trade)
7 = Cyberterrorism
(i.e.,
using
encrypted
communication
technology for terrorism; using cyber-resources
for terrorist recruitment and propaganda; using
cyberspace to financial support for terrorist
group)
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8. Offender motivation

If 0 = revenge
1 = exposure
2 = hacktivism (cyberterrorism): due to
political or ideological or religious reasons
3 = ego
4 = monetary gain
5 = entertainment
6 = personality disorder
7 = extortion and exploitation
8 = blackmail
9 = sabotage
10 = espionage
11 = information warfare
12 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Exposure)
13 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Hacktivism/Cyberterrorism)
14 = Mixed motivations (Revenge + Ego)
15 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Monetary gain)
16 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Entertainment)
17 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Personality disorder)
18 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Extortion/Exploitation)
19 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Blackmail)
20 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Sabotage)
21 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Espionage)
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22 = Mixed motivations (Revenge +
Information warfare)
23 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Hacktivism)
24 = Mixed motivations (Exposure + Ego)
25 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Monetary gain)
26 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Entertainment)
27 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Personality disorder)
28 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Extortion/Exploitation)
29 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Blackmail)
30 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Sabotage)
31 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Espionage)
32 = Mixed motivations (Exposure +
Information warfare)
32 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism + Ego)
33 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Monetary gain)
34 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Entertainment)
35 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Personality disorder)
36 = Mixed motivations
+Extortion/exploitation)

(Hacktivism

37 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Blackmail)
38 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Sabotage)
39 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Espionage)
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40 = Mixed motivations (Hacktivism +
Information warfare)
41 = Mixed motivations (Ego + Monetary
gain)
42 = Mixed
Entertainment)

motivations

(Ego

+

42 = Mixed motivations (Ego + Personality
disorder)
43 = Mixed motivations
Extortion/Exploitation)

(Ego

+

44 = Mixed motivations (Ego + Blackmail)
45 = Mixed motivations (Ego + Sabotage)
46 = Mixed motivations (Ego + Espionage)
47 = Mixed motivations (Ego + Information
warfare)
48 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Entertainment)
49 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Personality disorder)
50 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Extortion/Exploitation)
51 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Blackmail)
52 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Sabotage)
53 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Espionage)
54 = Mixed motivations (Monetary gain +
Information warfare)
55 = Mixed motivations (Entertainment +
Personality disorder)
56 = Mixed motivations (Entertainment +
Extortion/Exploitation)
57 = Mixed motivations (Entertainment +
Blackmail)
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58 = Mixed motivations (Entertainment +
Sabotage)
59 = Mixed motivations (Entertainment +
Espionage)
60 = Mixed motivations (Entertainment +
Information warfare)
61 = Mixed motivations (Personality
disorder + Extortion/Exploitation)
62 = Mixed motivations
disorder + Blackmail)

(Personality

63 = Mixed motivations
disorder + Sabotage)

(Personality

64 = Mixed motivations
disorder + Espionage)

(Personality

65 = Mixed motivations (Personality
disorder + Information warfare)
66
=
Mixed
motivations
(Extortion/Exploitation + Blackmail)
67
=
Mixed
motivations
(Extortion/Exploitation + Sabotage)
68
=
Mixed
motivations
(Extortion/Exploitation + Espionage)
69
=
Mixed
(Extortion/Exploitation +
warfare)

motivations
Information

70 = Mixed motivations (Blackmail +
Sabotage)
71 = Mixed motivations (Blackmail +
Espionage)
72 = Mixed motivations (Blackmail +
Information warfare)
73 = Mixed motivations (Sabotage +
Espionage)
74 = Mixed motivations (Sabotage +
Information warfare)
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75 = Mixed motivations (Espionage +
Information warfare)
76 = Mixed motivations (more three
motivations on the list above)

9. Offender’s distance level from target

If 1 = Intra-city
2 = Inter-city
3 = Inter-state
4 = International

10. Accomplice (Y/N)

If 0 = no, 1 = yes

11. Damage or monetary loss

If 0 = none
1 = infrastructure damage
2= individual or business property damage
(including monetary loss)
3 = sexual abuse
4
=
psychological
harm/death

harm/physical

5 = mixed damages (infrastructure +
individual/business)
6 = mixed damages (infrastructure + sexual
abuse)
7 = mixed damages (infrastructure +
psychological/physical harm/death)
8 = mixed damages (individual/business +
sexual abuse)
9 = mixed damages (individual/business +
psychological/physical)
10 = mixed damages (sexual abuse +
psychological/physical/death)
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12. Severity scale of damage

5 = Critical network and infrastructure
destruction
Example - power grid hack, hydroelectric
dams shut down, indirect death
Notes - For this measure to be coded, a state’s
critical infrastructure must be breached and
the network manipulated so that widespread
functionality is disrupted for a significant
period of time. These efforts have to be
massive, impactful, and clearly intentional.
4 = Widespread government, economic,
military, or critical private sector theft of
information
Example - (US OPM hack, DoD employee
records stolen, IRS hack)
Notes –Phishing and intrusion espionage
campaigns that successfully steal large troves
of critical information, such as the OPM
hack.
3 = Stealing targeted critical information
Example - (Chinese targeted espionage,
government-sanctioned cybercrime, Sony
Hack)
Notes - This involves the use of intruding
upon a secure network and stealing sensitive
or secret information. The theft of Lockheed
Martin’s F-35 jet plans or the U.S.
Department of Defense’s strategy in the Far
East are examples or if the target was
critical to national security or the objective
of the attack had national security
implications. The piggy-back method is
another example of this severity type. The
United States’ NSA was able to piggy back
on China’s Byzantine Series undetected and
spy on the targets that the original espionage
was spying upon.
2 = Harassment, propaganda, nuisance
disruption
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Example - (Propagandist messages in
Ukraine, Vandalism, DDoS in Georgia,
Bronze Soldier dispute)
Notes–Mainly
vandalism
or
DDoS
campaigns, this measure is coded when
pockets of government or private networks
are disrupted for periods of time and normal
day to day online life is difficult, but
recoverable.
1 = Probing without kinetic cyber
Example - (US NSA dormant infiltrations)
Notes - Using cyber methods to breach
networks but not utilize any malicious
actions beyond that. Hacking a power grid
but not shutting it down, planting
surveillance technology within networks,
and unsophisticated probing methods are
examples of this severity level.
13. Damage type
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1.

Indirect and delayed. If intellectual
property is stolen by an initiator
and it becomes publicly available,
this may result in improved
competition for states or private
companies that did not have this
technology or advantage prior.
China stole the American
company’s F-35 jet plans, and if it
gave these plans to Russia, the
effects of this cyber incident would
be indirect, and the costs would be
felt at a future point in time.

2.

Indirect and immediate. Indirect in
this context means that the
damage done by the cyber
incident was not the original intent
of the initiator. The stealing of
confidential information from a
bank or a breach in the Wall Street
system is an example of this. The
costs of these incidents are felt
immediately. Reputational
damage or loss of confidentiality

is what to look for when coding
this damage.

14. Random violence

3.

Direct and delayed. Stuxnet was
intended to disrupt Iran’s nuclear
program by damaging the
centrifuges at the Natanz plant,
and it succeeded. The impact of
this attack took a number of
months if not years to slowly
disrupt and damage these
centrifuges through code
manipulation.

4.

Direct and immediate: The term
direct in this context means that the
damage done by the cyber incident
was what was intended by the
initiator and the costs of the cyber
incident are felt immediately. The
Russian DDoS attacks on Estonia’s
government and private networks
in 2007 is an example, as the
effective shutdowns cost millions
of dollars in lost revenue for the
Baltic country.

0 = randomly attack to victim/target
1 = intended attack to victim/target,

15. Victim age

Age when he/she was victimized (e.g., 36)

16. Victim sex

If 0 = female,
1 = male

17. Victim geographic location

City (i.e., Maimi) and state (i.e., FL)
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Regression Standardized Residual for Cybercrime Victimization
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